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Saudi Arabia has declared its post-oil economic plan: Vision 2030 seeks to make the 
Kingdom “a global investment powerhouse” and disentangle national economic growth from oil 
revenues. This dissertation argues that jurisdictions like Saudi Arabia that hope to foster hospitable 
environments for foreign investment and efficient trade systems must establish effective dispute 
resolution systems that all business parties can trust. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
mechanisms fit perfectly in this context. ADR has become increasingly prevalent and popular 
around the world; indeed, arbitration and other means of ADR have become universal methods for 
resolving disputes in international commerce. 
Determining whether the current ADR system in Saudi Arabia can support Vision 2030 
goals thus requires comprehensive investigation and analysis. This dissertation thoroughly 
examines the reasons that many continue to perceive the Kingdom as inhospitable to ADR, 
identifying the root causes and analyzing their consequences. It also emphasizes the need for 
creating an effective ADR system in the Saudi jurisdiction. It evaluates the current status of ADR 
in the Kingdom by comparatively and critically analyzing the reality of ADR processes in the 
Saudi legal system and identifies possible strategies for expanding and improving ADR practices 
within that system. It offers multiple levels of analysis, comparing the Saudi system and experience 
to those of some leading jurisdictions around the world. The dissertation argues that, at the national 
level, implementing a clear and effective ADR system will benefit the public system of justice in 
many ways. The use of ADR in traditional courts via specialized public agencies as well as in other 
private bodies, if implemented within in a clear legal framework, will, for instance, positively 




“access to justice.” The dissertation examines and answers the following research questions: (1) 
What is the current status of the Saudi dispute resolution system? (2) Does the dispute resolution 
system in Saudi Arabia need to find, “a better way”? (3) If so, can ADR contribute positively to 
the system’s reform? (4) What are the benefits of creating a clear ADR legal framework? (4) 
Should ADR be a part of the many legal reform initiatives concerning the justice system in Saudi 
Arabia? (5) What law and practice reforms will enhance the functionality of ADR instruments? 
(6) What lessons do the experiences of some of the world’s leading jurisdictions in the field of 
ADR provide? (7) What role can education play in the development of ADR in Saudi Arabia? (8) 
How can institutionalization contribute to the growth of ADR in the Saudi jurisdiction?  (9) What 
aims should the Kingdom establish in this area and how should it endeavor to accomplish them? 
This dissertation fills the gap in the current scholarly literature by accomplishing several 
objectives. It highlights, for example, the importance of having a clear ADR framework, 
addressing the benefits of structuring and regulating ADR methods in the Kingdom. It also 
emphasizes that implementing an effective and efficient ADR legal framework will require 
reforms in many areas. 
The dissertation consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1 serves as in introduction; it provides 
general background information regarding the subject of the dissertation, stating the central 
problem it addresses and specifying its aims. Chapter 2 contextualizes the dissertation’s subject 
and examines the history and development of ADR in both the Saudi jurisdiction and several 
leading jurisdictions. It also explains the concept of justice in Islamic law, which is crucial to 
understanding the evolution of the Saudi system of justice and comparing current practice to its 
root. Chapter 3 provides a comprehensive critical analysis of arbitration-related law and practice 




practices in the United Kingdom and the United States. Chapter 5 comprehensively examines the 
role of education in the development of ADR in Saudi Arabia and discusses the findings of a 
survey conducted on ADR instruction in Saudi law schools. Chapter 6 analyzes the benefits of 
institutionalizing ADR in the Saudi legal system, outlining the improvements required to ensure 
effective implementation, explaining why and how the Kingdom should take the steps in question, 
and identifying what it should seek to reinforce, alter, and avoid. Chapter 7 concludes the 
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 “My Primary goal is to be an exemplary and leading nation in 
all aspect, and I will work with you in achieving this 
endeavor…”  
-King Salman Bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud 
1. Overview 
Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil exporter, has become a global leader in efforts to 
reduce fossil fuel-dependence by declaring its post-oil economic plan. The Kingdom unveiled 
Vision 2030 in early 2016, establishing a roadmap for gradually mitigating its dependence on oil.1 
Vision 2030 aims to prepare Saudi Arabia for the post-oil era by implementing initiatives to 
continue to achieve sustainable growth, maintain national gains, and ensure that the Kingdom 
retains its global economic standing. It thus outlines the way forward for the Saudi economy and 
creates a clear framework for future growth free from oil and the reliance on its revenues. 
Investment is the key mechanism of this plan for the Kingdom’s future growth and 
development. Attracting international investment is thus among the country’s current objectives 
for achieving the desired economic results by the year 2030. His Royal Highness the Crown Prince 
of Saudi Arabia Mohammed Bin Salman has stated the following: 
… The second pillar of our vision is our determination to become a global 
investment powerhouse. Our nation holds strong investment capabilities, which we 
will harness to stimulate our economy and diversify our revenues.2 
 
Vision 2030 embraces the Crown Prince’s representation of the country’s endeavors regarding the 
utilization of its resources and capabilities. It specifies, for example, that the Kingdom aims to 
                                                 
1 Saudi Vision 2030, available at: https://vision2030.gov.sa/en (last visited Dec 10, 2018). 
2 The full text of the Forward by His Royal Highness Prince Mohammed Bin Salman is available at: 
https://vision2030.gov.sa/en/foreword (last visited Dec 17, 2018). 
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create a diversified economy, enhancing its worldwide competitiveness and boosting its capacity 
as “an integral driver of international trade.”3 Saudi Arabia is no stranger to international trade and 
investment, but its newly professed objectives require a serious and comprehensive evaluation 
focused on identifying necessary reforms in all relevant sectors so that the Kingdom can 
successfully and confidently proceed with its future plan. Such an evaluation will facilitate the 
accomplishment of the objectives mentioned above. The Saudi dispute resolution system, which, 
of course, involves both the public and private justice systems in the Kingdom, is among the areas 
in need of examination; its ability to efficiently support the achievement of Vision 2030 goals must 
undergo careful and thorough analysis. 
The complexities of the contemporary business environment and the current boom in 
international trade have led parties involved in international commerce and business transactions 
to resolve contractual disputes privately via methods of alternative dispute resolution (ADR).4 The 
increased use of ADR in resolving commercial disputes has arguably also contributed substantially 
to the ongoing acceleration and expansion of international trade.5 The top global corporations have 
shown a significant tendency toward the use of ADR to resolve various disputes in recent decades.6 
Some scholars have argued that certain economic-related motives have fueled this tendency as 
companies search for time- and cost-efficient ways to resolve business conflicts.7 The fact that 
                                                 
3 Saudi Vision 2030, supra note 1. 
4 See e.g., LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, (Alan Redfern, Martin Hunter, & 
Nigel Blackaby eds., 4. ed, 2004). 
5 Michael F. Hoellering, Alternative Dispute Resolution and International Trade, - N. Y. UNIV. REV. LAW SOC. 
CHANGE 785. 
6 See generally DAVID B. LIPSKY, RONALD LEROY SEEBER & RICHARD D. FINCHER, EMERGING SYSTEMS FOR 
MANAGING WORKPLACE CONFLICT: LESSONS FROM AMERICAN CORPORATIONS FOR MANAGERS AND DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION PROFESSIONALS (1st ed. 2003); Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the Vanishing Trial: The Growth 
and Impact of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1 J. EMPIR. LEG. STUD. 843 (2004); Thomas J. - Stipanowich & J. 
Ryan - Lamare, - Living with ADR: Evolving Perceptions and Use of Mediation, Arbitration, and Conflict 
Management in Fortune 1000 Corporations, - HARV. NEGOT. LAW REV. 1. 
7 David B Lipsky & Ronald L Seeber, The appropriate resolution of corporate disputes: A report on the growing 
use of ADR by US corporations (1998). 
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ADR techniques offer disputing parties more control over dispute resolution processes has also 
helped popularize the use of these techniques among international corporations.8 Scholars have 
identified various additional motives for the increased use of ADR. Michael Hoellering, for 
example, writes:  
Why are alternatives to the courts so important to the resolution of international 
trade disputes? Primarily because ADR provides a neutral ground for parties of 
mixed nationalities, with different ethnic and legal systems, to resolve their 
controversies without fear of subjectivity by the court system of the forum state. 
Many disputants also find important the privacy and confidentiality associated with 
most ADR mechanisms. ADR has the further advantage over litigation of resolving 
disputes with less damage to ongoing business relations.9    
 
Countries seeking to attract international foreign investment by fostering hospitable 
environments and successful trade systems must recognize the importance of establishing effective 
dispute resolution systems that all business parties can trust. ADR mechanisms fit perfectly in this 
context. Arbitration, for example, has become the popular consensually agreed-to means of 
resolving contractual disputes between parties involved in international commerce.10 Professor 
Thomas Carbonneau once remarked that the current significance of arbitration for international 
trade stems primarily from the fact that “business transactions cannot take place without a 
functional system of adjudication.”11 This suggests that arbitration enables and facilitates cross-
border and overseas trade for two main reasons. First, it provides a private neutral method that 
allows parties to choose applicable laws and forums, a feature that helps contracting parties 
overcome fears related to many issues such as vagueness and ambiguity in unfamiliar foreign laws, 
foreign public policy, or foreign legal systems on the one hand, and the potential biases or 
                                                 
8 Id. 
9 Hoellering, supra note 5. 
10 THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION xiii–xiv, 593–98 (5th ed. 2014). 
11 Id. at 593. 
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prejudices of foreign courts on the other.12 Second, it gives parties an effective and efficient 
method for resolving potential contract-related disputes, which enables them to continue their 
contractual relationships and to recommence the efficient fulfillment of their obligations. It thus 
minimizes the risks associated with the international business activities.13 
Other alternative means of dispute resolution—including mediation and conciliation, 
which have recently received increasing attention from and become popular among leading 
international corporations—provide comparable benefits.14 More than 4000 U.S. companies, for 
instance, have subscribed to the 1984 initiative of the International Institute for Conflict Prevention 
& Resolution (CPR),15 known as (CPR Corporate Pledge); the signatories of the CPR Corporate 
Pledge have all expressed their willingness to consider alternatives to litigation to resolve disputes 
arising between them prior to filing lawsuits.16 This amicable commitment to genuinely attempt to 
                                                 
12 Id. at 593–98; Also see generally GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY AND 
MATERIALS (2nd ed. 2001). 
 13 CARBONNEAU, supra note 10 at 593–98; (“The conduct of business across national boundaries already involves 
a high level of risk: Compliance with customs regulations, obtaining government permissions and licenses, the 
hazards of international transport, the different labor law regimes in foreign countries, and the variability 
and complexity of national import-export regulation. It is unlikely, therefore, that transborder commerce would 
take place at all if there were no effective adjudicatory mechanism for resolving the basic problems of commercial 
contracts (defining breach, assessing performance, enforcing timely delivery, measuring the impact of exculpatory 
allegations and yet other considerations).”) Id. at 594. 
14 See generally GERALD H. POINTON, ADR IN BUSINESS: PRACTICE AND ISSUES ACROSS COUNTRIES AND CULTURES 
(2011). 
15 CPR International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution, available at: http://www.cpradr.org/index (last 
visited Feb 3, 2019). See also POINTON, supra note 14 at 10–19. (“Corporations today increasingly make ADR 
part of their corporate governance. For example, more than 4,000 United States companies and 1,500 United States 
law firms have subscribed to the CPR Corporate Policy Statement on Alternatives to Litigation (the CPR 
‘Pledge’), expressing a readiness to consider resorting to ADR when disputes arise with other existing or future 
signatories. The CPR Pledge, and the fact that so many companies in so many different industries have signed it, 
shows the growing significance and permanence of ADR practice. This continued interest in ADR ensures that it 
is more than a passing fad, even though ADR is still not used uniformly, since it depends on the view of individual 
corporate decision maker. Lawyers and law firms are key drivers of ADR culture and are in the best position to 
set consistent ADR standards that provide the most effective use of this tool. …ADR offers the international 
business community and their legal advisers a possibility to resolve disputes through commercial settlements that 
are more relevant to a company's operations than obtaining justice as defined and provided by law.”) Id. at 17.  
16 A full list of the signatories to the CPR Corporate Pledge is available at: 
   https://www.cpradr.org/resource-center/adr-pledges/corporate-
policystatement/_res/id=Attachments/index=1/CPR%20Corporate%20Pledge%20Signatories.09.28.18.F.pdf 
(last visited Dec 25, 2018). 
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resolve contractual disputes by means other than litigation17 represents the contemporary spirit of 
commerce and reflects new trends in business-to-business relationships.18 The use of ADR means, 
such as mediation, has become a regular business practice. Steven J. Ware describes this trend as 
follows: 
Mediation of disputes among businesses seems to be growing. The variety 
of business contexts generating these disputes is endless: sales of goods and 
services, licenses of technology and intellectual property, real estate development 
and construction, franchising, financing through loans or securities, and so on. 
More and more business contracts include “two-step” ADR clauses, providing that 
the parties shall mediate any dispute that may arise and, if mediation fails to result 
in a settlement, the parties shall arbitrate the dispute.19 
 
The trends described above indicate that parties involved in international commerce now generally 
prefer to use arbitration and other alternative techniques to resolve contractual conflicts. 
Parties involved in other types of disputes have likewise begun using ADR methods. 
Examples of areas where ADR has proved effective both within and outside court systems include 
labor, family, neighbor, civil, and criminal disputes and cases.20 ADR methods have, in other 
words, proved beneficial and advantageous not only to disputants, but also to the system of justice 
itself, as subsequent chapters will explain in detail.  
2. Problem Description 
ADR has become increasingly relied-upon and popular throughout the world. Its various 
methods have become business-universal means of resolving international commerce-related 
disputes, comparable in a sense to the English language, which now serves as the universal 
                                                 
17 POINTON, supra note 14 at 10–19. 
18 See Id. (“Modern commercial expectation is that it is better to build for the future than to dwell on the past. In 
addition deals, as well as the results of dispute resolution, are considered particularly successful when the success 
is shared and everybody can bring something home for their own respective benefit.”) Id. at 10. 
19 STEPHEN J. WARE, PRINCIPLES OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 307 (2nd ed. 2007). 
20 See generally WARE, supra note 19. 
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language of business.21 The absence of clear and effective dispute resolution systems makes 
success in international business and trade highly unlikely. ADR is not alien to Muslim or Saudi 
practice. Saudi Arabia must, however, modernize its ADR system to align with international 
standards. This highlights the critical importance of evaluating the Kingdom’s current ADR system 
to identify the reforms necessary to make the country more business-friendly and help it attract 
international investors and leading global corporations to explore the promising opportunities it 
has to offer and thereby achieve the Vision 2030 goals. This dissertation therefore undertakes a 
thorough examination of the issues that currently make the Kingdom a less than hospitable 
jurisdiction for ADR, identifying these issues and analyzing their consequences. It thus emphasizes 
the need for creating a clear ADR system in the Kingdom. It also analyzes the current status of 
ADR in the Kingdom by undertaking a comparative and critical analysis of the reality of these 
processes in the Saudi legal system, ultimately producing recommendations for expanding and 
improving ADR practice. It offers multiple levels of analysis of the subject in question. To begin 
with, it comprehensively evaluates the Saudi ADR system based on the international scale of 
assessment. This involves comparing law and practice in the Saudi jurisdiction to other leading 
jurisdictions. A broad-based awareness of ADR mechanisms, their roles, and their effectiveness in 
the field, provides valuable lessons. This dissertation, therefore, reviews ADR methods, describing 
their emergence, importance, and current functions in leading jurisdictions such as the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere. Secondly, the dissertation includes two additional 
levels of comparison in its evaluation of the Kingdom’s current ADR system: it provides a 
comprehensive overview of ADR in the Kingdom, explaining its historical origins, emergence, 
and development, which serves as the basis for the dissertations critical analysis of contemporary 
                                                 
21 See e.g. Global Business Speaks English, available at: https://hbr.org/2012/05/global-business-speaks-english 
(last visited Dec 29, 2018). 
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law and practice; and it compares the Kingdom’s current ADR system to its origins in old Islamic 
practice.  
The dissertation emphasizes that, at the national level, implementing a clear and effective 
ADR system will benefit the Saudi public system of justice in many ways. The use of ADR within 
a clear legal framework in traditional courts, specialized public agencies, and other private bodies 
will, for instance, help improve the justice system by reducing court caseloads and enhancing 
“access to justice” in general. One of the major issues this dissertation considers whether the 
Kingdom can modernize its ADR system to align with international standards and global practices 
in accordance with both Islamic law and Saudi national laws. 
3. Aims and Motivations of the Research 
This dissertation fills the gap in current scholarship by accomplishing the following aims. 
First, it emphasizes the importance of having a clear ADR framework, outlining the benefits of 
structuring and regulating these methods in Saudi Arabia. Second, it emphasizes that implementing 
an effective and efficient ADR legal framework will require reforms in many areas. Third, it 
analyzes the effectiveness, efficiency, and appeal to foreign investors and parties to international 
trade of the Kingdom’s current ADR system. Fourth, it examines the Saudi investment climate 
from a legal prospective, illuminating how ADR methods can play a major role in improving the 
country’s standard business practices. Finally, it proposes numerous practical legal solutions and 
makes recommendations that will help the Kingdom overcome the problems it currently faces, 
enhance the status of its dispute resolution system, boost its global business status, and aid 
significantly in making the Saudi jurisdiction one of the most popular destinations for international 
business and trade.  
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4. Research Questions 
This dissertation proposes and answers the following research questions: 
 What is the current status of the Saudi dispute resolution system? 
 Does the dispute resolution system in Saudi Arabia need to find, 
“a better way”? 
 If so, can ADR contribute positively to the system’s reform?  
 What are the benefits of creating a clear ADR legal framework?  
 Should the many legal reform initiatives concerning the justice 
system in Saudi Arabia include ADR as a central issue?  
 What law and practice reforms will enhance the functionality of 
ADR instruments?  
 What lessons do the experiences of some of the world’s leading 
jurisdictions in the field of ADR provide? 
 What similarities and dissimilarities exist between modern 
principles of arbitration and the Islamic approach to dispute 
resolution?  
 How can Saudi Arabia boost its position in the field of arbitration 
and other ADR processes?  
 What role can education play in the development of ADR in Saudi 
Arabia?  
 What is the status quo of ADR instruction in Saudi law schools?  
 How can institutionalization contribute to the growth of ADR in 
the Saudi jurisdiction?   
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
32 
 
 What is the current status of ADR institutionalization in the 
Kingdom?  
 What aims should the Kingdom establish in this area and how 
should it endeavor to accomplish them? 
5. Organization of the Dissertation 
The dissertation consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1 sets the scene by providing a general 
overview of the subject of the dissertation, discussing its background, and stating the problem it 
focuses on. It then explains the aims of the study and describes its research questions. Subsequent 
chapters of this dissertation are organized as follows.  
Chapter 2 offers general background regarding ADR in the Saudi jurisdiction and traces 
the historical growth of ADR in some of the world’s leading jurisdictions. It contextualizes the 
subject in question by highlighting contemporary discussions regarding many central issues that 
subsequent chapters discuss in more detail. It discusses, moreover, the history and reality of ADR 
as well as the concept of justice under the Islamic law. 
Chapter 3 provides a comprehensive critical analysis of arbitration-related law and practice 
in the Saudi legal system. It examines arbitration’s historical development in the Kingdom and 
carefully analyzes the current legal framework. It distinguishes, moreover, between the modern 
principles of arbitration and similar approaches that developed in the Islamic system of dispute 
resolution. This comparison helps identify the methods implemented and practiced in the Saudi 
legal system under the recently enacted law of arbitration. Chapter 3 also discusses the reasons 
that the Saudi jurisdiction remains inhospitable to arbitration. It, in short, investigates the causes 
of current problems and provides legal recommendations to overcome said problems.  
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Chapter 4 derives several important lessons from the law and practice of arbitration in some 
of the world’s leading jurisdictions including the United Kingdom and the United States. It aims 
to elucidate how parties have practiced ADR methods in these top legal systems. The fundamental 
lessons extracted from the experiences of these countries will significantly improve the efficiency 
of arbitration in the kingdom. 
Chapter 5 investigates the role of education in the evolution of ADR in Saudi Arabia. This 
chapter discusses the results of a survey conducted on ADR instruction in Saudi law schools. It 
provides a detailed discussion and careful analysis of the survey’s findings. The survey aimed to 
inspire future efforts to comprehensively examine and analyze the field of ADR in the Kingdom 
with special focus in the effectiveness of role played by Saudi law in contributing to the 
development of legal education in the country. This chapter also compares ADR instruction in 
Saudi law schools to ADR instruction in American law schools. 
Chapter 6 addresses the institutionalization of ADR. It emphasizes that institutionalization 
efforts in the Kingdom have, thus far, proceeded too slowly and remain insufficient. It also 
highlights the growing significance of ADR institutionalization and the successful and favorable 
outcomes institutionalization has yielded in several other jurisdictions. The chapter thus highlights 
the need to take serious steps toward utilizing and institutionalizing ADR in Saudi Arabia’s public, 
administrative, and private sectors. It outlines the goals and improvements necessary to ensure 
effective implementation and explains why and how the Kingdom should take the steps in question 
and what it should seek to reinforce, alter, or avoid. 
Chapter 7, the final chapter, restates the dissertation’s main arguments, summarizes the 
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Humankind has needed to resolve differences and mediate conflicts since first establishing 
cities and engaging in trade with neighbors. Population growth and business expansion make 
disputes, both resolved and unresolved, more frequent.1 Such new conflicts can prove difficult to 
resolve because their emergence coincides with the complications surrounding their nature.2 
Disputes in recent years not only concern relationship problems between humans interacting in 
proximity; they also stem from virtual connections between people on both national and 
international levels.3 Different social values, cultural identities, or other distinguishing factors 
make the nature of such disputes, their severity, and the suitable means of resolving them vary 
between different groups, even within individual societies.4  
 Enlightenment philosopher Adam Ferguson defined societatis civilis as a peaceful society 
governed by laws.5 A civilized society thus gives the state a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
force and relies on the rule of law to minimize violent conflict between parties with disagreements. 
The state can intervene when civilians infringe on the rights of other civilians.6 Societal evolution 
fueled the emergence of courts as the primary means by which people resolve disputes, beginning 
in America and much of Europe. State control over dispute resolution gradually increased in 
popularity around that world, as states responded to growing demand by offering citizens access 
                                                 
1 GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON ADR, 4 (Carlos Esplugues Mota & Silvia Barona Vilar eds., 2014). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. (“From disputes arising from face-to-face relationships between parties, we are now increasingly seeing disputes 
between parties whose relationships are based upon electric communication rather than personal contact. Whereas 
in the past disputes commonly involved an international element. The object of these disputes has also changed, 
with an increasing number of them focusing on intangible rights”). 
4 SIMON ROBERT & MICHAEL PALMER, DISPUTE PROCESSES: ADR AND THE PRIMARY FORMS OF DECISION-MAKING 1 
(2d ed. 2005);  see generally OSCAR G. CHASE, LAW, CULTURE, AND RITUAL: DISPUTING SYSTEM IN CROSS-
CULTURAL CONTEXT (2005). 
5 An Essay on the History of Civil Society - Online Library of Liberty, available at: http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1428 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2015). 
6 MARY KALDOR, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY: AN ANSWER TO WAR (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2003). 




to courts and judicial procedures as instruments for resolving conflicts.7 Some societies, however, 
have experienced judicial system failures in recent years. The causes appear to vary based on time 
and place and to be influenced by structural and cultural norms. Some courts have worked to 
decrease case backlogs, while others have criticized these efforts as insufficient and lacking serious 
resolve.8 Justice Felix Frankfurter rightly remarked that “Justice must satisfy the appearance of 
justice,”9 and, in this spirit, even small improvements serve some purpose. 
This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of alternative dispute resolution in Saudi 
Arabia, covering its origins, emergence, and historical development. Effectively explaining this 
history also requires careful examination of the broader picture of alternative dispute resolution at 
both national and international levels. This chapter is structured as follows: section 2 introduces 
the “Access to Justice” movements that have arisen in several countries in recent decades, linking 
these movements to the growth and development of alternative dispute resolution; section 3 
addresses the various definitions of alternative dispute resolution – the varying criteria of which 
lead to the inclusion or exclusion of certain alternative methods; section 4 provides a brief 
introduction to Islamic law; section 5 discusses the concept of justice from an Islamic perspective; 
section 6 asserts the Islamic roots of alternative dispute resolution, shedding light on the history 
of such practices in Islam; section 7 explains the dispute resolution system in Saudi Arabia; section 
8 describes alternative dispute resolution justice in the contemporary Saudi legal system; and the 
final section concludes by summarizing the chapter’s central points. 
                                                 
7 See GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON ADR, supra note 2 at 3. (“The response of the state to this challenge has usually been 
twofold. On the one hand it broadens the legal system in order to cope with new realities and provide them with 
legal answers. This has fueled the growing juridisdictionalisation of life. The law and the legislator aim to cover all 
aspects of society and social life and this entails as a corollary an overwhelming resort to State legislation and State 
courts. The only solution for every single dispute is to be taken to court and to be solved in accordance with the law 
designed by the legislator. On the other hand, this situation has given rise to a budgetary effort of the State over 
several decades to ensure an efficient and available State court system of justice”). 
8 Id. at 4,5; see generally PALMER, supra note 5 at 45. 
9 Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 at 825 (1986). 




2. Access to Justice and the Development of Alternative Dispute Resolution  
Responses to the delays and increasingly high costs of litigation in the U.S. legal system 
during the 1960s and 1970s exemplify the type of criticism court systems have historically faced.10 
These issues gave rise to the ‘access to justice’ movement11 whose proponents aimed to increase 
the pace of justice and lower the costs of litigation.12 
 People and the law require that judicial systems produce a certain degree of justice. 
Systemic judicial failures necessitate the development of appropriate solutions. In “Arbitration in 
Three Dimensions,” J. Paulsson states: “When the legal order provided by a state proves 
unsatisfactory to particular segments of society, alternative methods are devised.”13 This 
suggestion remains valid when traditional court systems cannot justly and efficiently resolve the 
issues brought before them.  
  Increasing awareness of the importance of alternative mechanisms for resolving disputes 
led such mechanisms to be deemed central to the substantial improvements in American law that 
followed the rise of the “access to justice” movement.14 Other jurisdictions also undertook serious 
reforms. The UK, for example, implemented the Civil Procedure Rules in 1999.15 These efforts 
went hand-in-hand with the constant search for more effective means of protecting the rights of all 
citizens in efficient and cost-effective manners.16  
                                                 
10 See Palmer, supra note 5, at 45-46 
11 Id .The “access to justice” movement in the U.S has developed through different stages, known as conversations. 
The first conversation aimed to make judgment accessible, fast, and achievable at the lowest possible cost for all 
people; meanwhile, the second conversation focused on the criticisms surrounding judgments themselves in order 
to highlight the benefits of settlements; finally, the third conversation advocated alternative mechanisms of dispute 
resolution over the adjudication. Id.    
12 Id.  
13 Jan Paulsson, ARBITRATION IN THREE DIMENSIONS, 60 INT. COMP. LAW Q. 291–323 (2011).  
14 DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS, 13 (Leonard L. Riskin ed., 4th ed. 2009).  
15 In 1977, the UK enacted The Civil Procedure Act 1997 (c. 12) granting the authority to create civil procedure 
rules and establishing the Civil Justice Council, whose job is to assess the civil justice system. The Civil Procedure 
Rules (CPR) were passed on 10 December 1998 and became effective on 26 April 1999. 
16 GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON ADR, supra note 2, at 5, 8. 




Time and money have not been the only issues that have produced criticism of court 
systems; parties have also criticized outcomes. Some have noted, in fact, that the results (or the 
lack thereof) that emerge from ADR methods are more appealing than those produced via 
litigation.17 Warren Burger, former Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, was an ADR 
enthusiast known for his biting criticism of the efficiency of the U.S. judicial system and of the 
litigation system’s failure to facilitate the creation of a more equitable society.18 In a speech to the 
American Bar Association in 1984, Justice Burger stated: 
Our system is too costly, too painful, too destructive, too inefficient for a truly 
civilized people. To rely on the adversary process as the principal means of 
resolving conflicting claims is a mistake that must be corrected.19  
 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor describes her vision of the future of dispute settlement similarly: 
“The courts of this country should not be the places where resolution of disputes begins. They 
should be the places where the disputes end after alternative methods of resolving disputes have 
been considered and tried.”20 
 Many credit the Roscoe Pound Conference, held in Minnesota in 1976, with spreading 
awareness of ADR procedures in the United States. A large group of legal scholars and law 
professors attended the conference, many of whom subsequently contributed to the growth of 
ADR.21 Professor Frank Sander presented his paper, “Varieties of Disputes Processing,” which 
                                                 
17 Jessica Pearson, An Evaluation of Alternatives to Court Adjudication, 7 JUSTICE SYST. J. 420–444 (1982). 
18 THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MELTING THE LANCES AND DISMOUNTING THE 
STEEDS 1 (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1989) (“Without referring to statistical appraisals, a number of 
telling examples illustrate the seriousness of the current discontent. With former Chief Justice Warren Burger, the 
United States Supreme Court criticized the professional ability and competence of attorneys. This criticism also 
indicated an acute concern for the threat that the volume of litigation poses to the general availability of justice in 
American society.”). 
19 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA JOURNAL (1984).  
20 Sandra Day O’Connor Quotes, available at:http://womenshistory.about.com/od/quotes/a/s_d_oconnor.htm (last 
visited Mar. 16, 2015). 
21 J. Clifford Wallace, Judicial Reform and the Pound Conference of 1976, 80 MICH. LAW REV. 592–596 (1982); See 
also CARBONNEAU, supra note 19 at 1; see PALMER, supra note 5 at 45.46 (“Auerbach identifies the 1976 National 
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (the Pound Conference) as 
‘the decisive moment in the legalization of informal alternatives’”). 




greatly inspired developments in ADR, in particular, and the American legal system, in general. 
Many specialists in the field of ADR regard his seminal paper as a sacred text.22 Professor Sander 
calls for a multi-door courthouse, also known as a dispute resolution center.23 He identifies the 
nature of the dispute, the relationship between disputants, the disputed amount, and the time and 
cost of resolution as important factors in determining the best means of settling any given dispute.24 
 Professor Sander envisions dispute resolution centers that benefit the entire dispute 
settlement system and function more efficiently than the basic court structure. The first step of the 
intake process he proposes involves a clerk tasked with screening disputes who directs disputants 
to one of six rooms based on the nature of each dispute (i.e., Mediation, Arbitration, Fact Finding, 
Malpractice Screening Panel, Superior Court, and, finally, the Ombudsman).25 He describes his 
proposal as follows:  
What I am thus advocating is a flexible and diverse panoply of dispute resolution 
processes, with particular types of cases being assigned to differing processes 
(or combination of processes), according to some of the criteria previously 
mentioned. Conceivably such allocation might be accomplished for a particular 
class of cases at the outset by the legislature; that in effect is what was done by 
the Massachusetts legislature for malpractice cases. Alternatively one might 
envision by the year 2000 not simply a court house but a Dispute Resolution 
Center, where the grievant would first be channeled through a screening clerk 
who would then direct him to the process (or sequence of processes) most 
appropriate to his type of case.26 
 Access to justice has also been a concern in the UK. In a 1978 article, Sir I. H. Jacob, Q. 
C. identifies litigation costs and the time consumed in a legal proceedings as among the main 
impediments to access in England. He maintains that access to justice should be considered a 
                                                 
22 Online Guide to Mediation: 30 Years after the Historic Pound Conference, a Reflection on ADR and Justice in the 
21st Century, available at: http://mediationblog.blogspot.com/2006/04/30-years-after-historic-pound.html (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2015). 
23 DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL, 23 (Carrie Menkel-Meadow ed., 2d ed. 2011). 
24 Id. at 27-29. 
25 Id. at 29. 
26 Id. 




remedy rather than a malady. He views access as an instrument that reinforces societal values.27 
Lord Woolf argues, in a report published years later, that access to justice would be assured if the 
system were to meet basic principles of civil justice, such as offering appropriate procedures at 
reasonable costs, dealing with cases at a reasonable speed, and becoming responsive to the needs 
of those who use the system.28 His work also focuses on achieving early settlements of disputes. 
In “Access to Justice Final Report,” he identifies early achievement of dispute settlement as 
crucial.29 He indicates, moreover, that court proceedings should serve as the final step when ADR 
proves unsuccessful.30 Lord Woolf’s report led the CPR in the UK to require parties to reasonably 
avail themselves of ADR methods before filing cases, even though ADR remains non-obligatory. 
The CPR also gives courts the right to ask parties to provide proof that they have done as it 
requires.31 Simon Roberts and Michael Palmer explain Lord Woolf’s report as follows:  
Lord Woolf … characterized the primary objective of civil justice as the 
sponsorship of settlement, with judgment reduced to the solution of last resort. 
Introducing the cultural change he wanted to bring about, he spoke entirely 
unselfconsciously of settlement as justice, leaving behind foundational image 
formed in the classical world and subsequently sustained over millennia in the 
Judeo-Christian-Islamic traditions. Virtually without fuss or protest. The Civil 
Procedure Rules 1998 now realise this novel vision. So settlement is now civil 
justice, just as ‘command’ has retreated behind ‘inducement.’32 
                                                 
27 I. H. Jacob, Access to Justice in England in ACCESS TO JUSTICE, VOL. 1: A WORLD SURVEY 432-78, 417-78 (M. 
Cappelletti and B. Garth, 1978). 
28 Department for Constitutional Affairs, Interim Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in England 
and Wales, available at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/interfr.htm (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2015). 
29 Communications Directorate Department for Constitutional Affairs, Department for Constitutional Affairs, 
available at:http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/index.htm (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2015). 
30 REGULATING DISPUTE RESOLUTION: ADR AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT THE CROSSROADS, 141 (Felix Steffek et al. 
eds., 2013). 
31 Id. at 142. 
32 Palmer, supra note 5, at 359. 




 Concerns about access to justice are not limited to the U.S. and the UK. Other countries 
have witnessed similar efforts to ensure justice.33 Many countries have, moreover, attempted to 
examine alternative means to enhance access to justice. Awareness of ADR and the trend toward 
using it has become nearly universal in recent years.34 This has inspired a new understanding of 
the idea of access to justice, as people choose between several venues to settle disputes.35 They 
can now decide whether one or more ADR mechanisms will enable them to settle their disputes, 
while continuing to consider litigation as a valid backup.36 Access to justice is no longer limited 
to formal court-administered justice.37 Professor Thomas E. Carbonneau likens the early status of 
ADR to “… a wheel spinning in the void, unable to catch a groove that allows it to channel its 
energy into the larger mechanism of society,”38 but that has changed dramatically and ADR 
methods now effectively compete with the courts in this field. The 1990 Civil Justice Reform Act 
asks federal district courts across jurisdictions to embrace ADR programs.39 The Alternative 
Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, in (1) and (2) of Sec. 2, states that increasing parties’ 
                                                 
33 See generally M. CAPPELLETTI AND B. GARTH, ACCESS TO JUSTICE, VOL. 1: A WORLD SURVEY (1978) ("The words 
'access to justice' are admittedly not easily defined, but they serve to focus on two basic purposes of the legal system 
– the system by which people may vindicate their rights and/or resolve their disputes under the general auspices of 
the state. First, the system must be equally accessible to all, and second it must lead to results that are individually 
and socially just.”) Id. at 6. 
34 GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON ADR, supra note 2, at 6-9. 
35 Id (“Overworked State courts are unable to offer a valid, specialized and quick response to increasingly complex 
disputes. More and more they need help from experts and other actors, and this not only increases the duration and 
cost of access to justice, it also generates a growing dissatisfaction among citizens with the response provided: 
justice delayed usually means justice denied. …This [dissatisfaction] has led to a situation in which citizens are 
more aware of and willing to exercise their rights, irrespective of the financial value or economic or social relevance 
of their claims. These factors could not have been predicted by the State when the paradigm of access to justice as 
access to State courts was elaborated”.) Id. at 7. 
36 Id. 
37 Id (“The awareness of [State courts] failure has forced national legislators to try to find other systems and 
mechanisms, both within and outside State courts, to raise in modern societies. … Outside State courts, the ADR 
movement has growing support as a valid way to solve all sorts of disputes.”) Id. at 8.  
38 Carbonneau, supra note 19, at 247 ("There is an evident need to expand the scope of consideration and to the present 
the ADR humanism to a larger public. Dealing with the modification of professional attitudes is only part of the 
effort. Such an approach is likely to have little impact–a trickle effect–upon those whose attitude matters perhaps 
the most–the actual beneficiaries of adjudicatory service”). 
39 GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON ADR, supra note 2, at 9.  




contentment, providing advanced means of settling disputes, and enhancing attainment of 
solutions with competence are great examples of what ADR should offer, if supported by judges 
and lawyers, and when employing highly qualified neutrals in programs managed by courts. It 
also states that ADR methods such as mediation, voluntary arbitration, and others can help 
decrease the accumulation of cases in Federal courts and thereby increase levels of efficiency.40  
 In his review of related research, Thomas J. Stipanowich severely criticizes the growth and 
impact of ADR.41 He first identifies the vast extent of behaviors grouped under the ADR umbrella 
as highly problematic.42 He argues that such an expansive definition makes the broad 
generalizations asserted in various studies suspect. He recommends that, at the very least, scholars 
should distinguish between the growth and impact of mediation methods and arbitration 
procedures.43 The second problem he highlights is a scarcity of data with any reliable utility for 
research purposes, given that courts and ADR programs rarely track more than the volume of filed 
and resolved matters. Statistics showing that the number of court-tried cases remained steady after 
the institution of ADR could simply indicate that the number of disputes generally increased during 
that period, and ADR subsequently handled the overflow. Concluding that ADR failed to reduce 
the number of court-tried cases, as some have, would be incorrect. He thus calls for better statistics 
combined with qualitative analysis of outcomes.  
Despite these limitations, Stipanowich’s review determines that ADR has not become a 
substitute for public trials. He finds instead that it has developed into an intervention stratagem 
fostering outcomes litigation was never meant to achieve. He contends that ADR generally 
                                                 
40 Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998. 
41 Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the Vanishing Trial: The Growth and Impact of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 
1 J. EMPIR. LEG. STUD. 843 (2004). 
42 For further clarification, see the “Alternative Dispute Resolution Definition” section that follows. 
43 Stipanowich, supra note 42. 




produces faster and less expensive solutions, molded for particular disputants, while assisting 
business aims, cultivating relationships, improving the quality of human interface, and making the 
dispute resolution process accessible to a wider population.44 
 The Center for Analysis of Alternative Dispute Resolution Systems (CAADRS) provided 
an extensive bibliography with annotations in 2002, summarizing sixty-two studies of mediation 
across more than one hundred ADR court programs. The research methodologies vary greatly, but 
many of the studies utilize control groups comprised of cases that did not involve mediation. Some 
studies find that gender, race, and culture correlate with satisfaction rates, but the results generally 
support the effectiveness of mediation. Disputants highlight the reduced cost, the fairness and 
speed of the processes, and the outcomes and compliance, among other positives, as sources of 
satisfaction.45 The release of CAADRS in an expanded Second Edition in 2007 further supported 
these findings.46 
 Many view arbitration less favorably than other ADR methods when it comes to speed, 
cost, outcomes, and the capacity to maintain relationships.47  The cost of arbitration has increased 
over time as a result of legal fees, the complexities of arbitration processes, and the more 
adversarial role lawyers take when advocating for their clients, especially when the clients attend 
arbitration proceedings. Arbitration nevertheless remains an important alternative to litigation.48 
                                                 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 See Jennifer E. Shack, Bibliographic Summary of Cost, Pace, and Satisfaction Studies of Court-Related Mediation 
Programs (Center for Analysis of Alternative Dispute Resolution Systems, 2nd ed, 2007). 
47 But see David K.Taylor, Esq. Road to Resolution, 75(2) Journal of Property Management, 30-32 (2010). Taylor 
claims that mediation and conciliation are only a waste of time with regard to their outcomes when compared to 
arbitration, which provides disputants with binding resolutions. He states: “A trying, 10-hour-long mediation 
where the parties are close to resolution can be thrown away when one party representative says he or she has to 
‘make a call’ to obtain final settlement authority. … In [binding arbitration] resolutions can’t be thrown away. 
When parties place an arbitration clause in a contract, they forego enforcing their legal rights in court, choosing 
to rely instead upon the arbitrator’s sense of fair play.” Id. 
48 See DAVID B. LIPSKY & RONALD L. SEEBER, THE APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION OF CORPORATE DISPUTES: A REPORT 
ON THE GROWING USE OF ADR BY U.S. CORPORATIONS (Cornell/PERC Inst. on Conflict Resol., 1998). 




 The increasingly commonplace nature of ADR has prompted attorneys to adopt more and 
more innovative strategies aimed at bolstering efficiency, reducing cost, and increasing satisfaction 
with outcomes.49 ADR’s positive contributions have forced the doors of justice open.50 Many 
scholars regard ADR not as a scheme to replace the formal judicial system, but as a supplement to 
what the courts can offer.51 The vision detailed by Frank Sander materialized in less than twenty 
years. Four decades have now passed since his seminal paper and the fact that reactions to ADR 
shifted from initial disinterest to a degree of hostility and resistance to, finally, widespread 
acceptance of its significance as a mode of dispute resolution is noteworthy.52 A great deal of 
evidence – not least, current developments in many European countries – supports the contention 
that ADR has received widespread acceptance. Judicial systems have been rebuilt (literally) to 
reflect the idea of the multi-roomed courthouse and judicial building replacing the ordinary court. 
These reformed courts now aim to provide citizens with different methods of accessing justice, 
empowering them to select the instruments they believe will best accommodate their various 
disputes.53  ADR now complements state courts and no longer acts as their substitute.54   
The new dimensions added to ADR as it evolved warrant attention. These dimensions 
testify to the enormous developments the field has undergone. ADR has engendered achievements 
in court reform and successes in new areas, reflecting its growing acceptance among members of 
society both in and outside the field of law. The progression and influence of ADR has gone 
beyond state and federal courts to impact communities, employees/employers, consumers, 
                                                 
49 Stipanowich, supra note 42. 
50 Professor Frank Sander used the term “multi-door courthouse” in an attempt to show that disputes can be resolved 
in numerous ways, both in and outside established courts.  
51 GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON ADR, supra note 2, at 9–11. 
52  DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS, supra note 15, at 41–42. 
53 GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON ADR, supra note 2, at 10. 
54 Id. at 11. 




investors/brokers, businesses, and other areas in which the principles of dispute resolution apply 
broadly.55 Qualitative and quantitative studies indicate that many organizations have 
systematically employed, monitored, and adjusted effective ADR programs, while others have 
remained reactive and, thus, less effective.56 Organizations could not achieve these results if they 
did not value ADR methods. These successes have fueled the worldwide distribution of ADR 
procedures. Many U.S. institutions have contributed to the design and implementation of ADR, 
and both governmental and non-governmental organizations have engaged in efforts to advance 
the use of ADR.57 Countries around the world have subsequently begun encouraging the use of the 
ADR, enhancing access to justice through court reform. These methods, naturally, had to be 
applied successfully at the national level before being implemented across borders.  
ADR methods also include On-Line Dispute Resolution (ODR).58 ODR provides more 
convenient ways of settling disputes. It has contributed to the expansion of ADR, helping to 
overcome the linguistic, temporal, and geographical barriers between parties by offering effective 
resolution to disputants all over the world using the same means as ADR but in an online context.59  
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ADR has proved its ability to resolve disputes and prevent the escalation of countless 
situations into more complex and obdurate problems. It has steadily developed throughout the 
world to provide a flexible means of resolving more and increasingly complex disputes. Carlos 
Esplugues and Silvia Barona argue: 
In this new context the evolution of the principle of access to justice has been 
particularly relevant and profound and has been tailored to provide a valid and 
sound response to the complex social, economic and political world in which we 
are currently living. New situations require new solutions, perfectly fitted to 
them, even if some of these ‘new’ solutions have long existed in legal systems.60 
 The ADR framework clearly allows disputants to bring greater creativity to the settlement 
process, thereby enabling them to achieve their agreed-upon targets in accordance with their 
priorities and likely leading to greater satisfaction.61 Ensuring that all parties receive these benefits 
can be a key element in the settlement process. Disputants must learn that the best access to justice 
can be achieved through a form of “self-reliance” now provided by cooperative ADR approaches.62 
 The emergence and development of ADR has arguably redefined the concept of justice, 
facilitating its evolution toward a focus on obtaining reasonable outcomes as quickly and cost-
effectively as possible while putting the least strain on participants. Former U.S. Supreme Court 
Chief Justice Burger envisioned this evolution: “Concepts of justice must have hands and feet... to 
carry out justice in every case in the shortest possible time and the lowest possible cost. This is the 
challenge to every lawyer and judge in America.”63 The progress achieved in the ADR field in 
some countries has not only redefined justice, but also engineered a quantum leap forward in how 
legal systems understand the need for access to justice. Scholars in some societies have expanded 
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the meaning of this essential prerogative, claiming access must also include access to fair dispute 
resolution; they assert that the state and its law must ensure access to both adjudication and ADR, 
and that disputants have the right to select the dispute resolution instruments they prefer.64  
3. Overview of the Definition of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
 The definition of ADR, as a general concept, varies. Legislators, scholars, and practitioners 
hold diverging views of the concept. Some definitions include all longstanding methods of settling 
disputes out of court. Others exclude well-known ADR methods because of certain standards or, 
sometimes, encompass functions unrelated to said methods. Some of these standards, moreover, 
rearrange the methods in terms of their importance and effectiveness. Other definitions divide the 
methods into several categories according to their functions and purposes. Expected outcomes may 
also split these methods based on the extent of the compulsion that such decisions may impose, as 
later sections of this chapter detail. 
Many agree that traditional courts serve as the primary venue for dispute resolution. ADR 
methods, from this perspective, serve the purpose of solving conflicts outside the courtroom, all 
under one wide tent.65 Out-of-court settlement thus involves the use of one or more ADR method. 
Defining ADR in this way positions it as the opposite of the formal justice process. The term 
alternative refers to methods that substitute for ordinary litigation. ADR may include negotiation, 
arbitration, mediation, conciliation, and all other methods discussed in this section.66  
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The role of third parties in the process could also lead to different definitions of ADR. The 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 defines ADR as a process that “[i]ncludes any process 
or procedure, other than an adjudication by a presiding judge, in which a neutral third party 
participates to assist in the resolution of issues in controversy, through processes such as early 
neutral evaluation, mediation, mini-trial, and arbitration.”67 Some definitions of ADR, however, 
describe it as an instrument used by third parties to settle disagreements between disputants with 
no mandatory outcomes. ADR techniques, according to this view, do not necessarily produce final 
and binding outcomes. Such definitions do not include arbitration as an ADR method.68 
Arbitration can be described as a process in which disputants agree in advance to abide by 
an impartial individual’s determination after hearing both sides of the dispute.69 Many courts refer 
specific classes of cases to arbitration; however, arbitration without a prior agreement that renders 
the award binding or in which the parties forfeit the right to seek relief in court has no teeth.70 
Some scholars also cite the unique manner in which arbitration functions to distinguish it from 
other alternative methods. Some argue, in fact, that arbitration’s specific value and unique legal 
framework separate it from other means (i.e., S. BARONA VILAR claims that ‘arbitration is 
arbitration’).71  
The view of arbitration as “[a] speedy and informal alternative to litigation [that] resolves 
disputes without confinement to many of the procedural and evidentiary structures that protect the 
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integrity of formal trail” once prevailed.72 Ongoing changes have complicated this view, however; 
increasingly widespread acknowledgment of the prolonged, costly nature of the process has 
negatively impacted its popularity as an ADR technique.73 Some, indeed, view other instruments 
of ADR as alternatives, not only to litigation, but also to arbitration.74Mediation is one such 
instrument, typically defined as a “[p]rocess that calls for parties to work together with the aid of 
a neutral facilitator ... who assists them in reaching a settlement [but in which] resolution of the 
dispute rests with the parties themselves.”75 
Some scholars divide the most important dispute resolution instruments (both formal and 
informal) into three main categories according to the nature of methods they involve: “adjudicative 
processes,” of which arbitration is the most common; “consensual processes,” which include 
negotiation, mediation, and conciliation; and “mixed processes” such as mediation-arbitration, 
arbitration-mediation, mini-trial, etc.76 
ADR techniques are designed to function at different levels and at different phases of 
dispute resolution processes. First, they can play a major role in attempts to avoid disputes. Second, 
they give parties new approaches to address disputes that circumstances make inevitable or that 
have already occurred, enabling them to reach settlements and minimize their losses.77 
Differentiating among the various ADR methods requires good definitions based on specific 
criteria. ADR can refer to negotiated settlement processes in which disputants work together to 
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achieve settlements without third party help. It can also refer to processes that involve the 
assistance of third parties – typically mediation or conciliation. Arbitration, meanwhile, involves 
processes in which third parties make decisions that bind the disputants.78 Other definitions do not 
distinguish between these three ADR methods (i.e., mediation, conciliation, or arbitration). They 
simply highlight the participation of third parties in settlement processes to distinguish between 
said methods and party negotiation, which requires no external involvement. The roles third parties 
play in settlement processes and the nature of the solutions they provide to disputants, however, 
distinguish mediation and conciliation from arbitration as explained earlier in this chapter.79 The 
roles of mediators and conciliators, nonetheless, are similar. Mediators try to shorten the distance 
between the parties and overcome obstacles, but they do not propose settlements; conciliators, 
meanwhile, suggest solutions after giving both parties time to explain their views and carefully 
analyzing the nature of the dispute. The extent of disputant participation in settlement processes 
also varies between mediation and conciliation. Parties involved in mediation must work together 
to reach a resolution they believe will best work. Parties involved in conciliation may act in a 
similarly collaborative fashion, but they tend to participate less than parties involved in 
mediation.80  
The above-mentioned arguments and definitions should make the term ADR clearer, but 
the topic requires further elaboration. Developments in the field have led some to question the 
literal meaning of ADR. Many argue that, rather than alternative dispute resolution, ADR should 
stand for appropriate dispute resolution.81 Others contend that it should stand for adequate dispute 
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resolution.82 These developments reflect the continuous pursuit of a better means of accessing 
justice – the impetus for ADR in the first place.83 ADR developed as a substitute for ordinary 
methods of resolving disputes. Some now recognize that ADR provides different means for 
resolving disputes, both from inside the court and in exterior forums.84 Certain scholars argue, in 
fact, that ADR offers suitable techniques for preventing disputes and developing acceptable 
resolutions when conflicts occur for both individuals and entire nations.85 
4. Brief Introduction of Islamic Law 
The world has known many different systems of law. Current leading systems include civil 
law, common law, and Islamic law.86 A large number of countries, both Muslim and non-Muslim, 
utilize Islamic law.87 Islamic law’s name makes its derivation from the religious doctrines of Islam 
obvious.88 Religion and law have much in common for Muslims. Many Muslims believe, in fact, 
that religion and law are two sides of the same coin; Islam is the religion and Sharia is the law.89  
 Knut S. Vikor points out, however, that Sharia has a more expansive meaning. He writes: 
… the Shari’a’s span is far wider than “law” in Western understandings, as 
God’s code of morality covers every aspect of life. This is recognized by Islamic 
jurisprudence, which distinguishes between “worship”, or man’s relation to God 
(ibadat), and “acts”, man’s relation to man (mu’amalat). They roughly coincide 
with rules of religious ritual (prayer, pilgrimage, etc.) against matters that we 
would consider legal, although the division is not precise: certain crimes 
considered to have their punishment specified in the revealed texts (the five 
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hudud crimes) are part of ibadat, as they are for that reason crimes against God, 
not against men.90 
 
 The works of certain Muslim philosophers reveal the close links in the Islamic tradition 
between justice as a principle, on the one hand, and the religious laws on the other.91 Ibn Khaldun,92 
for example, claims that because Sharia addresses many aspects of life during times of crises and 
prosperity, societies completely governed by Sharia are greater than other societies controlled by 
the laws of civilization.93 
 This section explains the most important norms of Sharia, defining some of its main 
principles, concepts, and elements to provide a clearer view of Islamic legal systems and their 
foundations. The section then explores the definition of the term justice within the Islamic 
tradition.   
 Sharia has two main sources. The first is the Quran or book of Allah (God). The second is 
the Sunna or words, pursuits, and habits of the Prophet Mohammed.94 Muslims consider law the 
command of God. The acknowledged function of Muslim jurisprudence has been, from the 
beginning, simply the discovery of the terms of that command.95 Fiqh refers to the process by 
which individuals, generally scholars, comprehend the sacred law.96 Lars Gule defines fiqh as 
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follows: “Jurisprudence in Islam— fiqh —is the study of these sources, principles and established 
precedents, and the legal rules and decisions that can be made on this Basis.”97 Coulson elaborates 
on this definition, writing: “Since law can only be the pre-ordained system of God’s commands or 
Shari’a, jurisprudence is the science of fiqh, or ‘understanding’ and ascertaining that law; and the 
classical legal theory consists of the formulation and analysis of the principles by which such 
comprehension is to be achieved.”98 
 Ibn Khaldun describes fiqh as a science derived from several sources of Sharia (the Quran 
and Sunna) that categorizes the sacred laws by distinguishing between the provisions of different 
Muslim behaviors. Fiqh defines, for example, wajib (compulsion), halal (lawful), makruh 
(detested), haram (prohibited or unlawful), or other behavioral categories.99 Professor Frank E. 
Vogel rightly points out, however, that “[t]he law is perfect but humans are not.”100 This view 
proves very useful when distinguishing between divine law or Sharia and human jurisprudence or 
fiqh.101 
 The varying interpretations of Islamic law stem primarily from divisions among 
Muslims.102 The rift between Sunnis and Shi’a divided the Muslim world. This rift resulted from 
failed arbitration between the Muslim Khalif (Ali) and the Muslim ruler of Syria (Mu’awiya) in 
658 AD.103 The features and views of the two branches of Islam overlap and diverge. Similarities 
and differences also exist between the approaches of the various schools of law within each 
branch.104 Escalations in the Sunni-Shia split have, however, concealed more critical issues. 
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Certain commentators maintain that political motivations now exacerbate this division.105 Some 
argue that, despite all the major and minor religious differences between Sunnis and Shia, recent 
conflicts between them have not risen to the level of what occurred during the Thirty Years War.106 
This underscores the major role of politics in shaping the split between Muslims.107  
 Interpretations of Islamic law (jurisprudence) also differ among the various schools of law 
(madhabs) within the Sunni sect.108 These schools include Hanbali, Hanafi, Maliki, and Shafi’i. 
Each one developed its own effective functioning framework for Islamic law.109 The divisions 
within the Sunni sect are noteworthy with respect to some relatively inconsequential minutiae and 
juristic selection, but the sects all share a fundamental belief in the Quran and Sunna as the two 
main sources of Islamic legislation.110 
 Ijtihad is the practice by which scholars or judges shape opinions on legal issues.111 It fills 
gaps by providing opinions on issues not clearly covered by stanzas in the Quran or Sunna.112 One 
of the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings (hadith) provides a good explanation of this exercise. Prior 
to assigning Muadh Ibn Jabal to Yemen as a judge, the Prophet asked him, “According to what 
will you judge?” Muadh replied, “According to the Book of Allah.” The Prophet inquired further, 
“And if you find nothing therein?” Muadh replied, “According to the Sunnah of the Prophet of 
Allah.” The Prophet again inquired further, “And if you find nothing therein?” Muadh replied, 
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“Then I will exert myself to form my own judgment.” Pleased, the Prophet responded: “Praise be 
to Allah who has guided the messenger of the Prophet to that which pleases the Prophet.”113 
 The different Sunni schools of law engaged in ijtihad for many years before its gates finally 
closed.114 The substantial progress made in the field eventually led the schools to determine that 
scholars and judges could no longer shape the law with their opinions.115 Coulson clarifies the 
motivation behind this conclusion, writing: “[It] was probably the result not of external pressures 
but of internal causes. The point had been reached where the material sources of the divine will—
their content now finally determined—had fully been exploited.”116 
 The varying interpretations and applications of Sharia by the multitude of Muslim sects 
remain a challenge for Islamic law today.117 Many Muslims nevertheless regard such variations as 
the result of great accomplishments made by scholars and imams – inspired by a sincere desire to 
achieve the interests of Muslim society – in discovering the proper meanings of the divine law.118  
 Some argue that contemporary legal frameworks in many parts of the Islamic world have 
become increasingly secular and westernized, but Islamic law and its practice remain important in 
some areas of these legal systems.119 Sharia still governs personal status laws in certain areas, but 
many jurisdictions have implemented western codes, especially for civil and criminal cases.120 The 
Quran’s rules of ethics and morality can, however, reinforce contemporary legal frameworks. 
These principles have the ability to produce disparate satisfying interpretations and fulfill current 
human and societal needs. They can thus perpetuate a viable, modernist paradigm that reflects the 
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ultimate and inimitable lifestyle modeled by Islamic jurisprudence in accordance with the orders 
of Allah (God).121 Coulson writes:  
Radical though the break with past tradition which such an approach involves 
might be, it is nevertheless a break with a particular construction of the religious 
law and not with its essence. This, at any rate, would seem to be the only realistic 
basis for future development and the only alternative to a complete abandonment 
of the nation of a law based on a religion. Law, to be a living force, must reflect 
the soul of a society, and the soul of present Muslim society is reflected neither 
in any form of outright secularism not in the doctrine of the mediaeval text 
books.122  
 
 Professor Knut S. Vikor argues that divisions exist within current Islamic parties in Muslim 
countries including Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Morocco. He claims that any expansion in Sharia’s 
juridical role in these countries will generate further debates regarding the degree to which they 
can integrate Islamic principles into mostly westernized and non-religious legal systems. Vikor 
anticipates that, if such developments occur, examining critical issues, such as the need to 
distinguish divine law from fiqh, the implications for future reinterpretation of ijtihad, and 
potential shifts in recognizing sacred principles as the result of a current public interests or desires 
of humans well-being (maslaha) as opposed to implementation of the Islamic Jurisprudence’s rigid 
precepts will prove crucial. He goes on to stress the potential consequences of such transformation, 
stating: “This may change fundamentally what we mean by Shari’a, or it may cause social conflicts 
in these countries between those who reach opposite conclusions on these legal and 
methodological issues.”123 
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5. Justice as an Islamic Concept 
 The Quran states: “We have already sent Our messengers with clear evidence and sent 
down with them the Scripture and the balance that the people may maintain [their affairs] in 
justice...”124 Islamic law and justice are inseparable from a Muslim point of view.125 Justice is a 
qur’anic concept; various surah (chapters) in the Quran mention its synonyms adl and qist 
(fairness and equity) multiple times.126 The Quran contains almost one hundred different terms 
that substantiate the concept of justice, as well as more than two hundred warnings regarding 
injustice.127 Examples include: “God commands justice and fair dealing... 128 [and] O you who 
believe, be upright for God, and (be) bearers of witness with justice.”129  
 Muslims believe that God, who has full sovereignty over people and society, serves as the 
source of their laws. They trust, moreover, that divine laws are uniquely capable of addressing and 
fulfilling their desires and needs.130 The Prophet Mohammed instructed his companions in the 
concept of justice and its meaning in Islam. He handled all matters that he encountered in a just, 
honest, and egalitarian manner.131 He introduced Muslims to important moral ideas and principles 
to prevent them from treating one another with meanness and severity. The Quran and Sunna 
regularly enjoin Muslims from acts of prejudice, inequity, and unfairness. It also reminds them 
that they must first satisfy their obligations to justice to accomplish all other duties required of 
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them as Muslims.132 Allah says in the Quran, “Among those whom We have created there are 
people who guide with truth and do justice thereby.” The Prophet elaborates:  
Behold! the Dispensers of justice will be seated on the pulpits of light beside 
God, on the right side of the Merciful, Exalted and Glorious. Either side of the 
Being is the right side both being equally meritorious. (The Dispensers of justice 
are) those who do justice in their rules, in matters relating to their families and 
in all that they undertake to do.133   
 
The Islamic conception of justice dictates that the settlement of any dispute should be fair, 
equitable, and impartial; in this vein, the Quran notes: “Allah doth command you to render back 
your Trusts to those to whom they are due; And when ye judge between man and man, that ye 
judge with justice.”134 The following hadith of the Prophet Mohammed sums up the importance 
of justice in Islam: 
Judges are of three types, one of whom will go to Paradise and two to Hell. The 
one who will go to Paradise is a man who knows what is right and gives 
judgment accordingly; but a man who knows what is right and acts tyrannically 
in his judgment will go to Hell; and a man who gives judgment for people when 
he is ignorant will go to Hell.135  
 
This hadith embodies an important principle of Islamic justice, emphasizing that beyond court 
justice, in every aspect of life, God always carries out a higher level of justice.136 Judges must issue 
fair judgments to properly observe the principles of Islamic law; this assures that courts in Muslim 
countries protect justice. Some call this view into question, maintaining that the decisions of biased 
judges can still perpetuate severe injustices.137  Angela Tang addresses such human imperfections, 
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stating: “If justice is not meted out in the Shari’ah courts, God will mete out the ultimate 
justice.”138 
 Some argue that Islamic law represents truth, justice, and the Will of God from which 
Muslims derive it. They maintain that it serves to codify the ethical obligations and notions of 
justice within Muslim communities by emphasizing religious principles.139 Ibn Khaldun contends 
that divine laws assure justice, if implemented properly, without corruption or partiality.140 He 
divides attempts to maintain the balance of justice into three categories. The first category includes 
instances in which religion and laws preserve the balance of justice in accordance with the general 
social norms and moral values of the origin state. These norms and moral values fundamentally 
come from God’s divine creative inspiration. The second category contains man-made laws that 
attempt to preserve the balance of justice in accordance with fundamentally rational beliefs that 
Ibn Khaldun finds deficient and imprecise. The third category encompasses efforts that combine 
the divine and the nonreligious approaches (the first two categories) to maintain the balance of 
justice; this may prove imperfect or irrational, but it gives priority to the public interest.141  State 
leaders under this understanding rule according to divine law theoretically, but in reality leaders’ 
wills and the needs of the people and the state greatly impact the formation and longevity of 
regimes.142 The implementation of secular pursuits and regulations in contemporary Islamic 
societies reflects the great influence of Western law on Islamic legal systems.143 Professor 
Khadduri claims: “In the absence of guidance from the classical doctrines, Muslim states felt 
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compelled to draw on the experience of Western nations for the improvement of their system of 
the administration of justice.”144 He concludes: “The historical experiences of Islam—indeed the 
historical experience of all mankind—demonstrate that any system of law and justice on the 
national as well as the international plane would lose its meaning were it divorced completely from 
moral principles.”145  
The author believes that any attempt to examine the level of justice in any Muslim society 
should take into consideration all the elements mentioned above – derived from divine Islamic law 
as well as from some important modern concepts – that shape contemporary practices of justice.  
6. Alternative Dispute Resolution in Islam 
 ADR has deep roots in the leading Abrahamic religions including Islam.146 The practices 
of these religions assure the benefits of various informal dispute resolution methods, including 
arbitration, mediation, and negotiation. Religious motivations induce people of certain religions to 
make good use of these techniques, either inside or outside courts when conflicts arise between 
them.147 Courts play major roles in these processes, guided by the aim to maintain strong and 
smooth interpersonal relationships among those who believe in the religion that produced them.148 
 Muslim societies utilize many methods of dispute resolution beyond traditional court 
litigation.149 The Quran states: “And if you fear a breach between the two, appoint an arbiter from 
his relatives and an arbiter from her relatives. If they both desire reconciliation Allah will affect 
harmony between them. Verily Allah has full knowledge, and is aware of everything.”150 Some 
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scholars claim, in fact, that the extensive history of informal dispute resolution in Muslim societies 
inspired the rise of ADR in the West or, at the very least, that Western countries absorbed the 
Islamic approach in this regard.151  
Processes of peaceful settlement in Islam include sulh, comparable to mediation or 
conciliation, and tahkim, equivalent to arbitration.152 The Quran states: “No good is there in much 
of their private conversation, except for those who enjoin charity or that which is right or 
conciliation between people. And whoever does that seeking means to the approval of Allah - then 
We are going to give him a great reward.”153 Expanding utilization of sulh (mediation or 
conciliation) and tahkim as peaceful means of dispute resolution testifies to the increasingly 
widespread recognition that these processes enhance justice. This recognition stems, in part, from 
the positive impact of ADR, and the increased progress in understanding its function.154  
Sahar Maranlou points out that many fundamental religious norms found in the Quran, 
such as adl (justice), sulh (negotiated settlement), musalaha (reconciliation), tahkim (arbitration), 
and salam (peace), serve as the basis for the Islamic dispute resolution system.155 The story of the 
rebuilding of the Kaaba in Makkah serves as excellent example of the use of ADR in Islam.156 
Many tribes participated in the renovation of the Kaaba and, after they completed the work, each 
tribe claimed the right to replace the sacred black stones in the Kaaba. They called on Prophet 
Muhammad to settle the dispute that arose and the Prophet offered a settlement that all the clans 
agreed upon. He placed the stones on a piece of cloth; he called for a representative from each 
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tribe to raise a corner of it; then he placed all the stones in their correct positions himself.157 This 
settlement prevented war from breaking out between the tribes.158 
 Informal dispute resolution practices have proved effective in delivering restitution, even 
in criminal disputes. Sulh has, for example, contributed significantly to the maintenance of justice 
in Islamic societies. It has served as a useful alternative mechanism in repairing the harm done to 
crime victims and their families and in preventing possible retaliation.159 Sulh functions both as a 
means of dispute settlement and as the final product of the settlement process, which takes the 
form of a contract by which the parties must abide. The Majelle, the Ottoman Code, unsurprisingly 
devotes an entire chapter to sulh.160 Article 1531 of the Majelle recognizes the two main forms of 
sulh, describing it as “[a] contract concluded by offer and acceptance, and consists of settling a 
dispute by mutual consent.”161 Parties must meet certain conditions, however, to render sulh lawful 
and ensure its recognition by Muslims. First, the settlement process, including its final result, must 
proceed in accordance with Sharia law and its rules.162 Caliph Omar reportedly once said: 
“Compromise (sulh) is permissible between people, except a compromise which would make licit 
(halal) that which is illicit (haram) or make illicit that which is licit.”163 Second, the sulh process 
must produce a fair and just outcome.164 The Quran states: “The believers are but brothers, so make 
settlement between your brothers. And fear Allah that you may receive mercy.”165 
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 Tahkim has long enjoyed recognition and acceptance as a method of dispute settlement in 
Islamic tradition and practice.166 Sunni schools of Islamic Jurisprudence have different opinions 
regarding the outcome of the tahkim process.167 The Hanafi and Shafi’i schools regard tahkim as 
similar to sulh; they contend that arbitral awards are binding only if the parties intended as much.168 
The Maliki and Hanbali schools assert, by contrast, that all arbitral awards are binding unless they 
contain egregious oppression or unfairness.169 An awards binds the parties, in practice, if a qadi 
(judge) concludes in court that it contains no defects.170 Islamic law recognizes foreign arbitral 
awards as long as they do not conflict with its provisions; only if such conflicts arise do qadis have 
the right to ignore the awards.171  
Many countries, both Islamic and non-Islamic, currently regard arbitration as a suitable 
mechanism for resolving disputes.172 Mohamed Keshavjee, the author of Islam, Sharia and 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, draws the following conclusion: 
Arbitration seems to have greater traction in Muslim communities than 
mediation. Mediation field training that I have carried out in a number of 
countries between 2000 and 2010 indicates that the resolution of conflict is 
conceptualised very differently in certain non-Western cultures than in the 
West. In countries such as Syria and Pakistan, for example, ‘mediators’ tend to 
utilize a more ‘directive’ approach to dispute resolution and often play the role 
of adjudication. Also, reconciliation features very prominently in the dispute 
resolution trajectory. Societies in transition could gain a great deal more by 
allowing the contesting parties more autonomy to resolve their own disputes, 
but that would need to be done gradually through an evolutionary process. It is 
in this context that a hybrid tool such as Med-Arb (Mediation-Arbitration) could 
prove valuable.173  
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Sulh has likewise gained increasing recognition in many contemporary Muslim societies. 
Professor Sahar Maranlou states: 
Islamic legal tradition did include use of alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms. During the Ottoman Empire, all judges were facilitating sulh 
(meaning peace/compromise/dispute resolution) between parties... In our time, 
most Muslim countries practice dispute settlement mechanisms based on Quran 
and Sunnah, as primary sources of Sharia.  … In Saudi Arabia, as an example of 
a Muslim–Sunni society, the legal system principally settles most civil cases in 
reconciliation, following the Quranic verse “sulh is best.”174 
 
Many scholars thus emphasize that, since Islam’s emergence, Muslim societies have 
utilized both formal court-based methods and informal approaches – fully recognized in Islamic 
law and practice, including sulh and tahkim – to resolve disputes.175 Fully comprehending Saudi 
law requires a recognition of the fundamental role Islam and Islamic law play for the Saudi Arabia 
government and its people.176 Countries in the Western world embrace secularism and clearly 
segregate government from all religious institutions177; by contrast, in Saudi Arabia, Islam controls 
all aspects of Muslims’ lives.178 
7. Dispute Resolution System in Saudi Arabia 
Vogel claims that the version of Islamic Sharia that serves as the constitution of Saudi 
Arabia makes its legal system more conservative than any other Islamic legal system.179 A plurality 
of Saudis maintain deep respect for Islam, deem it a fundamental component of life, and strive to 
enforce Islamic law and ethics in all aspects of life.180 Vogel argues that Saudi Arabia surpasses 
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many earlier Muslim nations in its broad implementation and successful practice of the doctrines 
of the old Islamic school of law.181 He points out, however, that:  
… this is not to claim that Saudi Arabia’s legal system is the ideal Islamic law 
or legal system. Saudi Arabia no doubt does not perfectly apply Islamic law, and 
indeed according to the views of some (and as a non-Muslim I make no 
judgment), does not apply true Islamic law at all. It is indisputable, however, that 
it does apply at least a traditionalist Islamic law in many spheres; and it does 
this, again, with certain notable successes relative to Islamic antecedents. Even 
the most forward-looking Muslim cannot disown entirely the past to which Saudi 
Arabia is heir.182 
 
Vogel also observes that, like other aspects of Saudi society, the field of law in Saudi Arabia 
has undergone an enormous transition in recent years as a result of an array of factors, both internal 
and external.183 The enactment of new laws and the establishment of certain specialized courts and 
tribunals separate from traditional Sharia courts to deal primarily with commercial and labor 
disputes exemplifies this progress.184 
Some believe that such developments signal a promising transformation towards more 
efficient standards in the Saudi legal system.185 Hossein Esmaeili notes: 
The nature of modern legal institutions, including the court system, is 
substantially different from the traditional tribal structures and Shari'ah 
principles. Indeed, the establishment of such institutions and the introduction of 
modem legal principles alongside Shari'ah could positively affect both the tribal 
structure and the traditional Shari'ah system in moving towards the 
establishment of the rule of law.186 
 
Many considered the 1992 enactment of the Basic Law of Governance187 a step forward, 
but more reform remains necessary.188 The 1992 law defines Saudi Arabia as an Arab and Islamic 
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state and establishes Islam as the state religion and Islamic law as the nation’s governing law. 
Article 1 states: “The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab and Islamic State. Its religion 
is Islam and its constitution is the Quran and the Sunnah (Traditions) of Prophet Muhammad…”189 
The state’s duties include the application of Sharia and the defense of Islamic doctrine. Article 23 
states: “The State shall protect the Islamic creed, [and] apply Sharia…”190 The law also mandates 
that the kingdom’s governing principles, derived from the Quran and Sunna, must stem from 
supreme principles of justice and equality consistent with Sharia standards.191 It stipulates, 
moreover, that the Quran and Sunna hold sway over all Saudi laws, including the Basic Law of 
Governance; this means that the formulation and legislative application of all Saudi laws must 
accord with Sharia.192 Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy193 and the king has ultimate 
supremacy as he rules over all the kingdom’s authorities. Article 44 states:  
Authorities in the State shall consist of: 
 - Judicial Authority. 
 - Executive Authority. 
 - Regulatory Authority. 
These authorities shall cooperate in the discharge of their functions in accordance with this 
Law and other laws. The King shall be their final authority.194 
 
The 1992 law also dictates that the Saudi judicial system follow Sharia and its principles and that 
the courts apply Islamic law in all cases.195 It requires, moreover, that the courts apply national 
legislation and regulations that accord with the sources of Sharia.196 
Article 48: The Courts shall apply rules of the Islamic Sharia in cases that are 
brought before them, according to the Holy Qur'an and the Sunna, and according 
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to laws, which are decreed by the ruler in agreement with the Holy Qur'an and 
the Sunna.197 
 
The kingdom has long subscribed to the Hanbali madhab, Islamic School of Law.198 Saudi 
courts and judges do not technically have to implement the specific beliefs of any of the Islamic 
law schools, but they tend to rely on the legal opinions of the Hanbali School in making their 
rulings and judgments.199 Judges can also, if necessary, apply interpretations that do not stem from 
any specific schools, as long as they align with Sharia rules.200 
Vogel’s observations of Saudi judges (qadis) and the inner workings of Saudi Sharia courts 
lead him to assert that judges often play major roles in helping disputing parties reach informal 
settlements (sulh); he points out, moreover that such settlements typically end disputes rather than 
necessitating additional rulings or judgments.201 He writes: 
In Saudi shari’a courts, I was often told, “the great majority” or “99 percent” of 
all civil cases end in reconciliation. I was often quoted the legal maxim, “sulh 
is best.” It comes from a verse of the Qur’an that suggests amicable divorce 
when a wife fears ill-treatment: 
[I]t shall not be wrong for the two to set things peacefully to rights between 
them: for sulh is best (al-sulh khayr) [4:128]202 
 
Some Muslim scholars argue that judges should only issue formal rulings,203 but Vogel 
claims that judges in Saudi courts often function both as adjudicators and as practitioners of 
alternative dispute resolution methods during the adjudicatory process. These methods include 
mediation and conciliation; Vogel claims that the judges actually tend to have high levels of 
expertise in applying these method, often producing the required amicable settlements between the 
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disputing parties.204 Judges in the West certainly do not engage in such practices, even when the 
law or the request of a judicial body makes the use of particular alternative methods obligatory.205 
Claimants in Saudi courts simply cease litigation once they reach sulh before the court. Settlements 
can also receive court certification if the parties so desire.206 The words of the second Khalif in 
Islam Umar – “Turn away the litigants, in order that they reach sulh, because judgment creates 
feelings of spite among a people”207 – further motivate qadis to help disputants settle their disputes 
informally. 
The Saudi court system has also contributed to legal development and reform in Saudi 
Arabia. The 2007 implementation of the new Law of the Judiciary and the new Law of the Board 
of Grievances exemplify recent legal reforms.208 The new Law of the Judiciary establishes the 
following hierarchical structure for the court system:  
1- The Supreme Court.  
2- Courts of Appeals. 
3- First instance courts, which consist of: General Courts, Penal Courts, Family 
Courts, Commercial Courts and Labor Courts.209 
 
Article 8 of the new Law of the Board of Grievances, moreover, specifies the following structure 
for the courts of the board: 
(1) The High Administrative Court.  
(2) The Administrative Courts of Appeal.  
(3) The Administrative Courts.210 
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The Implementation Mechanisms of the Judiciary Law and the Board of Grievances Law211 
abolish the jurisdiction of the Administrative Judiciary (the Board of Grievances) to hear 
commercial and penal cases which had existed prior to the enactment of the new laws. This 
followed the enactment of reforms to the Ordinary Judiciary – specifically to the commercial and 
penal courts – regarding the jurisdiction of the courts specified by law. The Implementation 
Mechanisms also mandate the transfer of the civil, commercial, and criminal quasi-judicial 
committees’ jurisdictions to the public judiciary, with exceptions for committees that deal with 
banks, financial markets, and customs cases. The Mechanisms state, moreover, that the Supreme 
Judicial Council will conduct a comprehensive study on the status of the excluded committees and 
suggest appropriate actions.212 
These judiciary system reforms may, at first glance, seem perfect and comparable in 
sophistication to other jurisdictions around the world. The judiciary has not, however, fully 
implemented the new laws, meaning that many provisions remain unenforced and predicting the 
timing of their complete and effective enactment remains difficult.213 Such progress is crucial 
nonetheless; the complete implementation of the new judiciary system laws will establish a clear 
and strong system for dispute resolution in the kingdom. 
Alternative dispute resolution should play a role in any future reform to the Saudi judicial 
system and the dispute resolution system in general. Vogel’s observation regarding the possible 
misuse of the sulh process in the Saudi courts warrants attention in this regard: 
Broad discretion to encourage sulh can cover abuses such as a qadi’s ineptitude, 
laziness, or dilatoriness, especially since case terminations by sulh are not 
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appealable. With the parties facing a choice between either sulh or long delays 
and unpredictable judgment, litigation can become mere ad hoc tests of will. 
Sulh can shield the reintroduction of tribal or customary law which the Saudi 
regime has long opposed. Perhaps worst of all, sulh lessens the pressure on the 
system and on individual qadis to undertake ijtihad in difficult and novel cases, 
perpetuating the present vacuum of law, substantive and procedural, on many 
matters relating to modern conditions.214 
 
8. Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Contemporary Saudi Legal System 
The Saudi legal system contains no specific laws regarding mediation, conciliation, or any 
other alternative methods except Arbitration.215 Sulh, as noted earlier, nonetheless exists as an 
alternative dispute resolution method in Saudi legal practice even though the practice of sulh stems 
from religious roles not legal requirements.216 Sulh in Saudi Sharia courts is a stable practice that 
well-trained Sharia judges have administered for decades, especially for cases related to family 
issues.217 
The Saudi legal system has legislated arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution 
method for decades, unlike sulh. The new Saudi law of tahkim (arbitration) abolished the 
provisions of the 1983 law.218 Some view this law as a step forward. Others go beyond this point 
to distinguish between the genuine meaning of tahkim, as an Islamic concept practiced in some 
Islamic jurisdictions such as Saudi Arabia, and the Western concept of arbitration. George Sayen, 
for instance, distinguishes tahkim from arbitration by defining it as a part of the adjudication and 
reconciliation process that cannot function independently.219 He also argues that Muslims have 
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difficulty accepting the idea that states can maintain or improve the administration of justice via 
means other than Islamic law or laws derived from its sources.220 
Few Saudi laws provide for the use of alternative dispute resolution, but some laws and 
regulations contain provisions that encourage recourse to amicable settlement mechanisms when 
resolving conflicts.221 Article 13 of the Law of Foreign Investment, for example, states that, in 
disputes between foreign investors and other parties (either the Saudi Government or any Saudi 
partner) linked to investors’ legal investments, the parties must pursue alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms; the law does not permit the resolution of such disputes via any other means 
unless informal resolution proves unreachable.222 
Some specialized commissions and committees also practice alternative methods, as 
required by certain legislation. The Labor Law, for example, makes attempted amicable settlement 
a procedural requirement before the Preliminary Commission for Settlement of Labor Disputes 
can hear cases. Article 220 of the Labor Law in Saudi Arabia states the following: “… Prior to 
referring the dispute to the Commission, the labor office shall take the necessary measures to settle 
the dispute amicably”.223 
 
The fact that Saudi Arabia has joined many international dispute resolution conventions 
and agreements warrants mention when addressing its legal framework for dispute resolution. It 
has, for example, joined the New York Convention, which aims to ensure the acceptance of all 
international arbitration clauses or agreements as well as the enforcement of foreign awards within 
member states.224 The flexibility that this convention grants its member states, particularly 
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regarding the right to reject foreign arbitration awards that violate their own laws arguably enabled 
Saudi Arabia to join it without relinquishing its national laws or Sharia provisions.225 
Saudi Arabia is also a member of the 1983 Convention on Judicial Co-operation between 
the States of the Arab League (known as the Riyadh Convention). This convention mandates the 
full recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards issued in any of its member states, unless they 
fall under any of the exceptions stated in Article 37. This article entitles member parties to, for 
example, reject and refuse to implement awards that violate Sharia or their own public policy.226 
Saudi Arabia has signed many other conventions, including the ICSID Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States.227 
Descriptions of these promising developments in the Saudi dispute resolution system must 
come with a note of caution:  
Dispute resolution in Saudi Arabia continues to develop. A prospering economy 
and an increase in foreign investment in recent years has prompted Saudi Arabia 
to take steps towards modernising the way disputes are resolved in Saudi 
Arabia. However, the implementation of changes generally is slow and Saudi 
Arabia remains a unique jurisdiction with respect to dispute resolution.228 
 
9. Conclusion 
Understanding the various stages through which ADR techniques have developed in 
different countries requires consideration of international practices in the field of alternative 
dispute resolution. Examining the recent progress of the concept of justice and the significant 
global growth of ADR reveals the tools necessary for evaluating the effectiveness of ADR at the 
national level and identifying the main related concerns. Such examinations can also improve the 
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practice of these methods on the national level. Leading countries such as the United States and 
the United Kingdom provide valuable lessons in this regard.   
Explaining dispute resolution’s deep roots in Islamic history is vital in the Saudi context, 
given Islam’s status as the kingdom’s official religion. This involves describing the concept of 
justice from the Islamic perspective and demonstrating the links between this notion and 
alternative dispute resolution methods. It also involves highlighting some of the related key 
elements in the Islamic legal system. Examining alternative dispute resolution in the Islamic 
context clarifies current ADR practices in the Saudi legal system and engenders comparisons 
between the Islamic origins of ADR and contemporary practices in some Muslim societies like 
Saudi Arabia. 
This chapter therefore emphasizes the necessity of including the effective use of alternative 
dispute resolution in any future reform initiatives or in any attempts to improve the dispute 
resolution system in Saudi Arabia. Legislators and scholars should view ADR methods not simply 
as alternatives, but as ideal and appropriate means. Efficiently resolving various contemporary 
disputes requires recognition of the global meaning of ADR and acknowledgment of what the new 
global order necessitates when it comes to implementing these mechanisms. 
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Arbitration is a form of adjudication that takes place out of court and leads to binding 
resolutions of disputed issues.1 It is frequently a less costly and more effective method of dispute 
resolution than formal litigation.2 Disputes cannot be arbitrated unless all parties consent. 
Agreements between contractual parties to submit disputes to arbitrators in lieu of filing lawsuits 
sufficiently justify the authorization of an arbitrator to resolve those disputes and rescind that 
authority from the courts.3 Recent years have seen an increase in arbitration’s popularity in many 
parts of the world. Belief in the efficaciousness of arbitration has, for example, made it the 
foremost means of resolving workplace conflicts and business-related disputes in the United 
States.4 
Arbitration has been around since antiquity. Aristotle, for example, compared the 
philosophy of arbitration and the role of an arbitrator to the philosophy of litigation and the role of 
a judge.5 He believed – and this belief held sway for more than a thousand years – the main function 
                                                 
1 THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 1–7 (5th ed. 2014).  
2 Id. 
3 Id.; see also MICHAEL PALMER, DISPUTE PROCESSES: ADR AND THE PRIMARY FORMS OF DECISION-MAKING 221–
35 (2nd ed. 2005); (“The simplest case we might imagine is that where two parties in dispute agree to approach a 
non- aligned third – the “neutral stranger” – and ask her to make a determination for them. A whole range of 
attributes might give the decision-maker legitimacy in a particular case. The parties might trust her: because she 
has no stake in the issue; because of her reputation as a wise and fair decision- maker; because of her professional 
background and training. ….”) Id. 
4 CARBONNEAU, supra note 1 at xiii–xiv. 
5 ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC. Translated by W. Rhys Roberts 50 (Dover thrift Eds 2004); (“It bids us remember benefits 
rather than injuries, and benefits received rather than benefits conferred; to be patient when we are wronged; to 
settle a dispute by negotiation and not by force; to prefer arbitration to litigation – for an arbitrator goes by the 
equity of a case, a judge by the strict law, and arbitration was invented with the express purpose of securing full 
power for equity.”) Id.; see also David C. Mirhady, Aristotle and the Law Courts, 23 POLIS J. ANC. GREEK POLIT. 
THOUGHT 302–318 (2006), the article describes the reason why Arbitration was invented by explaining the role 
of the arbitrator as follows: “the arbitrator looks at equity (to epieikes), but the dicast looks (only) at the law, and 
the reason why an [arbitrator] was invented was that equity might prevail” Id.; The English arbitration system 
witnessed a historical split between notions of law and equity. English courts subsequently focused on insuring 
that arbitral awards were based on law and no longer only on equity. Courts judged awards rendered by arbitrators 
legally insufficient if they were based only on arbitrators’ comprehension of fairness without regard for what the 
law has to say in that particular matter. BUILDING THE CIVILIZATION OF ARBITRATION, 338–39 (Thomas E. 
Carbonneau & Angelica M. Sinopole Eds., 2010); (“The court reasoning emphasized the importance of achieving 
adjudicatory results through the proper application of law and the essential role the courts played in realizing that 




of arbitrators was to mediate disputes to arrive at a satisfactory result for the disputants and 
strengthen the relationships between them or at least prevent hostility. Arbitrators sought the 
middle ground between disputants and arrived at settlements based on mutual concessions.6 
Arbitration in England, for example, supplemented the formal legal process, as follows:  
Litigation was a risky and expensive business; if pursued to its conclusion it 
produced a clear-cut winner-and loser. Arbitration was a much safer alternative 
because its primary function remained the achievement of a compromise 
acceptable to both sides… The function of arbitration, therefore, was 
complementary to that of the legal system. In this respect it should be seen as 
one of a number of equitable resorts to which disputants had [recourse] in the 
late middle ages.7 
 
Zephaniah Swift, in his late eighteenth century text A System of the Laws of the State of 
Connecticut, similarly defined arbitration as “an amicable and neighbourly mode of settling 
personal controversies.”8 This definition is consistent with Aristotle’s,9 and, together, these 
examples indicate that arbitration has long been perceived as a non-binding and amicable means 
of settling disputes out of court. Such historical extra-judicial proceedings, however, lacked the 
power arbitration enjoys today. Growing recognition of arbitration’s effectiveness in recent years 
                                                 
objective. Similarly, contracting parties could not authorize arbitrators to rule in equity instead of law. Given the 
division between law and equity and the nature of equity, courts were unable to supervise arbitral awards rendered 
on the basis of arbitrator perceptions of fairness”) Id. 
6 Michael John Mustill, Arbitration: History and background, 6 J INTL ARB 43 (1989); Edward Powell, Settlement 
of disputes by arbitration in fifteenth-century England, 2 LAW HIST. REV. 21–43 (1984); (“The history of 
arbitration procedures and extra-judicial forms of dispute settlement in medieval England remains largely 
unwritten. This neglect is no doubt attributable to the precocious development of the common law, which has 
monopolized the attention of English legal historians and left them little time to consider alternative forms of 
dispute resolution. Their main preoccupation, epitomized in the work of great scholars such as Maitland, 
Holdsworth and Plucknett, has been to trace the evolution of legal institutions, procedures and doctrine. 
Consideration of arbitration has at best been regarded as peripheral to this central task.”) Id. 
7 Powell, supra note 6. 
8 Z. SWIFT, 2 A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT: IN SIX BOOKS 7 (1795); BRUCE H. MANN, 
NEIGHBORS AND STRANGERS: LAW AND COMMUNITY IN EARLY CONNECTICUT 101 (1987); Mann explained that in 
the past people used many techniques to resolve their disagreements with others. Some of the methods he 
described were “neighborly,” in that they would end disputes in a peaceful way between the parties. Un-neighborly 
methods, however, were those that brought nothing but divisions to the disputants. Id. at 162-69.  
9 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 




has, in fact, made it an increasingly important and powerful method of dispute resolution in many 
parts of the world.  
 Arbitration has acquired great popularity, especially for resolving commercial disputes, in 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The principles of modern arbitration were introduced to the Saudi 
jurisdiction gradually. The Saudi government took several actions in the past two decades to 
reform its legal system and improve the dispute resolution framework within the Kingdom.10 The 
Law of Arbitration, enacted in 2012, was a milestone in this regard.11 This law aligns with the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, but several issues in the Saudi jurisdiction, including the considerable 
extent of court intervention and the enforcement of international arbitral awards, still warrant 
criticism.12 
             This chapter examines, analyzes, and critiques Saudi arbitration law and practice. It 
describes the historical evolution of the Saudi experience with arbitration, and evaluates the current 
Law of Arbitration in comparison to the previous legal framework. It also highlights the 
differences between the Islamic approach to dispute resolution, known as “tahkim”, and Western 
arbitration to show how the Saudi jurisdiction has shifted from tahkim to arbitration over the past 
decades. Modern principles of arbitration have been gradually introduced during these years. This 
chapter argues, however, that practical issues with the current legal framework prevent Saudi 
Arabia from being considered an arbitration-friendly jurisdiction; it identifies and analyzes these 
problems and proposes solutions and recommendations for future reforms. The chapter ultimately 
                                                 
10 See generally JOSEPH A. KECHICHIAN, LEGAL AND POLITICAL REFORMS IN SAʻUDI ARABIA (2013). 
11 See infra note 246 and accompanying text. 
12 For more information about the enforcement of international arbitral awards in Saudi Arabia under the current 
law, see Saud Al-Ammari & A. Timothy Martin, Arbitration in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 30 ARBITR. INT. 
387–408 (2014). 




contends that if Saudi Arabia wishes to boost its reputation in the field of arbitration, actual practice 
should match the strong statutory support for arbitration reflected in the 2012 Law of Arbitration.   
2. Early History and Practice of Arbitration in the Islamic World 
2.1 The pre-Islamic period 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, founded in 1932, is currently the largest country in the 
Arabian Peninsula. The early history of arbitration in this region resembles that of other parts of 
the world. Members of ancient tribal societies submitted their disputes to third parties, usually the 
heads of tribes, sages, or priests.13 Pre-Islamic Arabian clans were not subject to a unified or 
dominant authority, so they relied on their own rules and traditions to settle disputes between clan 
members.14 Settling conflicts between individuals and/or groups was an amicable and voluntary 
process; settlements, therefore, did not bind the parties.15 Disputants in such instances did, 
however, pledge assets to ensure implementation and enforcement of decisions prior to deciding 
matters.16 Such processes were known generally as “Tahkim”, the Arabic term for arbitration 
(“hakam” means arbitrator).17 Tahkim served as the only peaceful means in pre-Islamic times for 
                                                 
13 JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 6–9 (1982); ("The absence of an organized political 
authority in Arab society … implied the absence of an organized judicial system. ... [I]f protracted negotiation 
between the parties led to no result, recourse was normally 'had to an arbitrator (hakam)") Id. at 8; ̒ ABD AL-ḤAMĪD 
AḤDAB & JALAL EL-AHDAB, ARBITRATION WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES 5, 6 (3rd rev. and expanded ed. 2011). 
14 Id.; SCHACHT, supra note 13 at 6–9. See also NOEL J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 9, 10 (1964). 
15 SCHACHT, supra note 13 at 6–9.; AḤDAB AND EL-AHDAB, supra note 13 at 5,6. 
16 Id.; SCHACHT, supra note 13 at 6–9. (“… [E]ach party had to provide a security, either property or hostages, as a 
guarantee that they would abide by his decision. The decision of the hakam, which was final, was not an 
enforceable judgment … but rather a statement of right on a disputed point.") Id. at 8. 
17 ANN BLACK, MODERN PERSPECTIVES ON ISLAMIC LAW 161 (2013); Individuals did not have to meet specific 
requirements or qualifications to become hakams. Disputants could freely choose any person, usually the head of 
the clan, to decide the matter. Parties did, however, take into consideration a person’s, or the person’s family’s, 
skills and experience in settling conflicts when selecting hakams. SCHACHT, supra note 13 at 7, 8.  




disputing parties to resolve their disputes;18 it did not emerge as an alternative approach to any 
other method in the Arab world.19 Unsuccessful tahkim, in some circumstances, resulted in war.20  
2.2 Early Islamic practice 
 The birth of Islam in the Arabian Peninsula both reinforced and substantively altered 
traditional dispute resolution. The Prophet Mohammed and his companions acknowledged the 
prevailing peaceful method of settling disputes between parties.21 People continued settling their 
disputes using traditional methods after the Prophet established the new Muslim society.22 The 
rules for deciding disputes, however, did change. Muslims were now obligated to apply the Islamic 
principles and rules proclaimed by Allah and taught to the people by his Prophet.23 The Quran 
states: “O believers! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger, and those in authority among you. 
Should you disagree on anything, then refer it to Allah and His Messenger, if you ‘truly’ believe 
in Allah and the Last Day. That is the best and fairest resolution.”24 Coulson writes: “The principle 
that God was the only lawgiver and that his command was to have supreme control over all aspects 
of life was clearly established.”25  
 Muslims considered the Prophet the qadi (judge) and/or the hakam to whom disputants 
had recourse.26 The Prophet therefore exercised the roles of a hakam and a qadi in the new Muslim 
                                                 




21 AḤDAB AND EL-AHDAB, supra note 13 at 5–10. 
22 Id. at 6, 7; Aida Othman, “And Amicable Settlement Is Best”: Sulh and Dispute Resolution in Islamic Law, 21 
ARAB LAW Q. 64–90 (2007). 
23 Id.; Sayen, supra note 18. 
24 (Quran 4:59). 
25 COULSON, supra note 14 at 20. 
26 Id. at 21.; SCHACHT, supra note 13 at 10, 11.; see also V. M. LEBEDEV ET AL., JUSTICE IN THE MODERN WORLD 
106, 107 (2014). 




society.27 He oversaw the administration of justice and was the supreme qadi.28 The Quran, 
arguably, distinguishes between qadis and hakams. Words derived from hakam generally refer to 
the Prophet’s judicial acts while words derived from qadi denote supreme decrees or orders from 
God and/or his Prophet.29 One Qur’anic verse, however, combines derivatives from both words:  
But no, by thy Lord, they will not (really) believe until they make thee an arbitrator 
(yuhakkimuk) of what is in dispute between them and find within themselves no 
dislike of that which thou decidest (qadayt), and submit with (full) submission.30  
 
The derivation of the word hakam denotes the tahkim activity of the Prophet, while the word 
qadayt, which originated from qada, asserts the new characteristics of the Prophet’s ruling.31 All 
Muslims must recognize this ruling as official, final and binding.32 This verse suggests that 
Muslims not only must resort to the Prophet to resolve conflicts between them, but that they must 
also completely accept his decisions. The verse thus introduced a new framework for dispute 
resolution and justice in the Islamic era.33  
2.3 Dispute resolution under the Khalifs 
The Prophet’s Khalifs (successors) took on the role of deciding all disputes among Muslims 
after the Prophet’s death.34 They continued to acknowledge the newly reformed Islamic system of 
                                                 
27 SCHACHT, supra note 13 at 10–12. 
28 LEBEDEV ET AL., supra note 26 at 101.; ("The Prophet administrated justice, settling many disputes, resolving 
conflicts, and his decisions served thereafter as a model when considering analogous judicial cases.”) Id. at 101; 
COULSON, supra note 14 at 22. 
29 SCHACHT, supra note 13 at 10, 11. 
30 (Quran 4:65); There are several similar translations of the Arabic version of this verse, but this one is available 
at:  SCHACHT, supra note 13 at 10. Another translation of the same verse reads as follows: “But no! By your Lord, 
they will never be ‘true’ believers until they accept you ‘O Prophet’ as the judge in their disputes, and find no 
resistance within themselves against your decision and submit wholeheartedly.”  
31 Id. at 15, 16. 
32 Id. 
33 Id.; see also LEBEDEV ET AL., supra note 26 at 106, 07. 
34 Id. at 106; COULSON, supra note 14 at 25, 26. 




tahkim.35 Qualified Muslim individuals chosen, as in pre-Islamic times, by disputants decided 
disputes by applying Sharia provisions. 
Tahkim in the Islamic era covered a variety of areas, including individual rights and family 
issues.36 Its scope extended to political conflicts, as in the famous disagreement between Ali Ibn 
Abi Talib and Mu’awiya in 658 AD.37 This dispute stemmed from the refusal of Mu’awiya, who 
ruled Syria, to recognize Ali as the Khalif of all Muslims after the death of the third Islamic Khalif 
(Othman Ibn Affan).38 Mu’awiya requested that the conflict be resolved by tahkim, and Ali, after 
consulting with his companions, agreed. Each party then appointed an arbitrator (hakam).39 The 
two hakams wrote down the tahkim agreement outlined by the parties.40 The tahkim agreement 
read: "This is what was agreed [upon by] Ali Ben Abi Taleb and Muawiyat Ben Abi Sufiane."41 It 
stated that the hakams would decide the matter first in accordance with the Quran: "The [hakams] 
shall apply what they find applicable among the provisions of the Book.” The agreement went on 
to assert a second source of law the hakams should apply: “If the matter in dispute is not resolved 
in the Book, [they] shall apply the Sunna, i.e., the rules unanimously agreed upon."42 The 
                                                 
35 SCHACHT, supra note 13 at 15–17. 
36 AḤDAB AND EL-AHDAB, supra note 13 at 5–10. 
37 Id.; see also RALPH H. SALMI, ISLAM AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORIES AND PRACTICES 29 (1998); see 
generally TAYEB EL-HIBRI, PARABLE AND POLITICS IN EARLY ISLAMIC HISTORY: THE RASHIDUN CALIPHS (2010).  
38 AḤDAB AND EL-AHDAB, supra note 13 at 5–11. 
39 Id.; A particular group of people later disagreed with Khalif Ali’s decision to proceed with tahkim in this matter. 
The dispute continued between Ali and these people, who came to be known as “Khawarej,” and led to violence 
as the Khawarej were accused of killing almost everyone who supported Ali’s decision to resort to tahkim. Id. at 
11. 
40 Id. at 5-11. 
41 Id. at 10. 
42 Note that the drafting here is unclear regarding whether the word Sunna refers to the Prophet’s words and deeds 
or something else – especially since the phrase “the rules unanimously agreed upon” follows the word Sunna in 
the agreement. The clause, whether purposefully or not, did not specify that the hakams should apply the Sunna 
of the Prophet, if they found no applicable provision in the Quran. Martin Hinds has argued that the broad drafting 
and the ambiguity of this clause could expand the hakams’ authority: “What was this? Its presence in the text 
shows that the following of kitab allah [Quran] was not thought likely to provide any basis for a solution. It carries 
with it no specification of whose sunna is meant; indeed it could mean any sunna …” Martin Hinds, The Siffin 
Arbitration Agreement, 17 J. SEMIT. STUD. 93-129 (1972). (“ The central issue of sunna to which recourse was to 
be had must of course be connected with the development of the meaning of the word sunna from the broader 
“way of proceeding” and “generally agreed practice” in pre-Islamic and earliest Islamic times to the later and 




agreement also affirmed that the award, once rendered, would be final and binding: "[The] decision 
is binding upon the believers. Peace and justice shall surround them, and they may not be 
threatened by arms; this agreement is binding upon them, their families, chattels, those present and 
those absent."43 This clause replaced the old approach of ensuring the enforcement of the tahkim 
award by requiring the parties to pledge assets as security.44  
The agreement included other provisions to govern the process itself. For example: 
[Hakams] may not be dismissed due to war or segregation, unless they fail to fulfill 
their mission. [The] dispute must be examined in a time period expiring [on] the 
month of Ramadan unless the [hakams] desire to settle the dispute later, they should 
agree in this regard. If one of the [hakams] dies, the chief of the community shall 
replace him and shall be chosen [from] amongst the wise and just. The place of 
[tahkim] shall be located between Kufa and Damascus.45  
 
The early form of a tahkim (arbitration) agreement between two Muslim parties thus 
resembled present day arbitration agreements.46 It included many of the basic concepts of modern 
arbitration, such as freedom of contract, party autonomy, enforcement of the award, the choice of 
arbitrators, and arbitral immunity.47 The Ali Ibn Abi Talib and Mu’awiya tahkim marked the first 
time in Islamic history that parties used takhim to resolve a political dispute.48 The agreement did 
not, however, clearly specify the disputes that the parties agreed to have settled through tahkim.49 
That could partially explain why the tahkim process proved unsuccessful in this case,50 even 
                                                 
narrower meaning of “ precedents set by the Prophet.” Id.; note also that, upon Muawiyat’s request, the agreement 
did not contain any reference to Ali’s title as a Khalif of Muslims. Id. Such incidents reinforce the view that, in 
the drafting agreements, every word counts. 
43 AḤDAB AND EL-AHDAB, supra note 13 at 10.  
44 See SCHACHT, supra note 13 at 8, 11, 12. 
45 AḤDAB AND EL-AHDAB, supra note 13 at 10. 
46 Id. at 9-11. 
47 For basic concepts and principles of arbitration see CARBONNEAU, supra note 1 at 49–123. 
48 AḤDAB AND EL-AHDAB, supra note 13 at 9–11. 
49 Id. 
50 See generally Sayen, supra note 18. 




though the tahkim agreement included many principles known today in the regulation of 
arbitration.51     
2.4  Tahkim and the early judges  
History suggests that tahkim was a valid and an acceptable means to settle disputes between 
Arabs in the pre-Islamic period. The rise of Islam brought the first reform to the ordinary process 
of tahkim. The Prophet Mohammed and his successors determined that the practice of tahkim and 
all its results should comply with the two sources of Islamic Sharia at that time, the Quran and the 
Sunna of the Prophet.52 This practice coincided with judicial activity. The Prophet himself initially 
performed both practices.53 The broadening of the State in later years led to the appointment of 
judges (known as qadis), during both the time of the Prophet and that of his successors. It should 
be noted, however, that at the time there were no judicial bodies such as courts.54   
Muslim hakams and qadis (judges) both drew from the same sources of law, but differences 
persisted between the two positions. First, the Prophet and his successors appointed qadis, while 
disputants themselves selected hakams.55 Parties that failed to agree on one hakam would select 
                                                 
51 See generally SALMI, supra note 37; Hinds, supra note 42. M. Hinds describes the matter by his word as follows: 
“The whole affair bears every sign of having been a skillfully organized divisive manoeuvre, which successfully 
wrecked ‘Ali’s coalition. … The arbitration itself was a farce best summed up by Khalifa in one sentence ‘the 
arbiters agreed on nothing’.” Id.    
52 BLACK, supra note 17 at 160–64. The Quran and the Sunna of the Prophet are the two main sources of Islamic 
law. One of the most recognized scholars in Islamic law in Russia explains these sources by drawing a distinction 
between sharia and fiqh. “L.R. Syukiyainen, noted that Sharia includes the prescriptions of the Quran and Sunna 
as God’s revelation, establishing the general framework for modes of thinking and acting of the true believer, 
whereas Fiqh contains specific rules of consensus worked out on the basis thereof.” He also distinguished between 
the two sources of fiqh that are the secondary sources of Islamic law: “The norms of Fiqh are the products of the 
consensus opinion of companions of the Prophet and are the most authoritative Islamic jurists (Ijma) or theoretical 
constructions formed by analogy (Qiyas).”V. M. LEBEDEV ET AL., JUSTICE IN THE MODERN WORLD 98 (2014); see 
also COULSON, supra note 14 at 75–85.      
53 SCHACHT, supra note 13 at 10, 11. 
54 LEBEDEV ET AL., supra note 26 at 102. 
55 Id. at 107. 




their own hakams and the two hakams would decide the dispute together.56 Second, the both qadis 
and hakams represented the person who appointed them and acted on that person’s behalf; a qadi 
therefore represented the leader of the State while a hakam acted on behalf of the parties to the 
tahkim agreement.57 Finally, a hakam derived his power from the parties’ agreement, whereas the 
State or its leader granted and restricted the authority of a qadi.58 Outcomes in both systems, and 
under Islamic Sharia law provisions, were binding. 
2.5 The Umayyad era (661-750): The rise of hostility toward tahkim 
 Mu’awiya became Khalif of the Umayyad dynasty in 661 A.D and his regime 
purposefully weakened the tahkim system. This had never happened before in Arab and Muslim 
societies. The Umayyads’ governors mandated that officially appointed judges would resolve 
disputes.59 They applied and granted the doctrine of mandatory jurisdiction to qadis, thus replacing 
traditional tahkim methods with the Islamic judiciary system.60 Schacht describes the shift in these 
societies as follows: 
The Umayyads, or rather their governors, also took the important step of appointing' 
Islamic judges or kadis. The office of kadi was created in and for the new Islamic 
society, which came into being, under the new conditions resulting from the Arab 
conquest, in the urban centres of the Arab Kingdom. For this new society, the 
arbitration of pre-Islamic Arabia and of the earliest period of Islam was no longer 
adequate, and the Arab hakam was supplanted by the Islamic kadi.61 
 
The character of the tahkim changed dramatically at this stage – it effectively lost its 
significance.62 The dynasty gave its full support to the alternative method of resolving disputes 
                                                 
56 Sayen, supra note 18. The previously illustrated case of the dispute between Khalif Ali and Mu’awiya exemplifies 
this technique of selecting hakams. 
57 LEBEDEV ET AL., supra note 26 at 107. 
58 Id.; see also SCHACHT, supra note 13 at 23–27. 
59 BLACK, supra note 17 at 160, 161; SCHACHT, supra note 13 at 23–25; COULSON, supra note 14 at 28, 29; Sayen, 
supra note 18. 
60 COULSON, supra note 14 at 27, 28; BLACK, supra note 17 at 160, 161. 
61 SCHACHT, supra note 13 at 24.  
62 BLACK, supra note 17 at 160, 161. 




(qada) and reinforced the system like never before.63 Judicial authority thus became the new 
official system.64 Tahkim did not vanish entirely after the emergence of the formal system, though 
it suffered a great deal,65 and the Umayyads required judicial review of any tahkim decision.66 
Enforcing a tahkim decision became difficult, if not impossible, because of the hostility powerful 
official authorities and the qadis harbored for tahkim.67 The old method of settling disputes through 
takhim nevertheless persisted, if in a diminished state.  
The era of the Umayyad dynasty thus witnessed the first instance of official hostility 
toward tahkim in Arab and Muslim history. It also witnessed a change in the character of tahkim; 
the rise of the qadis not only caused tahkim to function differently than in the past, but also caused 
it to function differently than arbitration in other parts of the world.68 The term tahkim continued 
to refer to the process, disregarding its new “voluntary nature”.  The initiation of agreements after 
disputes had arisen, however, remained a typical characteristic of the institution of tahkim. The 
tahkim process thus remained unable to resolve potential future conflicts.69  
2.6 Tahkim and Islamic jurisprudence schools: Abbasid dynasty (750-1258)  
 The Abbasid era followed the Umayyads and qadis continued to enjoy support from the 
rulers.70 The qadis actually received more support because they no longer had to abide by the rules 
of the Khalif.71 The Abbasids guaranteed the independence of the judiciary and Islamic law 
                                                 







70 SCHACHT, supra note 13 at 49–53. 
71 Id. 




became the sole basis for decisions by qadis.72 The qadis thus grew in status,73 further diminishing 
the role of the hakam and the practice of tahkim in Muslim societies. Being a qadi also required 
expertise in Sharia.74 This development affected the appointment of hakams later in Islamic 
history.75   
The four Islamic schools of fiqh (jurisprudence) also date to the Abbasid era.76 Each school of fiqh 
– Shafi’i, Maliki, Hanbali, and Hanafi – carried the name of its founder.77 The dynasty’s 
geographical expansion led the Schools to spread throughout the Kingdom. Each main region 
followed its School, and the Schools reflected the prevailing thought of their particular 
geographical areas.78 Tahkim continued to receive some degree of official recognition. All the 
Islamic schools of fiqh acknowledged it, though they held different positions concerning its 
procedures. 79 Coulson contends that the schools were ultimately less different than they appeared. 
He writes:  
 Yet, however distinct the four schools might appear from the standpoint of both 
their doctrine and the conduct of legal practice generally, they were fused and 
blended together by Islamic legal philosophy as inseparable manifestations of the 
same single essence.80    
                                                 
72 Id.; During the Umayyad dynasty, rulers had a superior power over qadis and their decisions. Such authority 
meant qadis’ decisions depended on the ruler. The ruler’s satisfaction, or lack thereof, would determine the fate 
of such decisions as well as their enforcement. COULSON, supra note 14 at 120, 121.  
73 Id. at 121. 
74 SCHACHT, supra note 13 at 50. 
75 Id. at 189. 
76 Id. at 69–75. 
77 Id. at 69–75.; COULSON, supra note 14 at 86–102; LEBEDEV ET AL., supra note 26 at 104. See generally,BLACK, 
supra note 17. See also MOHAMED M. KESHAVJEE, ISLAM, SHARIA AND ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: 
MECHANISMS FOR LEGAL REDRESS IN THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY 62, 63 (2013); SADAKAT KADRI, HEAVEN ON 
EARTH: A JOURNEY THROUGH SHARI’A LAW FROM THE DESERTS OF ANCIENT ARABIA TO THE STREETS OF THE 
MODERN MUSLIM WORLD 53–70 (1st American ed. 2012); Schacht identified the significant contribution of the 
Abbasid era to Islamic law and the substantial accomplishment of the four law schools at that time: “… Islamic 
law, which until the early 'Abbasid period had been adaptable and growing, from then onwards became 
increasingly rigid and set in its final mould. This essential rigidity of Islamic law helped it to maintain its stability 
over the centuries which saw the decay of the political institutions of Islam.” SCHACHT, supra note 13 at 75. 
78 Id. at 57–68. 
79 AḤDAB AND EL-AHDAB, supra note 13 at 11–13. 
80 COULSON, supra note 14 at 102.; he also noted that: "Islamic jurisprudence succinctly expresses the very same 
notion in the alleged words of the Prophet: 'Differences of opinion among my community is a sign of the bounty 
of God.'" Id.; some antagonism, however, existed between the four schools of fiqh in the early history of their 





The schools nevertheless disagreed regarding tahkim. Some believed that tahkim should be a 
binding process of dispute resolution; they argued the arbitrators should be granted the authority 
to decide matters, and that their decisions should be enforced once rendered.81 This view of tahkim 
to some extent resembles contemporary practices of arbitration in many Western countries and 
other parts of the world. Other schools perceived tahkim as a friendly, voluntary and peacemaking 
approach to settling disputes.82 Those who held such views believed awards, should be based on 
equity rather than the law.83  
The diverse views of the Islamic schools of fiqh regarding tahkim highlight its unique 
characteristics in the Islamic world.84 The Hanafi School endorsed tahkim and its simplicity but 
deemed it similar to reconciliation.85 The Shafi’i School also recognized tahkim, but saw appointed 
arbitrators as possessing less power than official qadis, since the parties could discharge them.86 
Shafi’i scholars also perceived Tahkim as the best alternative to the court during extended periods 
of judicial misconduct or when corruption was suspected in the court system.87 These two Schools 
thus regarded tahkim as similar to reconciliation and neither viewed the decisions of hakams as 
binding unless the parties had agreed they should be so.88 The Maliki School held that the hakams’ 
                                                 
formation. A concord occurred among them later on, which positively contributed to the field of Islamic law. On 
that subject, Coulson writes: "Once the hostility between the schools had disappeared and they had settled down 
to a state of peaceful co-existance, the development of doctrine naturally displayed traces influences between 
them. But although this process of interaction often resulted in a superficial assimilation of the details of the law, 
it rarely affected the basic characteristics of the different systems.” Id. at 93; later in the history of the Islamic 
schools of fiqh, the four schools succeeded in coming to terms with each other and settling their differences. This 
success resulted from ijma (consensus) SCHACHT, supra note 13 at 67, 68. 
81 AḤDAB AND EL-AHDAB, supra note 13 at 11–13. 
82 Id. 
83 Id.; see also KESHAVJEE, supra note 77 at 67. 
84 AḤDAB AND EL-AHDAB, supra note 13 at 13. 
85 Id. at 13–15. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 KESHAVJEE, supra note 77 at 67. 




awards were final and binding, unless based on blatant legal errors or blatantly unfair.89 Maliki 
scholars assigned qadis had the power to review awards to determine the existence of such legal 
errors or “flagrant injustices.”90 The Hanbali School viewed the awards of hakams as binding and 
of comparable power to the judgments of the qadis. Assigning similar authority to the awards of 
hakams and the judgments of qadis affected the appointment of arbitrators under the Hanbali 
School; arbitrators appointed by the parties had to meet all the qualifications met by qadis.91 
Hanbali scholars also predicated the binding nature of any hakam’s award on the absence of any 
“flagrant injustice” in said award.92 
This review of the status of tahkim before and during the time of the Islamic schools of 
fiqh prompts several observations. First, hostility toward the institution of tahkim during these 
years did not cause the practice to recede completely from view.93 It survived through the golden 
era of the Islamic schools of fiqh and continued to be recognized in Islamic law.94 Second, the fact 
that tahkim in Arabic translates to arbitration does not indicate that the terms are interchangeable 
in practice; each term refers to a different institution and background, and each is applied 
                                                 
89 AḤDAB AND EL-AHDAB, supra note 13 at 13–15. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 KESHAVJEE, supra note 77 at 67; these various forms of tahkim should be distinguished from other forms of 
arbitration known in some parts of the world today: “… [The different concepts of tahkim] shall not be assimilated 
to modern concepts of arbitration, that is, arbitration in law and arbitration in equity. It is also wrong to assimilate 
them to the socialist arbitration concept. Indeed, the two concepts known in the Shari’a have features which do 
not coincide with those of the two concepts known through the rest of the world. If arbitration based on an attempt 
at conciliation, which is not binding upon the parties, may be close to equity arbitration (amiable composition) as 
known in the Western world, it does not correspond quite exactly to this kind of arbitration which was conceived 
by the modern liberal school. The same holds true for arbitration which award rendered therein is binding.”AḤDAB 
AND EL-AHDAB, supra note 13 at 13; Arbitration statutes in civil law jurisdictions clearly recognize both forms of 
arbitration (law or equity arbitration) and parties are free to choose which type of arbitration their dispute is to be 
decided upon.  Determining whether such a division exists in common law jurisdictions, by contrast, is quite 
difficult. Courts in many cases, however, do understand that the parties always assume that the arbitrators will 
conduct the process of arbitration in a different manner than the procedures followed by formal judges. Sayen, 
supra note 23; RENÉ DAVID, ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1985). 
93 Sayen, supra note 18. BLACK, supra note 17 at 160, 161. 
94 See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text. 




differently.95 Similarities existed between the two systems, but the distinctions are clear.96 Third, 
the Islamic schools of fiqh divided tahkim into two forms based on the outcome of the process. 
The question of the resolution’s binding effect determined the nature of each form:  tahkim had 
either an “amiable composition” or a binding character.97 A combination of the two formulas was 
also conceivable.98 The application of these different mechanisms varied based on geographic 
region and the school that held sway in a given area. Finally, at least one of the Schools (the Shafi’i) 
saw tahkim, for the first time in the history of Islamic law, as an alternative means of resolving 
disputes between Muslim parties when the judicial system suffered from corruption.99 
2.7 Takhim under the Ottoman Code 
Tahkim continued to evolve as Islamic law developed over the centuries,100 Jurists drove the 
modernization of Islamic law throughout its history. Schacht characterizes their efforts as follows:  
Islamic jurisprudence did not grow out of an existing law, it itself created it; and 
once again, it has been the modernist jurists who prepared, provoked, and guided a 
new legislation. It had been the task of the early specialists to impose Islamic 
standards on law and society; the real task which confronts the contemporary 
jurists, beyond their immediate aim of adapting traditional Islamic law to modern 
conditions, is to evaluate modern social life and modern legal thought from an 
Islamic angle, to determine which elements in traditional Islamic doctrine 
represent, in their view, the essential Islamic standards.101 
 
The enactment of the Majelle, or Ottoman Code, during the Ottoman Empire proved an important 
step in the modernization of Islamic law.102 The Majelle, which drew on the Hanafi School doctrine 
                                                 
95 AḤDAB AND EL-AHDAB,   note 13 at 13; Sayen, supra note 18. see also SAMIR SALEH, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
IN THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST 61 (2nd ed. 2006). 
96 Id. 
97 See supra notes 81-92 and accompanying text. 
98 See generally KESHAVJEE, supra note 77; BLACK, supra note 17; Sayen, supra note 18. 
99 See supra notes 87 and accompanying text. 
100 See generally SCHACHT, supra note 13. 
101 Id. at 110, 111. 
102 Id. at 92, 93, 100. 




and bore the imprint of Western values, marked the first attempt to codify Islamic law in writing.103  
It consisted of 16 books, each of which dealt with a different subject104 and contained, in contrast 
to all previous codes, written provisions for tahkim.105 The last book, entitled “The Judiciary,” 
included an entire chapter dedicated to tahkim, which contained several articles covering various 
aspects of the process.106  
The Majelle contained a tahkim–related rule that resembled the concept of arbitrability, a 
concept recognized in contemporary arbitration law. The rule stipulated that only matters related 
to individual rights to possessions could be submitted to tahkim.107 This doctrine made any dispute 
arising in connection with these rights arbitrable, enabling parties to resort to tahkim; it deemed 
disputes that did not fall within the given scope as non-arbitrable.108 The Majelle also governed 
the appointment of hakams (arbitrators). One or more hakams could conduct the process, and if 
parties chose to use multiple hakams, each side could select his own hakam.109 The decision to 
have more than one hakam needed to be unanimous.110 Hakams had jurisdiction to rule over 
submitted disputes within the period of time specified and agreed upon by the parties; their 
authority expired at the end of that period.111 The provisions of the Majelle recognized the parties’ 
                                                 
103 Id.; LEBEDEV ET AL., supra note 26 at 110–12; AḤDAB AND EL-AHDAB, supra note 13 at 16–18. 
104 LEBEDEV ET AL., supra note 26 at 111; THE MEJELLE: BEING AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF MAJALLAH EL-
AHKAM-I-ADLIYA AND A COMPLETE CODE ON ISLAMIC CIVIL LAW, (C. R. Tyser ed., Repr ed. 2003). 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 C. A. Hooper, The Mejelle: Book XVI: Administration of Justice by the Court, ARAB LAW Q. 305–311 (1990);  
Article 1841 of the Majelle states: “Actions relating to rights concerning property may be settled by arbitration.” 
Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id.; Article 1843 declares: “More than one arbitrator may be appointed, that is to say, two or more persons may 
be appointed to give a decision in respect to one matter. Both plaintiff and defendant may each validly appoint an 
arbitrator.” 
110 Id.; Article 1844 asserts: “In the event of several arbitrators being appointed as above, their decision must be 
unanimous. One alone may not give a decision.” 
111 Id.; According to article 1846: “If the arbitration is limited as to time it ceases to be of effect after the expiration 
of such time. 
Example: 




agreement, specifying that the hakams only had jurisdiction to rule on the disputes the parties 
agreed to submit to tahkim.112 The hakams’ decisions were binding and enforceable only on the 
parties to the agreement and only concerning the submitted dispute.113 Such a decision had no 
binding effect on non-parties due to the hakams’ lack of authority or jurisdiction.114 Either party 
could dismiss hakams after their appointment except in two cases: 1. A court with proper 
jurisdiction had approved the selection; or 2. The tahkim had been completed and the submitted 
disputes decided.115  
The Majelle granted the power of judicial review to the courts: courts had the jurisdiction 
to set aside any decision made by hakams that contravened the law116and they had to approve the 
hakams’ decisions in the absence of any such violations.117 These rules governed a form of tahkim 
that required the hakams to conduct and complete the process in accordance with the law, and 
lawful decisions bound the parties. Article 1850, however, identified a second form of tahkim, 
namely tahkim by sulh (settlement)118 where the parties had authorized the hakams to conclude the 
dispute by making sulh between the parties.119 The appointed hakams did, however, have to reach 
                                                 
An arbitrator appointed to decide a matter within a period of one month from a certain date, may only decide such 
matter within that period. He cannot give a decision after the expiration of that month. If he does so, the judgment 
will not be executory.” 
112 Id.; article 1848 affirms the following: “All decisions by arbitrators as regards the persons and matters in respect 
to which they have been appointed are binding and executory to the same extent as the decisions by the Courts 
concerning persons within their jurisdiction. Consequently, a decision validly given by the arbitrators in 
accordance with the rules of law is binding on all parties.” 
113 Id. 
114 AḤDAB AND EL-AHDAB, supra note 13 at 16–18. Article 1851, however, states that: “Should unauthorized person 
act as arbitrator in a dispute and give a decision and the parties later agree to adopt his decision, such decision is 
executory.” Hooper, supra note 107 at 305–311. 
115 Id.; article 1847 states: “Either of the parties may dismiss the arbitrator before he has given his decision. If the 
parties have appointed an arbitrator, however, and such appointment has been confirmed by a Court duly 
authorized thereunto, the arbitrator is considered to be a representative of the Court and cannot be dismissed.” 
116 Id.; According to article 1849: “A decision by an arbitrator, upon submission to a properly constituted Court, 
shall be accepted and confirmed, if given in accordance with law. Otherwise, it shall not be so confirmed.” 
117 Id. 
118 See supra notes 81, 82, 88-98 and accompanying text. 
119 Hooper, supra note 107.  




the sulh in accordance with the Majelle’s book of sulh.120 Final decisions in tahkim by sulh were, 
crucially, no different than tahkim by law; both forms bound the parties.121 The dissimilarity 
between the two forms thus stemmed fundamentally from the procedural rules by which the 
hakams conducted them. 
The process of tahkim continued as an alternative method to the court system under the 
Ottomans, albeit subordinated in power and official favor to the judiciary.122 The presence of a 
valid tahkim agreement between the parties did not prevent courts from exercising their jurisdiction 
to decide cases brought by any of the parties disregarding the agreement.123 Tahkim of future 
disputes remained unrecognized under the Islamic fiqh, since the Majelle did not codify it; 
agreements regarding such disputes were therefore deemed invalid.124  
The Ottomans enacted the Majelle in the late nineteenth century. The enactment of codified 
laws similar to Western legislation but based on Islamic law has persisted throughout Islamic 
countries ever since.125 Several regions of the Arabian Peninsula that would become parts of Saudi 
Arabia were subject to the Majelle until its partial revocation around 1915.126 Tahkim and its 
provisions in the Majelle remained a part of twentieth century legal reforms and continued to be 
enforced in some jurisdictions.127 Some Arab countries, however, replaced such provisions by 
                                                 
120 Id.; see also C. A. Hooper, The Mejelle: Book XII: Settlement and Release,  ARAB LAW Q. 326–331 (1989). 
121 Article 1850 asserts: “The parties appointing the arbitrators may authorize the arbitrators, if they think fit, to 
make a settlement, and such arbitrators may then make a valid settlement. 
Thus, if each of the parties appoint a person to act as arbitrator with power to dispose of the matter in dispute by 
way of settlement, and such arbitrators duly arrive at a settlement in conformity with the terms of the Book on 
Settlements, such settlement and arrangement is binding on both parties.” Hooper, supra note 107. 
122 AḤDAB AND EL-AHDAB, supra note 13 at 16–18. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 19; ("The "Medjella" recognized the validity of arbitration submission agreements subject to the following 
four condition: 
     (a) The dispute must already have arisen and be clearly defined. …") Id.   
125 SCHACHT, supra note 13 at 89–93, 100–111. 
126 T. E LAWRENCE & ANGUS CALDER, SEVEN PILLARS OF WISDOM 49–60 (1997); see also FRANK E. VOGEL, ISLAMIC 
LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM: STUDIES OF SAUDI ARABIA 83–85 (2000); Id. at 284 n.11. 
127 See generally AḤDAB AND EL-AHDAB, supra note 13. 




enacting new tahkim laws; the Majelle influenced a considerable number of these.128 Other 
countries had no laws regarding tahkim until the latter part of the twentieth century. The principles 
of the Hanbali School controlled the process in Qatar, for example, before the 1972 drafting of the 
Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure.129    
3. Saudi Jurisdiction: Arbitration Law, Practice and Reform 
3.1 Early history of tahkim in the Saudi legal system 
3.1.1 The Commercial Court Law of 1931 
Saudi Arabian law recognized the validity of tahkim as a means of resolving disputes as 
early as the 1930s, although no separate law codified tahkim specifically. Several provisions of 
The Commercial Court Law, enacted in 1931, addressed procedural aspects of the tahkim 
process.130 The law stated that an arbitration agreement must be put in writing, then signed by the 
parties and notarized.131 It also required that the agreement contain all the terms the parties had 
agreed on, including the necessary quorum for the hakams’ decision and the deadline for 
concluding the tahkim.132 The parties could select one or more hakams and once the court 
                                                 
128 For example: the Iraqi arbitration experience,  Id. at 225–57, the Jordanian experience, Id. at 259–304, and 
Sudanese experience, Id. at 673–698.  
129 Id. at 571. 
130 These provisions, however, only applied to cases of a commercial nature as title “The law of the Commercial 
Court” indicates. Royal Decree No. 32 on 15/1/1350H (June 2nd, 1931) enacted this law and a new law in 1970 
replaced it. The provisions related to tahkim, among other issues, remained the same in the 1970 law. The text of 
the 1970 Law of the Commercial Court in Saudi Arabia can be accessed at: Saudi Arabia: The Law of Commercial 
Courts (promulgated by Royal Decree No. (M/2) on 15/1/1390H (March 23rd, 1970)), 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=14595 (last visited Feb 7, 2017); note that King Abdu Aziz was 
known as the King of Hijaz and Najd in 1926. He issued a decree in 1927 that contained this proviso: “rules of 
the Ottoman qanun continue to be applied until now, because we have not issued our Will abrogating them.” 
Before he became the King of Saudi Arabia in 1932, King Abdul Aziz started to release new codified laws. The 
law of Commercial Court was one of the very earliest acts issued by the King at that time. The Drafted provisions 
of this law drew from the earlier Ottoman laws including the Majelle. VOGEL, supra note 126 at 284, 285; see 
also A. M. VASILʹEV, THE HISTORY OF SAUDI ARABIA 302, 303 (2000). 
131 Article 493, the law of the Commercial Court, Royal Decree No. 32/1350H (1931). 
132 Id.  




confirmed the selection, the parties could not dismiss the hakams before they decided the 
dispute.133 This law made it possible for any parties to a tahkim agreement to appeal the decisions 
of the hakams to the Commercial Court. A third party could not challenge such a decision since 
only the parties to the agreement could enforce or be bound by such decisions.134 The hakams who 
decided a dispute would submit it to the court for review. Each party would then provide a 
statement regarding the decision that would include any objections they might have. The court 
then would either confirm or set aside the decision.135  
Critics of these tahkim provisions highlighted several specific shortcomings.136 First, 
additional provisions would be necessary to comprehensively cover the tahkim process.137 Second, 
the law specified no procedure for case where parties failed or refused to choose a hakam; it did 
not even grant the court jurisdiction to choose a hakam in such circumstances.138 Third, the 
enforcement of decisions required judicial review.139 Finally, the law covered neither arbitration 
clauses nor agreements to resort to tahkim in future conflicts.140  
3.1.2 Arbitration clauses in international agreements and oil concessions 
Agreements between parties to resolve future disputes remained unrecognized and 
therefore invalid in the Islamic fiqh well into the twentieth century. This, however, did not prevent 
the founder of Saudi Arabia, King Abdulaziz ibn Saud, from signing concession agreements that 
included arbitration clauses for future disputes with several Western oil companies in the early 
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140 Id.; Some scholars contend that, in the past, Islamic law simply disregarded clauses or agreements regarding 
future disputes rather than totally forbidding them. The complicity of contracts today as well as the development 
of business interests, for example, led to the subsequent recognition of such clauses and agreements in many 
Islamic jurisdictions. AḤDAB AND EL-AHDAB, supra note 13 at 20–24.  




decades of the twentieth century.141 The king issued a royal decree ratifying the oil concession 
agreement reached between Saudi Arabia and the Standard Oil Company of California (SOCAL) 
on July 7, 1933.142 The agreement stipulated that all potential future disputes or disagreements 
between the parties, out of or in connection with their agreement, would be submitted to arbitration 
if not settled by other extra-judicial means.143 The Saudi government’s approval of an agreement 
containing an arbitration clause constituted a recognition of arbitration clauses, even though the 
                                                 
141 A. M. VASILʹEV, THE HISTORY OF SAUDI ARABIA 312–20 (2000); in 1923, King Abdul Aziz signed an agreement 
with Major Frank Holmes who represented the Eastern and General Syndicate Ltd., that granted the British 
company an oil concession in AL-Ahsa in the eastern region of Saudi Arabia. Id. at 314; the parties agreed to 
arbitrate all future disputes in that agreement. See Confidential D 107 86/5-I Eastern and General Syndicate Ltd. 
- Saudi Arabia, [110v] at 187,188, Qatar Digital Library, available at:  
http://www.qdl.qa/en/archive/81055/vdc_100025704696.0x00001a (last visited Feb 6, 2017); see generally 
HARRY ST JOHN BRIDGER PHILBY, ARABIAN OIL VENTURES (1964); FOUAD FARSY, MODERNITY AND TRADITION: 
THE SAUDI EQUATION (1990). 
142 Royal Decree No. (M/1135) on 14/3/1352H (July 7th, 1933). 
143 Id. Article 31; The agreement is also known as The Original Concession Agreement, see UNITED STATES 
CONGRESS SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, 
V.6, PART 8 MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY. HEARINGS, NINETY-THIRD 
CONGRESS [NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION] 356–67 (1975). The clause clearly stated a number of 
essential elements such as the parties' intention to arbitrate any dispute between them, but the agreement did not 
specify other governing rules, such as the governing law, the means of substituting the arbitrators, the language 
of the arbitration and the time limit of the process. The parties’ failure to address such issues in the agreement 
caused ambiguity; this highlights the poor drafting of the clause. The award of a well-known case Saudi Arabia 
v. Aramco, which related to a dispute that arose later out of this agreement, addressed some of these concerns. See 
infra note 153 and accompanying text. Article 31 of the agreement reads: “If any doubt, difference or dispute shall 
arise between the government and the Company concerning the interpretation or execution of this contract, or 
anything herein contained or in connection herewith, or the rights and liabilities of the parties hereunder, it shall, 
failing any agreement to settle it in another way, be referred to two arbitrators, one of whom shall be chosen by 
each party, and a referee who shall be chosen by the arbitrators before proceeding to arbitration. Each party shall 
nominate its arbitrator within thirty days of being requested in writing by the other party to do so. In the event of 
the arbitrators failing to agree upon a referee, the government and the Company shall, in agreement, appoint a 
referee, and in the event of their failing to agree they shall request the President of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice to appoint a referee. The decision of the arbitrators, or in the case of a difference of opinion 
between them, the decision of the referee, shall be final. The place of arbitration shall be such as may be agreed 
upon by the parties, and in default of agreement shall be The Hague, Holland.” Id. at 365,366; this article is subject 
to various possible interpretations, especially the part that governs the tribunal decision-making process. The term 
did not clearly specify the method of this process. It also did not specify whether the third arbitrator (the referee) 
should act like a chairman or an umpire. Each position would grant the referee different authorities – for example, 
if the referee should decide the case solely or simply possess a casting vote. The various possible scenarios left 
unaddressed for this term contributed to the article’s vagueness, as illustrated above. Most of these concerns, 
however, were obviated in the arbitration agreement signed by the parties, as this a later section of this chapter 
shows A few years later, the parties agreed to add some supplementary provisions to the Concession agreement 
and to amend some of the existing ones; this has become known as the Supplemental Agreement of 1939. See Id. 
at 367–72; on January 31st, 1944 the name of the Company was changed to Arabian American Oil Company 
(Aramco). Id. at 367.        




1931 commercial law had no provisions for regulating agreements to resolve future disputes.144 
The Saudi government understood that, should any conflict arise, the Western companies agreed 
to resort to arbitration as practiced by Western countries – a different method than tahkim.  
The Saudi government may have chosen to sign agreements with arbitration clauses even 
though Saudi law did not cover such clauses because of the unequal bargaining power between the 
two parties.  Speculation about the magnitude and location of petroleum resources on the Arabian 
Peninsula accompanied the negotiations between Saudi Arabia and SOCAL. Western companies 
had greater bargaining power in negotiating agreements with Saudi Arabia before the drilling of 
major oil wells in 1938 brought recognition of the true economic importance the Saudi oil reserves. 
The newly-created Kingdom lacked the financial resources to exploit its resources and looked to 
Western companies to fund economic development.145  
The steps taken by the Saudi government to implicitly recognize such clauses stemmed 
from one of the latest developments in Islamic fiqh as expounded by the Hanbali School, the 
favored teaching in Saudi Arabia at that time.146 Al-Sanhuri once argued: “Perhaps the most 
remarked evolution in Islamic Law with respect to the ‘clause’ associated with a contract is that 
which characterizes the doctrine of Ahmad Ben Hanbal especially if it is completed by the teaching 
of Ibn Taimiyya.”147 The distinguished Hanbali scholar Ibn Taimiyya claimed that contracts are 
                                                 
144 See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
145 VASILʹEV, supra note 130 at 317–20; one of the agreements signed by the Saudi government at that time has been 
described as follows: ("The terms of the agreement were undoubtedly extremely advantageous to the company 
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and sunna.”) Id. at 10. 
147 AḤDAB AND EL-AHDAB, supra note 13 at 23; his name is Abdul Razzaq Al-Sanhuri, an Egyptian scholar of 
contemporary jurisprudence known for his legal work, especially his contribution to the revised Civil Law of 




binding if they require no action prohibited by Islam, and do not conflict with public policy.148 The 
renewed Hanbali doctrine invalidated clauses only as an exception to the general rule; it deemed 
any clause as valid unless it contradicted the contract, public policy or ethics, or unless Islamic 
law prohibited it.149 Some scholars have argued for the validity of arbitration clauses that ignore 
Islamic law (and practice) for various reasons including the growing interest and need for such 
clauses in contemporary commercial transactions.150  
The foregoing discussion illustrates the progress made by Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) in 
facilitating the acceptance and approval of arbitration clauses in agreements signed between the 
Saudi government and foreign oil companies in the early decades of the twentieth century. This 
does not mean, however, that Saudi Arabia has viewed arbitration (or even tahkim) favorably as a 
means to resolve domestic disputes. Western companies initially proposed arbitration clauses as 
preconditions to any agreements.151 The government’s attitude toward arbitration remained clear 
at that point, as no dispute requiring judicial attention had yet arisen The approval of arbitration 
clauses to resolve future disputes regarding oil concessions with foreign companies, and the 
                                                 
Egypt in 1948. See Enid Hill, Al-Sanhuri and Islamic Law: The Place and Significance of Islamic Law in the Life 
and Work of ’Abd al-Razzaq Ahmad al-Sanhuri, Egyptian Jurist and Scholar, 1895-1971, 3 ARAB LAW Q. 33–64 
(1988).  
148 AḤDAB AND EL-AHDAB, supra note 13 at 23. 
149 Id. Al- Al-Sanhuri concluded: “With the renewal brought by Ibn Taimmiyya, the Hanbali doctrine made  
a great step forward on the way of evolution. It has rejected the principle of the transaction’s unity and restricted 
the scope of invalid clauses. …Therefore, the Hanbali doctrine has come quite close to the Western doctrine …” 
Id.  
150 Id. at 24; but see SALEH, supra note 95 at 39, 40, 61–64. 
151 The texts of the drafted clauses contained in several signed agreements at that time support this conclusion. See 
supra notes 146-150 and accompanying text; the foreign companies clearly always intended to apply arbitration 
as practiced in some Western jurisdictions and not tahkim. The fact that these companies aimed to overcome the 
country’s law (Sharia) and courts testifies to this intention – tahkim, as an Islamic way of settling disputes, was 
thus one of the processes they sought to avoid. Some scholars point out: “… the classic concession agreement 
granted foreign oil companies largely unrestrained access to, and control over, states' petroleum supplies for fifty 
years or more, prescribed and then ‘froze’ extant law through so-called stabilization clauses, and required 
arbitration of any disputes that might arise. Thus the concessionaires secured their investments during the lifetime 
of the concessions. The decisive characteristic of each of the resulting arbitrations was the negation of domestic 
Islamic law, resulting in the elevation of "general principles of law" that were firmly rooted in the laws of Western 
jurisdictions (typically to the benefit of the foreign claimants).” Charles N. Brower & Jeremy K. Sharpe, 
International Arbitration and the Islamic World: The Third Phase, 97 AM. J. INT. LAW 643–656 (2003). 




absence of similar provisions for other contracts in Saudi law arguably highlight the distinction 
between tahkim and arbitration in the Saudi legal system at that time. 
3.2 Onassis agreement and Aramco case 
Hostility to arbitration in Saudi Arabia emerged due to the famous Aramco case.152 In 1954 
The Saudi government signed the so-called “Onassis agreement” in 1954, granting the shipping 
magnate Aristotle Onassis the privilege to start a new corporation known as Saudi Arabia Maritime 
Tankers (SATCO) to transport oil from Saudi Arabia to anywhere in the world.153 Aramco (a 
successor to SOCAL) alleged that the privilege granted to SATCO contradicted its contractual 
rights set forth in the 1933 concession agreement signed by the Saudi government.  The terms of 
that agreement granted Aramco the right to freely choose the oil’s conveyance.154 Aramco rejected 
the government’s request to comply with the Onassis agreement and the Saudi government stood 
its ground regarding rights granted to Onassis.155  
This dispute was referred to arbitration in 1955 as the 1933 concession agreement 
stipulated.156 Aramco alleged that the terms of the Onassis agreement diminished Aramco’s 
“exclusive right” to transport the oil it produced, and therefore the Saudi government had breached 
                                                 
152 See generally ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL (LUCERNE), SAUDI ARABIA & ARABIAN AMERICAN OIL COMPANY, 
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153 Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company. (Aramco), 27 ILR 117, (1963). 
154 Id. 
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156 Id.; the disputants in this case signed the arbitration agreement on February 23rd, 1955 after failing to reach an 
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arbitrators fail to agree in this regard, each party of the dispute would then choose another person to fulfill this 
specific task expeditiously. The provisions of the agreement addressed many procedural issues including 
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its contract with Aramco.157 The government confirmed that Article 1 of the concession agreement 
granted Aramco’s exclusive right but noted the dissimilarity between the terms “exclusive” and 
“absolute.” The government maintained that the term “exclusive,” on which Aramco based its 
claim, did not specify that Aramco had the “absolute” right to transport its oil by sea to other 
countries; it thus asserted the right to interpret Aramco’s right restrictively.158  
The government claimed its rights as a sovereign country applying the principle of public 
service in the 1933 concession agreement to support its position. It relied on French law, which 
subjected any company running a public service to government supervision; this included the right 
to administer, or even to adjust, the operational system the company used for this purpose. The 
government asserted that a sovereign state has the right to establish regulations and, in so doing, it 
only exercised one of its rights, without violating its obligations under the 1933 concession 
agreement.159 Aramco demanded enforcement of what it deemed an absolute and exclusive right, 
with no restrictions on the transportation and exportation of the oil produced on the land designated 
in the concession agreement.160  
3.2.1 Tribunal’s work and decision 
The tribunal recognized that the parties’ agreement restricted its jurisdiction and aimed 
therefore to issue “a declaratory award” that would provide clear legal answers to the questions 
submitted by each party. It saw the need to legally interpret some articles in 1933 agreement and 
related agreements that were drafted in two languages, with no indication of which language would 
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prevail in disputes.161 The arbitrators began by identifying the applicable law. They observed that 
Saudi law at that time derived from Islamic Sharia and, except for the Law of the Commercial 
Court, had not been codified. They eventually decided to apply Saudi law and the international 
customary rules recognized in the petroleum industry. They relied on international principles and 
rules established by legal precedents to address any apparent gaps in Saudi law. The tribunal 
carefully examined many legal concepts and fundamental principles related to the claims and legal 
questions raised by both parties.162  
The tribunal successfully clarified the position of Islamic law in some instances. It found, 
for example, that even though Islamic law, and the Hanbali teaching specifically, did not regulate 
oil concession, such agreements resembled other contracts governed by Islamic law and the 
Hanbali school of thought. These other contracts relied on two principles: first, freedom of contract 
– parties could agree upon contractual conditions if the subjects and the terms adhered to the 
Islamic legal framework; and second, lawful contracts of all types were binding. The tribunal 
confirmed the binding nature in Islamic law of all different types of agreements, whether public 
contracts, administrative contracts, or private contracts.163   
The tribunal ruled in favor of Aramco and the award confirmed that the concession granted 
the company exclusive rights with no restrictions, including the transport of oil by sea from Saudi 
Arabia to other markets in the world.164 The award declared that the contractual nature of the 
concession agreement – not legally characterized as a public service – meant the government could 
make no change to any right that the concession agreement granted the company without the 
company’s approval. The tribunal asserted that the government had no power to compel Aramco 









to comply with an agreement granting a third party the rights a prior agreement exclusively granted 
to Aramco.165 The tribunal further found that the government’s agreement with Onassis conflicted 
with the 1933 concession agreement with Aramco, and therefore Aramco did not have to comply 
with the terms of the Onassis agreement.166 The Saudi government thus lost the first arbitration 
case in history decided on the basis Saudi law. 
3.2.2 Consequences of Aramco case: State hostility 
The Saudi government enforced the arbitral award in the Aramco case, but the award’s 
consequences fueled official hostility toward the arbitration system in the Kingdom.167 Arbitration 
fell into disfavor and the state actually forbade government bodies from engaging in the practice.168 
This hostility resulted from the Aramco decision, testifying to the government’s disappointment 
with the arbitral award.169 The government only banned its agencies from resorting to arbitration, 
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168 Id.; see also Sayen, supra note 18. For further analysis regarding the government resolution No. 58 of 1963 that 
prohibited public authorities and its bodies from resorting to arbitration see A. LERRICK & Q. J. MIAN, SAUDI 
BUSINESS AND LABOR LAW: ITS INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION 176–81 (1982).  
169 Scholars have argued that additional factors beyond the arbitral award may have fueled the government’s 
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concerns over the ability and willingness of foreign arbitrators to apply Saudi law to disputes involving Saudi 
Arabia's most important natural resource.” Sayen, supra note 18. The same could be true regarding other 
participants in this case. The lack of qualified Saudi attorneys and legal experts in the country at that time forced 
the government to hire an esteemed legal team consisting of Yale Law School Professor Myres McDougal, 
Professor Roberto Ago, and the British lawyer Sir Lionel Heald. See Schwebel, supra note 167. Determining 
whether the team had sufficient knowledge of the main sources of Saudi law, namely Islamic law and Hanbali 
teaching is difficult. Such knowledge, if attained by the team members themselves, would certainly have enhanced 
their ability to effectively handle the case; it would also have helped better address the government’s claims and 
connect them to Saudi law, which may or may not have affected the final result of the arbitration.    




but the ban had a far wider effect than intended; many perceived it as an absolute prohibition of 
arbitration in the Kingdom.170  
 The Saudi government’s failure to understand the difference between arbitration and 
tahkim may explain why it lost the case. Arbitration was an established practice in many Western 
jurisdictions at the time of the dispute, but Saudi Arabia had no previous or relevant experience 
with the practice. The Saudi government’s inexperience was apparent on numerous occasions 
during the proceedings. The government requested, for example, that the tribunal reconcile the 
conflicting provisions of the two disputed agreements in order to make them both workable. The 
tahkim system would have allowed such a practice, but it ran contrary to the process of arbitration 
and the way it had evolved over time in many Western jurisdictions.171 The tribunal, therefore, 
replied that its task was to issue an award based on the law, and that it lacked the authorization to 
reconcile the two provisions.172  
3.3 Judicial hostility toward tahkim and arbitration 
3.3.1 Absence of a statutory framework 
The continued hostility to arbitration had many causes, including the absence of a statutory 
framework. Neither arbitration nor tahkim were codified in Saudi Arabia for several decades after 
its founding. Some laws related to the private sector (such as labor law), however, did recognize 
alternate methods of dispute resolution.173 These laws, which focused on foreign parties, 
encouraged economic development in the country by enabling foreign investors or skilled workers 
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to settle disputes by means other than the traditional courts.174 The enforceability of decisions 
obtained through these methods, however, remained questionable. No law stripped Sharia courts 
of jurisdiction over cases decided by means other than litigation,175 and Sharia courts often refused 
to recognize or enforce these decisions.  
The combination of hostility, judicial jealousy, and the absence of clear laws regulating 
these procedures explain the Sharia courts’ actions. Saudi religious scholars, known as ulama, 
wanted to control both Sharia courts and the law applied in these courts. They opposed any codified 
legislation because it would limit their power. The Saudi king, however, saw the courts as the 
responsibility of the state.176 Frank Vogel explains: “Because codification epitomizes 
macrocosmic, particularly rule-law, forms, it directly threatens fiqh's microcosmic, particularly 
instance law, predilections. It arouses competition between ‘ulama’ and ruler over who is to 
control legislation and adjudication, …”177 Vogel goes on to describe the ulama’s position, arguing 
that “… the crucial doctrinal issue to them [was] when, or even whether, the ruler [had] the power 
to dictate the law his qadis [applied].”178 Most of the ulama opposed the codification of laws. They 
believed the qadis should decide each case separately and uniquely based on their understanding 
of fiqh; certain laws or rules other than the Sharia provisions should not restrict the qadis. The 
ulama perceived codified laws as inappropriate, even degrading mechanisms, inimical to Sharia 
courts.179 Judges in Sharia courts were hostile to codified laws and declined to enforce them, basing 
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their judgments solely on fiqh. Judges could, however, dismiss cases they believed should be 
decided according to a statute; another legal body would then apply the relevant law.180 
The ulama and Sharia courts’ hostility to codification led the king to establish several legal, 
but non-judicial panels. The first such legal body, the Commercial Court, dates to 1931. The 
formation of similar panels continued in the following decades; the Labor Commission, established 
by the Labor Law of 1969, is one example.181 Laws establishing panels had to specify jurisdictions 
authorizing each panel to enforce the relevant laws and decide disputes arising under their 
provisions rather than send the matter to Sharia courts.182  
The ulama opposed the establishment of such panels because the panels decreased their 
authority.183 Two incidents show the ulama’s attitude toward codification. The Saudi king asked 
senior ulama to describe their views on codified laws in the early 1970s; they took almost two 
decades to express their opposition to codification.184 The ulama likewise strongly resisted the 
government’s special codification of the rules of Civil Procedure in 1987, leading the government 
to abandon the attempt after just one year.185 
Saudi Arabia’s struggles to enact modern legislation and the traditional Sharia courts 
hostility to such laws highlight the difficulty of establishing laws that introduced new adjudicatory 
means like arbitration. Arbitration had evolved to occupy a legal position parallel to traditional 
courts in other jurisdictions, but nothing of the sort had developed in Saudi Arabia; moreover, 
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resorting to Saudi courts to enforce rulings from alternate systems remained difficult. The absence 
of a statutory framework in the Saudi jurisdiction has contributed to the long-lasting judicial 
hostility towards alternate methods of dispute resolution, and decreased the status of all such 
methods. 
3.4 State hostility to commercial arbitration 
The Saudi Arabian government continued to accept arbitration clauses in agreements with 
foreign parties with greater bargaining power, even after the Aramco decision, to promote 
economic growth and development.186 This was an exception to the ban on arbitration clauses in 
domestic contractual agreements that followed the Aramco case.187 State hostility to arbitration 
also manifested in new ways that augmented this ban.188  
A 1979 resolution of the Ministry of Commerce forbidding the inclusion of arbitration 
clauses in corporate charters unless the charter designated Saudi Arabia as the venue increased 
private sector hostility to arbitration as well. The Ministry would not register a corporation if its 
corporate charter assigned a foreign country as the seat of arbitration or specified that arbitration 
would not be conducted under Saudi law. Hearings involving at least one Saudi party (either the 
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company itself or one of its associates) had to take place inside the Kingdom. The Ministry also 
applied the resolution to all agreements requiring registration – a very broad application.189 This 
actually highlights how broadly the ministry interpreted the resolution to cover issues not specified 
by its provisions. Corporate parties involved in the technology industry could, however, submit 
disputes to arbitration even if the hearings took place outside of Saudi Arabia, provided the relevant 
corporate charters contained arbitration clauses. 190  
3.5 Progress and improvement of the legal framework 
3.5.1 First Law of Arbitration  
Economic development, especially in the private sector, contributed to arbitration’s 
growing importance in the Kingdom in the latter decades of the twentieth century.191 It helped 
initiate a slight change of direction in the Saudi jurisdiction, represented by the enactment of the 
first independent statutory law on arbitration in 1983192 and the implementation of regulations 
issued in 1985.193 Some well-respected ulama participated in the drafting of this law, together with 
other legal advisors and experts.194 Lawmakers thus paved the way for the law’s smooth enactment 
and enforcement by Saudi Sharia courts.195   
3.5.1.1 An overview of the law 
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The 1983 Law dealt with issues and principles similar to arbitration laws in other countries. 
It regulated subjects including the scope of arbitration, formalities of arbitration agreements, the 
legal capacity of disputants and appointed arbitrators, arbitrability, the proceedings, the arbitral 
award, and enforcement of the award. The Saudi law and its regulations, however, addressed these 
matters in somewhat different ways. 
The 1983 Law recognized arbitration agreements and arbitration clauses as permissible for 
the first time in Saudi history.196 It limited arbitrable disputes, however, to those suitable for 
conciliation.197 Article 3, which gave administrative entities recourse to arbitration to resolve any 
dispute with other parties (upon approval by the Prime Minister), exemplifies the government’s 
change in the attitude.198 This provision effectively repealed (based on the principle of “The 
Hierarchy of Laws”) the 1963 prohibition in government resolution No. 58.199  
One issue, above all others, warrants attention: the implementing regulations contained 
new provisions that had no basis in the 1983 law and others that conflicted with the original 
statutory provisions. Article 4 of the law, for example, states: “An arbitrator is required to be 
experienced and of good conduct and reputation and full legal capacity. In case of multiple 
arbitrators, they shall be odd in number.”200 The law set forth no additional legal requirements and 
qualifications for arbitrators. Article 3 of the regulations, however, stipulated that only Saudis or 
Muslim non-nationals could serve as arbitrators.201 Such disparity between the law (the superior) 
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and the regulations (the inferior) clearly conflicts with civil-law principle of “The Hierarchy of 
Laws.”202  
3.5.1.2 A Brief Critical Evaluation of the 1983 Law  
Numerous provisions in the 1983 law indicate a movement away from tahkim as previously 
practiced under Islamic law and toward arbitration as practiced in Western jurisdictions. A 
comparison of the 1983 Law to the provisions of tahkim under the Majelle makes this especially 
clear.203 The provisions of the 1983 Law were, nevertheless, not identical to those in modern 
Western legislation; distinct differences persisted.204  
Several specific features of modern arbitration laws remained unavailable in the Saudi 
jurisdiction.205 The 1983 Law and its regulations, for instance, contained unnecessary procedural 
provisions that greatly expanded judicial supervision and intervention.206 These provisions 
distinguished Saudi arbitration from arbitration laws in other countries. Such procedures could 
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cause the process to function inefficiently, which would eventually result in the failure of 
arbitration.207 The Saudi law also failed to state the grounds for vacating arbitral awards.208 Some 
have argued that the vagueness caused by some of the statutory provisions in this law would 
enhance the tendency toward procrastination, which could delay the process.209 Enforcement of 
domestic and international arbitral awards under the 1983 Law also remained questionable.210 The 
law failed to clarify, for example, the fate of international awards rendered by non-Muslims.211 
Some scholars have also argued that the Saudi court would not enforce or recognize all arbitration 
awards issued outside the Saudi jurisdiction, especially those that favored non-national parties; the 
court would, so the argument went, most likely review the merits of the case.212 
The 1983 Law thus did not give arbitration the status it holds elsewhere; nor did it achieve 
the objectives of arbitration in other jurisdictions. Professor Carbonneau writes: “By eradicating 
judicial hostility to arbitration, modern statutes give arbitration systemic autonomy. They 
command that courts respect, assist, and refrain from trespassing on arbitral operations.”213  
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The 1983 Law provided, despite its shortcomings, the first statutory framework for the 
arbitration process in Saudi Arabia, leading to many advantages. The enactment of the 1983 Law, 
first of all, narrowed the gap between the Saudi legal system and other jurisdictions. Some argued 
that it “… provides a comprehensive, uniform set of rules which are accessible to foreign 
businesspersons and their legal counsel. [It] is designed to allay their fears over the previous lack 
of judicial and legislative support for commercial arbitration.”214 Second, it responded, to a degree, 
to the societal needs at that time.215 Third, it contributed in to the development of Saudi arbitration 
law by paving the way for future reforms and opening the door for society to more readily accept 
future progress. The 1983 Law benefitted the legal system, too; it created a legal framework that 
helped dissipate years of judicial hostility toward codified laws and tribunal awards. 
This achievement (i.e. the 1983 Law), given the complexity of the Saudi system at the time, 
marked a huge step forward in building a legal framework for arbitration; it brought the Saudi 
legal system closer to the practices, based on universally-recognized principles, embraced in other 
countries.216 One could also argue that Saudi lawmakers realized that no shift occurs all at once; a 
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legislative approach characterized by the notion that “less can be more” may therefore prove more 
effective because of potential fears and resistance toward the codified law and its provisions. 
Assessments of the 1983 Law ultimately must consider two main points. First, the enactment of 
the law – though inadequate without additional provisions – was a necessary step to establish a 
sufficient legal framework for arbitration. Second, the enactment of the 1983 Law did not mean 
Saudi Arabia and its system had become an arbitration-friendly country.217 That would require 
further steps and advancements. 
3.5.2 Accession to the New York Convention 
The absence of a governing legal framework at both domestic and international levels 
meant that, before acceding to the New York Convention, Saudi Arabia did not enforce arbitral 
awards, especially those not in favor of the Saudi government.218 This led several foreign courts 
to grant investors Mareva injunctions219 to freeze Saudi assets.220 Such incidents, however, did not 
renew the Saudi government’s hostility toward arbitration, as in the past.221 Saudi Arabia 
unexpectedly acceded to the 1958 New York Convention in 1993,222 signaling a dramatic rise in 
the status of arbitration in the Saudi jurisdiction.223  
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of the Errant Defendant, 31 UC DAVIS REV 1091 (1997). 
220 El-Ahdab, supra note 218. 
221 Id. 
222 Royal Decree No. (M/11) on 16/7/1414H (December 29th, 1993); the following was an observation by one of the 
scholars in regard to Saudi Arabia’s accession to the New York Convention: “It should be noted that the Kingdom 
made no reservation—as was done by other countries—concerning the nature of the dispute subject-matter of the 
award as it did not require that this dispute be a "commercial" dispute.” Id.; The full text of the 1958 New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, can be accessed at: 1958 New York 
Convention Guide, available at: http://newyorkconvention1958.org/?opac_view=-1 (last visited Mar 8, 2017).  
223 It can be also seen as an example of the willingness of the Saudi government to move toward the Western model 
of the process rather than the Islamic approach. 




Commitment to economic growth, once again, motivated the Kingdom’s decision.224Saudi 
Arabia received substantial benefits as a result of acceding to the New York Convention, as do all 
member states.225 The desired economic growth was one obvious benefit; the Kingdom’s accession 
motivated foreign businessmen and investors to do business in Saudi Arabia. Accession to the 
convention also meant that other member states would recognize and enforce arbitral awards 
rendered in Saudi Arabia.226 The Kingdom thus acquired the right to enforce any award rendered 
inside its jurisdiction and issued in its favor in any other jurisdiction, pursuant to the provisions of 
the Convention.227 
Many scholars viewed the accession to the New York Convention by an Arab Muslim 
country as progress;228 others, however, perceived this development differently. They argued that 
despite its accession to the New York Convention, Saudi Arabia had not changed its hostile attitude 
toward international arbitration.229 Article V(2) (b) of the New York Convention did not oblige 
                                                 
224 El-Ahdab, supra note 218; “The National Committee of the ICC, issue of the Council of Chambers of Commerce 
and Industry in Saudi Arabia, had an important role in the preparation of the Kingdom's accession to the New 
York Convention. It convinced the competent authorities of the interest of this accession in order to encourage 
international commercial trade with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.” Id.  
225 See Brower and Sharpe, supra note 151. This article effectively explains many of these gains; it illustrates the 
progress that many Muslim States have achieved after acceding to the New York Convention. The same could be 
said about many other member States. For more general information regarding how developing countries benefit 
from acceding to international arbitration conventions, see generally Jan Paulsson, Third World Participation in 
International Investment Arbitration, 2 ICSID REV. 19–65 (1987). 
226 1958 New York Convention, supra note 222. 
227 Id.; Kuwait, for example, was unable to enforce an award in the United Kingdom issued in 1973 within its 
jurisdiction against a British company because both countries were non-signatory to the New York Convention at 
that time. Many years later, however, both countries became members of the convention, which enabled Kuwait 
to enforce the award in the United Kingdom. Id.; Kuwait v. Sir Frederick Snow, 1 ALL E.R. 733 (HOUSE OF LORDS 
1984); see also Albert Jan van den Berg, Does the New York Arbitration Convention of 1958 apply retroactively: 
decision of the House of Lords in Government of Kuwait v. Sir Frederic Snow and others, 1 ARBITR. INT. 103–
107 (1985). 
228 Brower and Sharpe, supra note 151. 
229 Kristin T. Roy, New York Convention and Saudi Arabia: Can a Country Use the Public Policy Defense to Refuse 
Enforcement of Non-Domestic Arbitral Awards, The, 18 FORDHAM INTL LJ 920 (1994); see also Whitney 
Hampton, Foreigners Beware:Exploring the Tension between Saudi Arabian and Western International 
Commercial Arbitration Practices: In re Aramco Services Co., J DISP RESOL 431 (2011). (“Saudi Arabia finally 
acceded to the NYC in 1994. The NYC allows its signatory countries the option of refusing to recognize any 
foreign arbitration award that goes against their public policy. This has allowed Saudi Arabia the ability to align 
itself more closely to international dispute resolution standards without having to abandon its public policy or 
religious beliefs. … Remember that the New York Convention, ratified by Saudi Arabia, was designed to ensure 




Saudi Arabia either to recognize or enforce any foreign arbitration award that conflicted with its 
public policy.230 Some scholars regarded this as a major issue for foreign investments and investors 
in Saudi Arabia.231 They argued that if the ratification of the New York Convention indicated Saudi 
Arabia’s readiness to improve the situation regarding the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards issued in other member States, article V (2) (b) of the convention undermined the 
promise.232 Proponents of this school of thought believed Saudi Arabia’s decision to join the New 
York Convention would not increase the number of foreign awards enforced in the Saudi 
jurisdiction. It would not therefore improve the situation. Kristin T. Roy writes:  
The New York Convention provides a vehicle for the recognition of international 
commercial arbitral awards, thus accomplishing Saudi Arabia's goal of 
modernizing its international dispute resolution methods. At the same time, Article 
V (2) (b) of the New York Convention provides a safe harbor wherein Saudi Arabia 
does not have to recognize a non-Saudi Arabian arbitral award that is contrary to 
its public policy. Article V (2) (b) allows Saudi Arabia to embrace the international 
community and its rules for international dispute resolution and enforcement, 
without rejecting its own history and public policy. 233 
  
                                                 
the enforcement of foreign awards. The problem, however, is that the Convention allows judicial bodies to refuse 
recognition of a foreign award if it goes against their public policy. Some nations have interpreted this provision 
narrowly, finding that an arbitration award can be refused only if it violates international policy. However, Saudi 
Arabia seems to have adopted a much broader interpretation, allowing it to deny any arbitration award that does 
not comport with its own national policy. This is particularly relevant here because Saudi Arabia's laws and public 
policies, which are so heavily based on a strict interpretation of the Shari'a, stand in stark contrast to those of many 
member states.”) Id.  
230 1958 New York Convention, supra note 222. Article V(2)(b) reads: “Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral 
award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought 
finds that: 
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; 
or 
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.” Id.; 
scholars have concluded that, based on the flexibility granted by this article and the convention as a whole, by 
joining this convention, Saudi Arabia managed to “accomplish both of its current needs: (1) the need to modernize 
in the international community; and (2) the need to maintain its history and religious beliefs.” Roy, supra note 
229. The convention, in other words, gave Saudi Arabia “the ability to align itself more closely to international 
dispute resolution standards without having to abandon its public policy or religious beliefs.” Hampton, supra 
note 229. 
231 Roy, supra note 229. 
232 Id. 
233 Id.; see also Mark Wakim, Public policy concerns regarding enforcement of foreign international arbitral awards 
in the Middle East, 21 N. Y. INT. LAW REV. (2008). 




Article V (2) (b), however, applied to all member states and therefore, in reality, all member 
states could benefit from the provision’s exception. Those who believe the provision fails to 
promote the status of international arbitration should criticize the article itself, or the Convention, 
rather than individual member States.234 Saudi Arabia aimed to modernize its international system 
of dispute resolution by adopting an international instrument available to all sovereign States. Such 
criticism would only be justified had Saudi Arabia continued to abstain from the convention, which 
represents the modern trend in international arbitration.235 The Kingdom’s efforts to preserve its 
values, traditions (both religious and cultural), and legacy while continuing to modernize stem, 
moreover, from the legitimate right to reject what it deems contrary to its fundamental principles. 
Contemporary constitutions and national laws in several jurisdictions have protected such rights.236 
This chapter has shown on several occasions that modernization efforts in Islamic legal 
systems, including the Saudi legal system, went hand-in-hand with the preservation of Islamic 
                                                 
234 Many articles have been written in this respect. For example see Linda Silberman, The New York Convention 
After Fifty Years: Some Reflections on the Role of National Law, 38 GA J INTL COMP L 25 (2009); see also V. V. 
Veeder, Is there a Need to Revise the New York Convention?, 1 J. INT. DISPUTE SETTL. 499–506 (2010); but see 
Emmanuel Gaillard, The Urgency of Not Revising the New York Convention,  VAN DEN BERG 689–696; 
Emmanuel Gaillard, Is There a Need to Revise the New York Convention, 2 DISP RESOL INTL 187 (2008).  
235 The New York Convention is viewed as “the cornerstone of the international arbitration system” and among the 
most significant international instruments which regulates international trade. UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW & SECRETARIAT, 
UNCITRAL SECRETARIAT GUIDE ON THE CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN 
ARBITRAL AWARDS (NEW YORK, 1958) 1 (2016). 
236 See for example, THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU & WILLIAM ELLIOTT BUTLER, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND 
ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 565–69 (2nd ed. 2013). Section 328 of the Civil Procedure Code in 
Germany states that Germany will not recognize any foreign judgment that conflicts with any national law 
particularly the principles of the German constitutional law. Id. at 566; The full text of the German Code of Civil 
Procedure (as amended up to Act of August 31, 2013) can be accessed at: 
 http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=324362 (last visited Mar 11, 2017). The United States is another 
example. Section 3 of the “Securing the Protection of Our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act 
(SPEECH Act)” forbids domestic courts from recognizing or enforcing a foreign libel judgment in several cases. 
For example, libel laws applied by foreign courts that do not provide the same protection for freedom of expression 
granted by the First Amendment to the Constitution and by the Constitution and state law – the domestic court, in 
such cases, will base its decision regarding the defendant’s accountability for libel on the First Amendment to the 
Constitution and the Constitution and law of the defendant’s state. The full text of the 2010 SPEECH Act can be 
accessed at: H.R.2765-111TH CONGRESS (2009-2010): SPEECH ACT (2010), available at: 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/house-bill/2765/text (last visited Mar 10, 2017). 




principles. The Saudi system has historically taken steps toward modernization in response to 
existing needs of the moment, and fiqh has driven these reforming processes.237 Understanding 
this mechanism is essential; it will fuel and foster any further advancement in the Saudi legal 
system. 
3.6 Arbitration Law of 2012 
Scholars have noted that acceding to the 1958 New York Convention and implementing the 
UNCITRAL Model Law indicate “a State’s formal endorsement of, and commitment to, 
arbitration.”238 The Saudi jurisdiction did not fully complete these steps until the second decade of 
the twenty-first century. The ratification of the New York Convention by many Muslim and Arab 
countries led to these jurisdictions to pass new arbitration laws.239 The UNCITRAL Model Law 
inspired and influenced these new laws.240 This advancement in international arbitration aimed to 
foster a global practice of arbitration based on the Model Law that would apply at the domestic 
level and be reflected in the national laws.241 It also “provide[d] an excellent statutory framework 
for arbitral proceedings and thus a hospitable legal climate for such proceedings in any State 
adopting it.”242  
One of the most important aspects of the UNCITRAL Model Law warrants particular 
attention: specialists in Islamic law and from different cultural and legal backgrounds actively 
                                                 
237 See generally VOGEL, supra note 126. This chapter explains how Islamic fiqh played a significant role in the 
evolution of tahkim. It also describes how parties conducted the practice in, for example, the famous case between 
Ali and Mu’awiya under Islamic Sharia with some of the highest standards known in the practice of arbitration 
today. 
238 BUILDING THE CIVILIZATION OF ARBITRATION, supra note 5 at 335. 
239 Brower and Sharpe, supra note 151.  Some of these countries are Egypt, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Bahrain … etc. 
240 Id.; UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: 1985 ; WITH AMENDMENTS AS 
ADOPTED IN 2006, (Vereinte Nationen ed., 2008); see generally HOWARD M. HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS, 
A GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY AND COMMENTARY (1989). 
241 Paulsson, supra note 225.     
242 See Carl-August Fleischhauer, Foreword to HOLTZMANN AND NEUHAUS, supra note 240 at V. 




contributed to the process of drafting the Model Law.243 This suggests that the adoption of the 
Western approach to arbitration need not conflict with Islamic principles. A middle ground exists 
between the two systems. Some Arab scholars argue: 
[T]he evolution of the concept of Islamic arbitration and the adaptation thereof to 
the spirit of the century is not a derogation from, or a betrayal of Islamic law, but it 
is a return to its sources. … Any step accomplished by the Shari’a in order to keep 
in step with the spirit of the century is neither a betrayal of Islamic Fiqh, nor an 
imitation or copy of other laws, as long as it respects the principles contained in its 
sources. One should not forget that Islamic law contains a rule according to which 
“any difficulty must be made easier,” …244 
 
3.6.1 An overview of the law  
Saudi Arabia embraced the “wave of modernization”245 by enacting a new Law of 
Arbitration in 2012, nearly two decades after joining the New York Convention. The UNCITRAL 
Model Law served as an important source of inspiration for this new law.246 It recognizes, like the 
1983 Law, arbitration clauses and agreements, according to which parties can submit both existing 
and future disputes to arbitration.247 Article 2 deals with the scope of arbitrability. It asserts that 
the 2012 Arbitration Law applies to all types of disputes conducted domestically, but only to 
international commercial disputes conducted outside Saudi Arabia in which the disputants agree 
to abide by Saudi law.248  
                                                 
243 Paulsson, supra note 225; Brower and Sharpe, supra note 151.  
244 AḤDAB AND EL-AHDAB, supra note 13 at 16.  
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246 The Saudi Law of Arbitration was enacted by Royal Decree No. M/34 on 24/5/1433H (April 16 th, 2012) 
[hereinafter, THE 2012 ARBITRATION LAW], which replaced the 1983 Law.  
247 THE 2012 ARBITRATION LAW, Articles (1-1), 9.  
248 Id. Article 2; Article 2 of the 2012 Arbitration Law reads: “Without prejudice to provisions of Islamic Sharia and 
international conventions to which the Kingdom is a party, the provisions of this Law shall apply to any arbitration 
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or is an international commercial arbitration taking place abroad and the parties thereof agree that the arbitration 
be subject to the provisions of this Law.  
The provisions of this Law shall not apply to personal status disputes or matters not subject to reconciliation.” Id.   




Article 2 also defines as non-arbitrable “personal status disputes” and “matters not subject 
to reconciliation.”249 Articles 2 and 3 explicitly state that the 2012 Arbitration Law does not cover 
international arbitration related to subject matters other than international trade.250 The law 
distinguishes between national and international arbitration and thereby limits the scope of 
international arbitration related to commercial disputes to four types of cases that Article 3 
specifies.251 Note, however, that in the Model Law, which influenced the 2012 Arbitration Law, 
the word “commercial” encompasses any issue arising from commercial relations and transactions, 
contractual or non-contractual.252  
The 2012 Arbitration Law promotes the concept of party autonomy unlike the 
implementing regulations of the 1983 Law; it allows disputants to freely choose the applicable law 
by which their dispute should be decided, as long as that law does not conflict with the Islamic 
Sharia.253 The parties, therefore, may include a “choice of law” clause in the original contract or 
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250 Id. Articles 2, 3. 
251 Id. Article 3; Article 3 states: “Under this Law, arbitration shall be international if the dispute is related to 
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1. If the parties to an arbitration agreement have their head office in more than one country at the time of conclusion 
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agreement, and one of the following places is located outside said country:  
a. The venue of arbitration as determined by or pursuant to the arbitration  agreement;  
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Id. 
252 Such as “any trade transaction for the supply or exchange of goods or services; distribution agreement; 
commercial representation or agency; factoring; leasing; construction of works; consulting; engineering; 
licensing; investment; financing; banking; insurance; exploitation agreement or concession; joint venture and 
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in their arbitration agreement. Several other provisions of the law, which prescribe general rules 
and procedures for parties to follow unless they agree otherwise, also reinforce party autonomy.254 
The 2012 Arbitration Law constituted a major step forward; it granted robust support for 
the arbitration process and indicated a trend toward favoring arbitration in the Kingdom. One 
aspect of this support relates to enforceability, as the law empowers both parties and courts to 
uphold arbitration agreements and arbitration clauses. Article 11, for example, instructs the court 
to dismiss any case if the parties have agreed to arbitrate the disputed matter and the defendant 
requests an enforcement of the arbitration provisions.255 The law, however, requires that such a 
request must precede any other statement or plea submitted by the defendant to the court.256 A 
defendant’s participation in the court proceedings without requesting enforcement of the 
arbitration agreement denotes his intention to give up the right to arbitrate. This provision makes 
clear that, unlike the FAA in the U.S. and the 1996 Arbitration Act in the UK, the 2012 Arbitration 
Law, like laws in many other civil law jurisdictions, prefers case dismissals to stays of judicial 
proceedings when parties have made arbitration agreements regarding the disputed matters.257 
                                                 
254 See Id. Articles (6-1), (8-2), (15-2), (22-1), 26, (29-1), (33-1), (33-3), (34-1), (34-2), 36, 38, (39-3), (39-5), 40, 
(50-3). 
255 Id. Article 11; Article 11 also asserts that lawsuits filed in court should not interrupt any stage of arbitral 
proceedings or the rendering of arbitral awards. 
256 Id. 
257 In this regard, see generally GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2009); see also Gary 
Born, INTERPRETING SECTION 9(1) OF THE ARBITRATION ACT 1996: LOMBARD V GATX KLUWER ARBITRATION 
BLOG (2012), available at: 
  http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2012/05/24/interpreting-section-91-of-the-arbitration-act-1996-lombard-v-
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stay of litigation brought in violation of a valid arbitration agreement, whereas courts in civil law jurisdictions do 
not merely stay pending litigations, but dismiss them entirely.” Id.; the issue of whether to stay the proceeding or 
dismiss the case has been the subject of lively debate among scholars. For example, suggesting that staying the 
judicial proceeding would benefit the arbitration process as well as the parties of the arbitration agreement under 
the provisions of the FAA, one scholar has concluded that “Other than removing the proceedings from the court’s 
docket and from the judicial sphere, a dismissal can stifle proceedings, increase litigation costs, and create an 
undue delay—precisely what the FAA was meant to combat.” Jesse Ransom, United States Federal Circuit Court 
Practice: Stay versus Dismissal on Motions to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration, 2 ARB BRIEF v (2012); see also, 
Angelina M. Petti, Judicial Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements: The Stay-Dismissal Dichotomy of FAA 
Section 3, 34 HOFSTRA REV 565 (2005); but see Richard A. Bales; Melanie A. Goff, An Analysis of an Order to 
Compel Arbitration: To Dismiss or Stay, 115 Penn St. L. Rev. 539, 560 (2011).     




Article 12 further demonstrates the 2012 Arbitration Law’s favorable approach to 
arbitration, Article 12 instructs courts to refer disputes to arbitration if the disputants agree to 
arbitrate the disputes. Parties must, however, clearly specify in their agreements the disputes they 
intend to resolve via arbitration to make their agreements legally valid.258 Articles 11 and 12 
generally express strong support for the arbitral process and demonstrate the positive trend in Saudi 
law toward ensuring enforceability of arbitration agreements and arbitral clauses. 
The separability doctrine is another aspect of the 2012 Arbitration Law’s support for 
arbitration. Separability protects arbitration clauses or arbitration agreements from any challenge 
to the validity of original contracts between parties by making the former separate from the 
latter.259 “The nullity of the main contract, therefore, does not—ipso facto—invalidate the 
agreement to arbitrate. The moving party must establish that the alleged flaw also affects the 
provision for arbitration.”260 Such doctrines decrease the chance that any parties will procrastinate, 
which in turn supports the arbitral process and the enforceability of arbitration agreements.261 
Article 21 of the 2012 Arbitration Law expresses the separability doctrine, stipulating that any 
arbitration provision included in a contract should stand independently from all other provisions. 
The annulment of the main contract does not therefore necessarily lead to the annulment of the 
arbitration provision, unless the arbitral tribunal identifies the arbitration provision itself as 
invalid.262  
The doctrine of separability does not operate alone; it parallels the concept of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz within the systematic framework of arbitration.263 “In fact, separability has no practical 
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function other than to trigger the application of Kompetenz-Kompetenz.”264 The latter principle 
requires that the arbitration tribunal decide all claims brought by any party to invalidate the 
arbitration clause or any claim regarding the arbitral clause’s scope of application.265 It 
supplements the provision of Article 21 in the 2012 Arbitration Law by preventing the national 
court from exercising or claiming any jurisdiction over such pleas.  
Article 20 clearly asserts the principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz. It grants arbitration 
tribunals exclusive jurisdiction over jurisdictional allegations, including but not limited to any 
challenges to agreements to arbitrate on the grounds of the non-existence of such agreements, their 
invalidity, or claims regarding whether the agreements to arbitrate encompass certain disputes or 
not.266 Professor Carbonneau notes the significance of the doctrines of separability and Kompetenz-
Kompetenz, emphasizing the following:  
The separability and Kompetenz-Kompetenz doctrines reinforce the autonomy of 
the arbitral process. They give arbitrators judge-like authority and are likely to 
dissuade parties from engaging in perfunctory challenges to arbitrator jurisdiction. 
Court supervision of the arbitrator’s determination of such issues is likely to be lax 
and delayed until the final award is rendered. For all intents and purposes, under 
these doctrines, the arbitral tribunal decides questions pertaining to the validity and 
scope of its adjudicatory authority. 267    
 
The 2012 Arbitration Law also protects the parties from any harmful error of law or unfair 
consequences that may result from the arbitration. Article 38-2 permits disputants to give the 
tribunal the power to make an amicable settlement to resolve their dispute.268 It allows the tribunal, 
therefore, to decide the dispute in conformity with the “the rules of equity and justice.”269 The law 
does not specify these rules; the phrase only indicates that the tribunal should seek to settle such 
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disputes in a friendly way – in a way that prioritizes the satisfaction of both parties over accordance 
with the law.270 The law grants this device as a “safety valve” for the parties of arbitration.271 
The 2012 Arbitration Law also contains several provisions pertaining to the enforcement 
of arbitral awards. It restricts the right to appeal to a request to vacate the arbitral award by one of 
the parties.272 It also limits the possibility of challenging awards by specifying the grounds for an 
award’s revocation.273 The law, moreover, limits the court’s oversight of arbitral awards by not 
granting the court the jurisdiction to review awards on the merits.274 The law gives the court 
hearing an appeal the authority to set aside any arbitral award if it conflicts with Islamic Sharia 
law, Saudi public policy, or agreements the parties have made. Courts can also set an award aside 
if the dispute does not fall within the scope of arbitrable issues defined by the 2012 Arbitration 
Law.275    
3.6.2 The practice and the 2012 Arbitration Law: catching up with legislative 
modernization  
The 2012 Arbitration Law introduced several important concepts for the first time into the 
Saudi legal system, especially in the field of arbitration. Enacting this law thus narrowed the gap 
between Saudi law and other jurisdictions in the field of alternative dispute resolution, at least in 
theory. Its enactment demonstrates that arbitration in the Kingdom has evolved in such a way as 
to achieve a modern perspective while at the same time maintaining its religious and traditional 
values. This surely proves that fiqh remains, as always, the heart of development in this area.  
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The 2012 Arbitration Law has yet to be thoroughly tested due to the short period of time 
since its enactment.276 Actual practice must emulate the progressive trend by enacting the legal 
principles established by the 2012 Arbitration Law. The bench, for its part, should demonstrate 
acceptance of this reform and willingly participate and support the process by enforcing valid 
arbitration agreements and awards to the fullest possible extent, supporting the arbitral proceedings 
pursuant to the provisions of the law, and limiting the exercise of their supervisory power, thus 
reducing judicial oversight to a minimum.277   
True and effective change requires that a tangible shift in practice follow the qualitative 
transformation represented by this new legislation. This will help ensure that this reform in the 
Saudi arbitration system remains in place, and that the system does not regress to its earlier state. 
The enactment of the 2012 Arbitration Law, in other words, is promising and represents significant 
progress,278 but to be considered a success it must shape and guide actual practice. The law, for 
example, provides significant support for the arbitral process in governing the relationship between 
courts and tribunals. It minimizes court intervention and supervision, and includes many 
provisions protecting the parties’ autonomy and the arbitrators’ competence.279 Future dialogue 
between courts and tribunals will reveal whether the new legislation has ended court hostility to 
arbitration and curbed judicial intervention and supervision. The 2012 Arbitration Law should 
reshape this dialogue to reflect both the great support the law grants to the tribunal and the arbitral 
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process in general and the fundamental concepts of arbitration as recognized internationally. 
Enactment of the 2012 Arbitration Law in Saudi Arabia may, in short, have set the wheels of 
arbitration in motion, but whether the new device will keep the wheels turning effectively remains 
an open question.280  
3.6.2.1 Legal education: the role of law schools 
Shaping a robust arbitration practice in Saudi Arabia will require a better understanding of 
the importance of the newly introduced principles of arbitration and all the doctrines involved in 
the 2012 Arbitration Law. Law schools in the Kingdom should serve as a primary avenue to 
accomplish this objective. The present education system must reform to keep up with the evolution 
of the legal system. A brief examination of the current curricula of ten Saudi Arabian law 
schools281 shows they teach subjects including labor law, corporate law, commercial contracts and 
banking, commercial transactions and the recently enacted Law of Enforcement. None, however, 
offer courses in arbitration.282 Only one out of the ten has begun moving in this direction; its 
updated curriculum for the academic year 2017-2018 includes a two-credit general ADR course.283 
Exclusion of arbitration law from law school curricula stems from Saudi Arabia’s historical 
hostility to arbitration; it runs counter to the current trend toward supporting the practice, and will 
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University, King Saud University, Umm Al-Qura University, Tabuk University, Princess Nourah bint 
Abdulrahman University, Majmaah University, Taibah University, King Faisal University, King Khalid 
University, and Shaqra University. The findings are based on information made available in the law schools’ 
websites. 
282  See for example, The Curriculum Plan, Taibah University Law School, available at: 
     https://www.taibahu.edu.sa/Pages/AR/DownloadCenter.aspx?SiteId=6226f67e-43b3-41d8-b9d1-
985c416db80e&FileId=010c8fa1-2a71-4fe9-a5e9-c5ab84413182 (last visited Aug 3, 2017). 
283 The new law school curriculum plan, Princess Nourah University available at:  
     http://www.pnu.edu.sa/en/Faculties/Management/systems/Pages/planofstudy.aspx (last visited Aug 3, 2017). 




not help boost the status of arbitration in the country. Saudi law schools must update the current 
curriculum to better prepare students to respond to the demands of both society and the labor 
market.  
Teaching arbitration as an independent subject in law schools would significantly shape 
the future of this process. Prospective lawyers, legal consultants, judges and arbitrators should be 
aware of the importance of this method, as well as the manner in which it should function, in order 
to ensure its effectiveness and success.284 Scholars should design several well-planned core 
modules in arbitration. The proposed curriculum should cover the various steps of arbitration 
including arbitration clauses, arbitration agreements, arbitral proceedings, arbitral awards, and 
enforcement. It should also incorporate crucial topics and skills such as:  
(1) The definition of arbitration and its distinguishing features.  
(2) A comprehensive explanation of its fundamental concepts and doctrines.  
(3) An overview of the history of arbitration as well as a discussion of its increasing popularity.  
(4) An explanation the various types of arbitration.  
(5) An examination of the aspects of the contemporary practice.  
(6) The national and international legal frameworks for arbitration, including examples from best 
practices around the world. 
The proposed modules should take into consideration “learning by interaction” techniques 
to maximize effectiveness. Simulations and mock arbitration would help students develop such 
essential skills as party representation and drafting arbitration clauses and agreements.285 
                                                 
284 See generally T. Carbonneau, Resource, Teaching Arbitration in US Law Schools, 12 WORLD ARBITR. MEDIAT. 
REP. 227 (2001); Stephen J. Ware, Teaching Arbitration Law, (2003). 
285 See generally Carbonneau, supra note 284.  




Simulations would also build students’ self-confidence and help them develop the skills they will 
need to become successful arbitrators. 
Legal education institutions can also help promote arbitration and its status by offering 
continuing education programs to practicing arbitrators, lawyers, and judges. Schools need to 
develop new continuing education programs and review and reassess currently offered courses to 
ensure they serve their purpose and contribute to the objective. This would require a collaborative 
effort between courts, law schools, governmental entities (like the Ministry of Justice), public 
institutions (such as the Saudi Bar Association) and other private organizations.             
3.6.3 Analysis of potential problems  
3.6.3.1 Statutory time limits 
Several practical issues related to the 2012 Arbitration Law may cause problems. The 2012 
Arbitration Law only allows parties sixty days after the notice of an arbitral award, for example, 
to file an action to set aside that award.286 The UNCITRAL Model Law, meanwhile, gives the 
parties three months.287 Saudi law stipulates that, if the arbitration agreement includes special 
appeal procedures before an appeal tribunal—an increasingly a common practice in the 
international arena—parties and the appeal tribunal will face a tight time frame.288  
                                                 
286 THE 2012 ARBITRATION LAW, Articles 51. 
287 See Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION, supra note 252; UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, UNITED NATIONS 
COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, AND SECRETARIAT, supra note 235.  
288 Arbitration appellate tribunals have been the subject of recent debate. See William H. Knull III & Noah D. Rubins, 
Betting the Farm on International Arbitration: Is It Time to Offer an Appeal Option?, 11 AM REV INTL ARB 531–
607 (2000); Yilei Zhou, Breaking the ice in the international commercial arbitration: from the finality of arbitral 
award to the arbitral appeal mechanism, 3 CHINA-EU LAW J. 289–299 (2014); see also David A. Gantz, An 
appellate mechanism for review of arbitral decisions in investor-state disputes: prospects and challenges, 39 
VAND J TRANSNATL L 39 (2006); Eric Van Ginkel, Reframing the Dilemma of Contractually Expanded Judicial 
Review: Arbitral Appeal vs. Vacatur, 3 PEPP DISP RESOL LJ 157 (2002); see also Ian Laird & Rebecca Askew, 
Finality Versus Consistency: Does Investor-State Arbitration Need an Appellate System, 7 J APP PR. PROCESS 285 
(2005). 




3.6.3.2 Overlapping and conflicting laws 
The Law of Enforcement, enacted in Saudi Arabia about two months after the enactment 
of the 2012 Law of Arbitration, presented another issue.289 It supplemented the latter with new 
provisions pertaining to the enforcement of national and international arbitral awards. Any party 
seeking to enforce an arbitral award thus must go through a lengthy process governed by the Law 
of Arbitration and the Law of Enforcement.  
The 2012 Law of Arbitration stipulates that parties can appeal arbitral awards before the 
assigned courts and parties can also appeal arbitral awards vacated by those court.290 The party 
favored in an award, in such a case, will most likely seek to enforce the award by filing a petition 
before the enforcement judge under the Law of Enforcement.291 The Law of Enforcement also 
allowed parties to appeal a judge’s ruling of a lack of jurisdiction, refusal to enforce the award, or 
postponement.292 Parties can also appeal a judge of enforcement’s ruling to validate or enforce the 
award.293 
The Law of Enforcement also gives the enforcement court the authority to set aside any 
award that violates Sharia or Saudi public policy.294 This provision duplicates a procedure carried 
out by another court under the Law of Arbitration.295 Such provisions increase judicial supervision 
                                                 
289 Royal Decree No. (M/53) on 13/8/1433H (June 20th, 2012) [hereinafter THE ENFORCEMENT LAW]. Almost eight 
months later, following the enactment of the law of enforcement, ministerial order No. 9892 issued and put into 
force the implementing regulations on 17/4/1434H. (February 27th, 2013) [hereinafter THE ENFORCEMENT 
IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS].    
290 THE 2012 ARBITRATION LAW, Articles 50, 51. 
291 THE LAW OF ENFORCEMENT, Articles 2, 8, 9. 
292 Id. Article 6; THE ENFORCEMENT IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS, Articles (6-4), (6-5). 
293 THE LAW OF ENFORCEMENT, Articles 1, 3, 6, 9; THE ENFORCEMENT IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS, Articles (3-
1), (6-4), (6-5), (9-1). 
294 THE LAW OF ENFORCEMENT, Article (11-5); THE ENFORCEMENT IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS, Articles (9-1), 
(11-3). 
295 Article (50-2) of the 2012 Arbitration Law states the following: “The competent court considering the 
nullification action shall, on its own initiative, nullify the award if it violates the provisions of Sharia and public 
policy in the Kingdom or the agreement of the arbitration parties, or if the subject matter of the dispute cannot be 
referred to arbitration under this Law.” THE 2012 ARBITRATION LAW, Article (50-2). 




by making the arbitral awards subject to multiple levels of review exercised by different types of 
courts. The absence of a clear statutory definition of the Saudi legal system’s fundamental 
principles, moreover, makes determining if a conflict exists a matter of judicial discretion. This 
increases the risk that an award will be set aside.  The wide exercise of judicial discretion could 
also result in abuse; it makes the fate of arbitral awards unpredictable and vague.296      
The 2012 Law of Arbitration also does not draw clear distinctions between provisions of 
Islamic Sharia law and public policy. Article (50-2) states: “The competent court considering the 
nullification action shall, on its own initiative, nullify the award if it violates the provisions of 
Sharia and public policy in the Kingdom …”297 This article indicates that the Law of Arbitration 
distinguishes between the two terms; the word “and” introduces an additional matter that the award 
should not violate, namely “public policy in the Kingdom.”  The Law of Enforcement, however, 
defines “public policy” as the provisions of Islamic Sharia, which means no such distinction exists 
between the two terms.298  
The 2012 Law of Arbitration also governs arbitration related to administrative disputes. It 
allows governmental bodies to arbitrate disputes with the prime minister’s approval, like the 1983 
Law.299 The 2012 Law of Arbitration, however, does not legally require the prime minister’s 
approval if a special provision of the law permits submission to arbitration.300 The Law of 
Enforcement, however, excludes any judgment or resolution regarding administrative cases from 
the jurisdiction granted to the judge of enforcement.301 A legal vacuum clearly exists in such cases, 
                                                 
296 For more information about judicial discretion in the Islamic system and under the Saudi legal system, see 
generally VOGEL, supra note 126.  
297 THE 2012 ARBITRATION LAW, Article (50-2). 
298 THE LAW OF ENFORCEMENT, Article 11; THE ENFORCEMENT IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS, Article (11-3). 
299 THE 2012 LAW, Article (10-2). 
300 Id. 
301 THE LAW OF ENFORCEMENT, Article 2. 




since no other legal instrument governs the enforcement of arbitral awards issued in cases related 
to administrative disputes. The 2012 Law of Arbitration has not eliminated this ambiguity; both it 
and its implementation regulations, which took effect on June 8, 2017, are silent in this area302 The 
prime minister attempted to fill this legal void on July 27, 2017, ordering that the governor of each 
province would enforce all administrative judgments and resolutions.303  
Determining the effectiveness of the new procedure will require more time, but several 
concerns and relevant points warrant attention. First, the new procedure does not provide the same 
legal guarantees for administrative arbitral awards that the Law of Enforcement provides for other 
types of awards. Privileges granted by the Law of Enforcement but excluded from administrative 
arbitral awards include compulsory enforcement, direct enforcement, protective measures such as 
provisional and enforced attachment, and sanctions.304 Both individuals and governmental bodies 
who receive favorable arbitral awards will not, as a result, benefit from all of the means of 
enforcement specified in the Law of Enforcement. Second, the procedures for enforcement of 
foreign awards specified by the Law of Enforcement, especially in Articles 11, 12, 13 and 14, do 
not govern administrative arbitral awards issued outside Saudi Arabia.305 The absence of similar 
provisions governing administrative arbitral awards could create a double standard with regard to 
enforcing arbitral awards.  Third, giving governors of provinces such authority could cause 
confusion and uncertainty and may conflict with the principle of judiciary independence. The 
current legal framework does not grant jurisdiction to any judicial body to hear cases and disputes 
related to enforcement of administrative court decisions. Assigning a judicial body to perform 
                                                 
302 Several years after the enactment of the 2012 Arbitration Law, order No. 541 issued its implementing regulations 
on 26/8/1438H. (May 22nd, 2017) [hereinafter THE IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS OF 2017].    
303 Order No. 49256 on 26/10/1438H (July 27th, 2017) 
304 See THE LAW OF ENFORCEMENT, Articles 7, 9, 23-92, 95.   
305 Id. Articles 11-14. 




these tasks would therefore guarantee the protection of rights for all persons in society without 
distinction of any kind, and ensure equality before the law. These issues highlight the need to 
establish a new judicial body in the administrative courts system with the jurisdiction to enforce 
administrative court decisions and arbitral awards.        
The problems listed above could seriously undermine the efficiency of the arbitral process 
and the Saudi jurisdiction’s reputation for hospitality to arbitration. Gathering all arbitration-
related provisions in one statutory framework would have better served the laws and the process 
of arbitration than dividing them into scattered parts, especially considering the short interval 
between the enactments of the two laws. Adopting such an approach would eliminate legal 
vacuums, overlapping laws, and conflicts between the two laws – making arbitration and the 
enforcement of arbitral awards more effective.  
3.7 Recent developments in international practice  
The Kingdom’s adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law in 2012 reduced its antagonism 
toward international arbitration. Other jurisdictions criticized Saudi Arabia prior to the enactment 
of the 2012 Law of Arbitration for not taking such a step. Many therefore expected that enacting 
this law would bridge the gap between the Kingdom and other jurisdictions regarding 
arbitration.306 Numerous countries, however, have recently passed new laws that prohibit the use 
of foreign laws, especially Islamic Sharia.307 Such prohibitions include the designation of Islamic 
Sharia as the law of choice in parties’ agreements in national or international arbitration.308 These 
                                                 
306 Hampton, supra note 229.  
307 Id. 
308 Intense debate has surrounded the Islamic Sharia ban in many jurisdictions, such as Canada, England and Wales, 
as well as several states in the U.S. see Id.; Caryn Litt Wolfe, Faith-Based Arbitration: Friend or Foe-An 
Evaluation of Religious Arbitration Systems and Their Interaction with Secular Courts, 75 FORDHAM REV 427 
(2006); see also Maryam Razavy, Canadian Responses to Islamic Law: The Faith-based Arbitration Debates, 32 
RELIG. STUD. THEOL. (2013), available at: 




jurisdictions will not, therefore, enforce arbitral awards based on agreements between parties in 
which the parties bind themselves by Saudi law or Islamic Sharia.309 Saudi corporations must bear 
in mind such new international developments.310 
Islamic Sharia bans apparently violate the principles of party autonomy and freedom of 
contract. Putting restrictions on these principles in any jurisdiction will negatively affect 
hospitality to arbitration and will increase hostility toward arbitration, thus decreasing the 
efficiency of the process. The New York Convention, moreover, grants reciprocal treatment.311 
Countries affected by such bans, including Saudi Arabia, could therefore hold firm to their rights 
of reciprocity regarding enforcement of foreign arbitral awards;312 Saudi Arabia could, in other 
words, refuse to enforce arbitral awards rendered in any of the banning countries. International 
arbitration will bear the burden and suffer the consequences if such a standoff occurs.  
                                                 
  http://www.equinoxpub.com/journals/index.php/RST/article/view/19197 (last visited Mar 31, 2017); Sherene H. 
Razack, The “Sharia law debate”in Ontario: The modernity/premodernity distinction in legal efforts to protect 
women from culture, 15 FEM. LEG. STUD. 3–32 (2007); Lee Ann Bambach, The Enforceability of Arbitration 
Decisions Made by Muslim Religious Tribunals: Examining the Beth Din Precedent, 25 J. LAW RELIG. 379–414 
(2009); Erin Sisson, The Future of Sharia Law in American Arbitration, 48 VAND J TRANSNATL L 891 (2015); 
SALIM FARRAR & GHENA KRAYEM, ACCOMMODATING MUSLIMS UNDER COMMON LAW: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS (2016); Rebecca E. Maret, Mind the gap: the equality bill and Sharia arbitration in the United 
Kingdom, 36 BC INTL COMP REV 255 (2013); see also Legislation tries to bar foreign influence - News - 
GoUpstate - Spartanburg, SC, available at: http://www.goupstate.com/news/20110204/legislation-tries-to-bar-
foreign-influence (last visited Mar 31, 2017); Michael C. Grossman, Is This Arbitration?: Religious Tribunals, 
Judicial Review, and Due Process,  COLUMBIA LAW REV. 169–209 (2007); Mona Rafeeq, Rethinking Islamic Law 
Arbitration Tribunals: Are They Compatible with Traditional American Notions of Justice, 28 WIS INTL LJ 108 
(2010); see also Albert D. Spalding & Eun-Jung Katherine Kim, Should Western Corporations Ban the Use of 
Shari’a Arbitration Clauses in their Commercial Contracts?, 132 J. BUS. ETHICS 613–626 (2015). 
309 Hampton, supra note 229. 
310 Id. 
311 1958 New York Convention, Article 1. 
312 Reciprocal treatment is also one of the legal requirements for enforcing international awards in Saudi Arabia 
under the provisions of the Law of Enforcement See THE LAW OF ENFORCEMENT, Article 11; THE ENFORCEMENT 
IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS, Article (11-5); but see Geoffrey Fisher, Sharia Law and Choice of Law Clauses in 
International Contracts, LAWASIA J 69 (2005); for more information about the right of reciprocity under the New 
York convention, see generally Young-Joon Mok, The principle of reciprocity in the United Nations Convention 
on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards of 1958, 21 CASE W RES J INTL L 123 (1989). 





Arbitration has evolved over time from a friendly, non-binding method of settling disputes 
that maintained the parties’ relationship to an effective, binding method of adjudication. Disputants 
today resort to arbitration in order to obtain clear-cut rulings that end their disputes. This chapter 
demonstrated that tahkim and arbitration are two different institutions. They have resembled one 
another at various times in history, but the two processes evolved in different ways. Tahkim 
reached its peak in the early days of Islam; it faced great hostility after the era of the Prophet and 
his successors due to allocation of power issues. The role of the process, therefore, decreased in 
many Islamic jurisdictions at that time, and its popularity weakened, but it continued to exist. This 
chapter showed that tahkim became a subject of debate between different Islamic schools of 
thought. The differences between these schools regarding the nature of tahkim and its final 
products, however, did not prevent fiqh from supporting the practice – keeping it alive through a 
long period of hostility.  
The modern manifestation of fiqh has helped introduce principles of arbitration into many 
Islamic countries. It played a crucial role in the development of the 2012 Law of Arbitration in 
Saudi Arabia, which established many modern arbitration doctrines in the Kingdom. One could 
characterize the Saudi experience with arbitration as follows: whenever legislators demonstrated 
the will, fiqh helped them lead the way.   
The adoption of internationally recognized principles of arbitration via the enactment of 
the 2012 Law of Arbitration proves that these principles do not conflict with the country's 
constitution or Islamic Sharia; Articles 1 and 67 of the Basic Law of Governance would have 




prevented its enactment if they did.313 Arbitration, its principles, and awards should therefore 
receive full enforcement and support in order to encourage arbitration in Saudi Arabia and to help 
boost its reputation on the international stage. Adopting such principles also demonstrates the 
Saudi system’s movement toward arbitration as practiced in many Western jurisdictions today, 
rather than toward tahkim. This movement demonstrates an evolutionary stage in which a Muslim 
country has finally come “full circle” in this area.314  
This progress does not, however, mean that the Saudi jurisdiction has become hospitable 
to arbitration, particularly to international arbitration.  Saudi Arabia has taken many steps to foster 
international arbitration, and the 2012 Law of Arbitration is a significant milestone. It bodes well 
for the future of the Saudi jurisdiction, and the environment may well become more hospitable to 
arbitration in years to come. The door, however, is not yet wide open.315 Enactment of a one-size-
fits-all method in arbitration law, in other words, ensures modernity in the legal system, but it does 
                                                 
313 The Basic Law of Governance in Saudi Arabia was enacted by Royal Decree No. A/90 on 27/8/1412H (March 
1st, 1992). Article 1 states: “The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic State. Its religion is Islam. 
Its constitution is Almighty God's Book, The Holy Qur'an, and the Sunna (Traditions) of the Prophet (PBUH).” 
Article 67 states: “The Regulatory Authority shall be concerned with the making of laws and regulations which 
will safeguard all interests, and remove evil from the State's affairs, according to Sharia. …” Id. 
314 Brower and Sharpe, supra note 151. (“No one argues that international arbitration is without its pitfalls, or that 
misguided national courts have ceased to threaten the efficacy of international arbitration. But when one views 
the current strength and vibrancy of international dispute resolution in the Islamic world against arbitration's 
troubled history there during the past half-century, one cannot fail to see progress at every level. A prominent 
Arab commentator has argued that ‘the evolution of the concept of Moslem arbitration and the adaptation thereof 
to the spirit of the century is not a derogation from, or a betrayal of Moslem law, but is a return to its sources.’ 
The third phase of its modern relationship to international arbitration thus appears to have brought the Islamic 
world full circle.”) Id.; the main aspects of the third phase of the relationship between international arbitration and 
Muslim countries are: (1) Joining the New York convention. (2) Adopting the UNCITRAL Model Law. (3) 
Opening up to institutional arbitration by domestic and international levels. Id. The upcoming chapter will discuss 
the latter requirement, which Saudi Arabia has also fulfilled. 
315 One development under the reforms represented by the 2012 Arbitration Law, as well as the Law of Enforcement 
in Saudi Arabia, is the recent decision of the Court of Enforcement in Riyadh, which will enforce an US$18.5 
million arbitral award in Saudi Arabia. The award was issued outside the country, in London, pursuant to the rules 
of the ICC. Hosam ibn Ghaith, SAUDI ENFORCEMENT COURT CONFIRMS THAT IT WOULD ENFORCE A LONDON ICC 
AWARD KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (2016), available at: 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/07/13/saudi-enforcement-court-confirms-that-it-would-enforce-a-london-
icc-award/ (last visited Apr 1, 2017). One could view this as advancement, if a sluggish one. It is, after all, only 
one step forward. 




not necessarily indicate that the particular system has become an arbitration-friendly 
jurisdiction.316    
Commercial arbitration currently lacks the status to be an effective means of resolving 
disputes in Saudi Arabia; parties face lengthy and unpredictable enforcement processes after 
arbitral tribunals render awards. The cumbersome enforcement process makes the Saudi 
jurisdiction unappealing to international investors. Legislative and judicial recognition of the need 
for arbitration in resolving disputes will enhance the enforcement of both domestic and 
international arbitral awards. This will have a significant impact on the effectiveness of arbitration 
and the country’s hospitability toward the practice.317 
A thorough assessment of the current framework of dispute resolution and access to justice 
could lead to the requisite judicial and legislative recognition. Such an evaluation would identify 
all issues leading to ineffectiveness in the system before proposing any remedies, such as 
alternative dispute resolution methods.318 The legislative and executive branches should 
collaborate to evaluate the effectiveness of all proposed mechanisms in resolving the identified 
issues and then implement the mechanisms that prove appropriate. They should not conduct these 
assessments in isolation from other concerns addressed at the international level. They should 
consider all contemporary problems and trends in the international practice of arbitration, since 
Saudi Arabia is not immune to these issues.319 
                                                 
316 CARBONNEAU, supra note 1 at 115–23.  
317 Id. at 117–19. 
318 See generally BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN AMERICA, (Samuel Estreicher & Joy Radice eds., 
2016). 
319 See generally CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, (Julian D. M. Lew ed., 1987); 
ANNUAL FORDHAM LAW SCHOOL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION, ARTHUR W 
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MEDIATION THE FORDHAM PAPERS (2013) (2015); see also Thomas Stipanowich, Reflections on the State and 
Future of Commercial Arbitration: Challenges, Opportunities, Proposals,  (2014); Thomas Stipanowich, 
Arbitration: The New Litigation, 2010 UNIV. ILL. LAW REV. 1 (2010); Thomas Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration 
Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion and the Future of American Arbitration, (2011). Several recent 




Legal education could also help bolster legislative and judicial recognition of arbitration’s 
importance in the Saudi jurisdiction. Curriculum reform in all law schools in the country should 
reflect the progress made in the legal system in general, and in the area of arbitration in particular. 
Such reform would ensure that prospective legislators, lawyers, judges, and arbitrators acquire the 
updated knowledge and skills they need for their professions. Reform should lead to improved 
understanding of the need for arbitration, and help bridge the gap between law and practice.  
The above-mentioned steps will lead to an informed vision regarding all potentially 
necessary reforms for promoting progress and efficiency in the dispute-resolution framework. The 
arbitration system in Saudi Arabia needs further improvement, both domestically and 
internationally, to achieve two ultimate goals; increasing access to justice at the national level and 
becoming internationally recognized as a jurisdiction hospitable to arbitration. Learning from the 
experience of other legal systems will help Saudi Arabia achieve these objectives faster. The next 
chapter elucidates this approach. 
 
                                                 
studies have observed new trends in arbitration. For example see Donna Shestowsky, The Psychology of 
Procedural Preference: How Litigants Evaluate Legal Procedures Ex Ante, (2014). This empirical study found 
that disputants prefer the other dispute resolution methods – for example, mediation and court trial – it studied 
over both binding and non-binding arbitration. Id. Disputants preferred mediation over all methods of 
adjudication, except for court trial, and the study findings suggest that disputants preferred mediation because they 
want an extended role in the decision-making process – one that includes their presence and greater involvement 
during the process. Id.; see generally GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON ADR, (Carlos Esplugues Mota & Silvia Barona 
Vilar eds., 2014). 
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1. Introduction  
The last chapter highlighted the newness of the legal framework and practice of arbitration 
in the Saudi jurisdiction. The current arbitration law was enacted in 2012; it superseded and 
repealed rarely used provisions of the country’s first arbitration law, which was enacted in 1983.1 
The relative novelty of the Saudi arbitration system explains the immaturity and simplicity of 
arbitration practice in Saudi Arabia.  
The development of arbitration law and practice is a continuous process that countries can 
foster in a variety of ways. Saudi Arabia would benefit from examining and applying the lessons 
of its own history with arbitration (covered in the previous chapter). It would also gain valuable 
lessons and insights from exploring the history of the practice in other jurisdictions (this chapter’s 
focus). 
Arbitration has become an increasingly sophisticated and effective process for resolving 
various types of disputes in many countries around the world. The United Kingdom and the United 
States are among the leading jurisdictions in establishing and maintaining successful arbitration 
practices. The success of arbitration in both jurisdictions resulted from prolonged evolution 
processes.   
Examining the history of those evolution processes can benefit Saudi Arabia in many ways. 
First, it will improve Saudi understanding of the nature and origins of the principles that the 2012 
arbitration law implemented. These principles were derived from and inspired by the UNCITRAL 
Model Law; by adopting them, the Saudi legal system has made itself current with the latest trends 
in international practice. Second, studying the evolution of arbitration in the U.S. and the U.K. will 
                                                 
1 The Saudi law of arbitration was enacted by the Royal Decree No. M/34 on 24/5/1433H (April 16th, 2012). 
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also produce valuable insights, since legislators, judges, lawyers, and practitioners in these 
countries have long discussed and debated the process and enforcement of its principles, and 
thereby made substantial progress in creating effective arbitration systems. 
The short period since the enactment of the 2012 Saudi arbitration law reinforces the 
importance of learning from the rich experience of countries with strong arbitration systems; doing 
so will make practice under the current law more effective and successful. It will also help 
overcome potential problems, barriers, and difficulties that the new practice may face or cause, 
since these jurisdictions may have experienced and successfully addressed similar issues. In 
addition, this approach may provide guidance when looking ahead and initiating future reforms in 
this field.  
This chapter identifies several valuable lessons from the history of arbitration in the U.K. 
and the U.S.; it seeks to better understand the process and the various principles it relies on in order 
to ensure the functionality and effectiveness of arbitration practice in the Saudi jurisdiction. The 
remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 examines the arbitration legal system 
in the UK. Section 3 explores the American experience and the law and practice of arbitration in 
the United States. These two sections provide overviews of the evolution of arbitration practice 
and how it has progressed over time in both jurisdictions. They also derive key lessons from the 
main stages of these processes. Section 4 concludes this chapter. 
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2. The English Perspective and Experience  
2.1 The history of the legal framework for arbitration 
2.1.1 Early developments 
In “Arbitration: History and Background,” former Lord Justice of Appeal, Sir Michael J 
Mustill2 summarized the main difficulties arbitration faced during its early emergence in England 
in the late seventeenth century: arbitration agreements were rescindable and unenforceable, and 
the system lacked efficient mechanisms to enforce arbitral awards.3  
English lawmakers passed the first Arbitration Act in 1698 to address these problems.4 The 
1698 Act stipulated that arbitration agreements were enforceable and irrevocable only after a 
obtaining a court ruling mandating enforcement.5 The Act also authorized courts to impose 
sanctions on parties who rescinded arbitration agreements; this did not, however, stop parties from 
revoking arbitration agreements.6 
After the 1698 Act, the status of arbitration in England did not change significantly until 
the nineteenth century. The 1833 Statute specified that once a court ratified an arbitration 
agreement, arbitrators could continue arbitration proceedings to render an award unless otherwise 
                                                 
2 Michael John Mustill, Arbitration: History and background, 6 J INTL ARB 43 (1989); He was appointed in 1985 as 
Lord Justice of Appeal in England. He went on to hold a position of Judge on the Appellate Committee of the House 
of Lords in 1992, and was appointed Lord of Appeal in Ordinary. Subsequently, he became a life peer, as Lord 
Mustill of Pateley Bridge in North Yorkshire. He died in 2015. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 9 WM. III, C. 15. (1698); see also Paul L. Sayre, Development of commercial arbitration law, 37 YALE LAW J. 595–
617 (1928). 
6 Ernest G. Lorenzen, Commercial Arbitration. International and Interstate Aspects, 43 YALE LAW J. 716–765 
(1934). 
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ordered by the court.7 Arbitration agreements, however, could still be revoked prior to court 
ratification, since English courts continued to uphold the principle of “common law revocability.”8 
In 1854, English lawmakers enacted the Common Law Procedure Act9 to regulate 
procedural and enforcement issues associated with the implementation of arbitration agreements. 
This Act gave courts the authority to order parties to arbitrate complicated disputes while retaining 
full control over cases with the right to intervene to prevent and/or resolve any maladministration 
during the arbitration process.10 The 1854 Act initiated three basic developments in English 
arbitration:  1) it granted judges the authority to enforce arbitration agreements by postponing court 
hearings; 2) it framed and established rules regarding appointment of arbitrators to resolve any 
potential problems, especially if a party failed to appoint an arbitrator in the manner specified by 
the agreement; and 3) it gave judges control of cases involving arbitration, including the authority 
to remand cases to arbitrators for further clarification.11 
2.1.2 The Arbitration Act (1889) 
Many of the concepts that arbitration relies on today, including freedom of contract and 
the enforceability of arbitral agreements and awards, evolved during the nineteenth century. 
Legislators began devoting more attention to issues related to the recognition and enforcement of 
such principles. These legislative efforts coincided with the industrial revolution in England, 
                                                 
7 3 & 4 WM. IV, C. 42. (1833); Sayre, supra note 5; Lorenzen, supra note 6. 
8 Sayre, supra note 5.; for more information about the common-law revocability, see generally Wesley A. Sturges & 
Richard E. Reckson, Common-Law and Statutory Arbitration: Problems Arising from Their Coexistence, 46 MINN 
REV 819 (1961).  
9 17 & 18 VXCR. C. 125. (1854); see also H. T. HOLLAND, T. CHANDLER & C. E. POLLOCK, THE COMMON LAW 
PROCEDURE ACT, 1854: WITH TREATISES ON INJUNCTION AND RELIEF, ALSO A TREATISE ON INSPECTION AND 
DISCOVERY (1854). 
10 Mustill, supra note 2. 
11 KYRIAKI NOUSSIA, CONFIDENTIALITY IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
OF THE POSITION UNDER ENGLISH, U.S., GERMAN AND FRENCH LAW 11–12 (2010). 
CHAPTER FOUR: CREATING A STRONG ENABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR 




indicating that legislators recognized the role of arbitration in economic growth.12 The 1889 
Arbitration Act,13 for example, maintained, reinforced, and strengthened the 1854 Common Law 
Procedure Act’s arbitration provisions.14 Section 1 states: “A submission, unless a contrary 
intention is expressed therein, shall be irrevocable, except by leave of the Court or judge, and shall 
have the same effect in all respects as if it had been made an order of Court.”15 The 1889 Act also 
governed all arbitration agreements—applying to both current and future disputes, whereas 
previous statutes only applied to specific arbitration-related disputes.16  
Arbitration in the English jurisdiction thus progressed throughout the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, as legislators passed statutes to support the process. Adherence to certain 
outdated principles and traditional judiciary practices (including the doctrine of common-law 
revocability), however, inhibited more substantial progress.  
Legislative steps taken in the nineteenth century brought more significant development as 
the law began to recognize and enforce arbitration agreements of all types.17 The expanding role 
of the courts in supervising the arbitration process, however, ran contrary to this progress.18 
The early history of arbitration practice in England suggests that any legislative efforts that 
acknowledge arbitration’s role in fostering economic growth and therefore seek to strengthen and 
support the practice should include measures limiting court intervention. Legislators should aim 
                                                 
12 Mustill, supra note 2. 
13 52 & 53 VICT. C. 49. (1889). 
14 Sayre, supra note 5; Lorenzen, supra note 6. 
15 52 & 53 VICT. C. 49. (1889), § 1. 
16 Id.  
17 See for example, Lorenzen, supra note 6; Sayre, supra note 5. 
18 See for example, 52 & 53 VICT. C. 49 (1889), § § 1&5; GREAT BRITAIN & W. O. CREWE, THE LAW OF ARBITRATION: 
BEING THE ARBITRATION ACT, 1889 : WITH NOTES OF STATUTES, RULES OF COURT, FORMS AND CASES, AND AN 
INDEX (1898). 
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to ensure arbitral autonomy by restricting court involvement and the broad judiciary supervision; 
otherwise, such progress would not be sufficient and its objectives will not be achieved as planned.  
2.2 Cause-effect relationship between courts and arbitral tribunals  
The relationship between traditional courts and arbitration tribunals has ebbed and flowed 
for centuries.19 Assertive actions carried out by one entity led to reactions from the other.20 Both 
courts and arbitrators have sought to sway the allocation of power in their favor.21 Legislation has 
played a decisive role in shifting the balance of power from one side to the other.22 The law initially 
supported the courts completely, but that support gradually began to shift toward arbitration.  
This struggle for power has positively influenced the shape of new laws governing the 
relationship between courts and arbitrators.23 Arbitration award appeals were, for instance, 
submitted to traditional courts in England during the eighteenth century.24 Parties could appeal the 
                                                 
19 BUILDING THE CIVILIZATION OF ARBITRATION, 337–42 (Thomas E. Carbonneau & Angelica M. Sinopole eds., 2010). 
Professor Carbonneau observes that the English long regarded arbitration as a lower class venue compared to 
litigation. He describes the relationship between traditional the courts and arbitration as follows: “The relationship 
between arbitration and the courts had all the trapping of a Cinderella story or a Dickens novel. Arbitral tribunals 
were thought of as the step-children of the legal process, and it was believed that they should recognize their 
disabilities and lowly status and allow courts to supply the lawful conclusion to litigation.” Id. at 337,339. 
20 Id. at 337-42. 
21 For more information about “Allocation of Power between courts and arbitrators” see generally GARY BORN, 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS (2nd ed. 2001); See also Aaron-
Andrew P. Bruhl, Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, The, 
83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1420, 1490 (2008). 
22 BUILDING THE CIVILIZATION OF ARBITRATION, supra note 19 at 337–42. 
23 But see Claude Reymond, The Channel Tunnel {Channel Tunnel Group Ltd. v. Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd., 
{1992} 2 All E.R. 609} case and the law of international arbitration., 109 LAW Q. REV. 337–342 (1993); Professor 
Reymond states the following: “Over the last 20 years or so the development of law and international arbitration 
has been marked by an obvious tendency to limit the possibilities of court intervention in the course of an arbitration. 
Thus England abolished the special case and curtailed the powers of the courts even in support of an arbitration.   ... 
It may be that the tide is now turning: it is increasingly realized in international arbitration circles that the 
intervention of the courts is not necessarily disruptive of the arbitration. It may equally be definitely supportive, in 
the best English tradition’ Id.; see also D. Alan Redfern, Arbitration and the Courts: Interim Measures of 
Protection–Is the Tide about to Turn, 30 Tex. Int'l L. J. 71, 88 (1995); see also William Wang, International 
Arbitration: The Need for Uniform Interim Measures of Relief, 28 Brook. J. Int'l L. 1059, 1100 (2002-2003). 
24 BUILDING THE CIVILIZATION OF ARBITRATION, supra note 19 at 337–339. 
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truth-finding process, the accuracy of an arbitrator’s determinations, and the tribunal’s legal 
outcomes. Court review of these matters resulted in the revocation of many appealed awards.25  
Arbitrators began excluding rationales for the awards they rendered to block further 
judicial intervention.26 The 1854 Common Law Procedure Act explicitly limited such behavior by 
arbitrators. It established the “case-stated procedure”, which gave parties and/or the tribunal the 
right to seek legal opinions in the form of court decisions regarding points of law at any stage 
during the arbitration process.27 This development reinforced the courts’ judicial oversight 
authority over arbitral proceedings and awards. Subsequent statutes made no major changes 
limiting the courts’ power of intervention. The 1889, 1934, and 1950 Arbitration Acts actually 
expanded the statutory basis for the stated case procedure.28 In fact, the 1950 Act prevented parties 
from agreeing not to resort to such procedures, which the 1889 Act had still allowed.29 
                                                 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 338–39. 
27 17 & 18 VXCR. C. 125 (1854), § 5; THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 125 n.2 (5th 
ed. 2014). BUILDING THE CIVILIZATION OF ARBITRATION, supra note 19 at 338–339.  
28 B. J. Conrick, Where the Kings Writ Does Not Run: The Origins and Effect of the Arbitration Act of 1979, 1 QLD. 
INST TECH LJ 1 (1985); § 19 of the 1889 Act introduced the consultative stated case and the 1934 Act authorized 
the assigning of interim awards through the case-stated procedure. Id. The practice persisted under the 1950 Act as 
§ 21 addressed the stated case. Id; 14 GEO. 6 C. 27 (1950). 
29 Conrick, supra note 28; (“The 1889 Act had allowed the parties to contract out of the possibility of having an award 
stated as a special case. Section 7 of that Act ran, so far as relevant: 
‘The arbitrators or umpire acting under a submission shall, unless the submission expresses a contrary intention, have 
power... 
(b) to state an award as to the whole or part thereof in the form of a special case for the opinion of the court ...’ 
(emphasis added) 
Importantly the proviso in italics was dropped from s. 21 in 1950 with the result that the parties could not contract out 
of any of the forms of stated case.”) Id. 
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Legislators apparently enacted this procedure to prevent arbitrators from rendering 
unreasonable awards.30 Professor Carbonneau describes the reality of arbitration under the former 
statutes as follows: 31 
Obviously, the foregoing developments reinforced the judicial power to 
oversee the determinations reached by arbitrators. The public interest in law 
application and adjudication demanded that courts have the authority to revisit all 
aspects of adjudication achieved through arbitration. The arbitral process, therefore, 
had little integrity and was, for all intents and purposes, devoid of real autonomy 
and independence. The integrity of law was seen as the primary and overriding 
value. 
 
Some legal commentators have argued that the case-stated procedure contributed to the 
development of law, especially Maritime and Commercial law. They suggest it brought constancy 
to the practice of arbitration and compelled arbitrators to decide cases in accordance with law.32 
Commentators have also argued that despite the lasting recognition and adoption of this procedure 
throughout English jurisdiction, England remained a popular place for arbitration in the world.33    
These arguments can be challenged on various grounds. First, the case-stated procedure 
made arbitration time consuming. Both the proper use and the misuse of the procedure triggered 
factors that led to significant delays in the process.34 1) By following the case-stated procedure’s 
provisions like preparing the question of law or taking other actions stipulated by the Act, 
arbitrators unavoidably slowed the arbitration process. 2) Delays also resulted from parties’ misuse 
of the procedure.35 Parties resorted to the case-stated procedure to impede the process, its 
                                                 
30 BUILDING THE CIVILIZATION OF ARBITRATION, supra note 19 at 338–39. (“The procedure was intended to quell 
arbitrator apprehensions about judicial supervision and, yet, assures that courts continued to be the exclusive oracles 
of the law. Whether a legal question should be referred to the courts was within the arbitrator’s discretion—at least, 
at this stage in the evolution of the process.”) Id. at 338. 
31 Id. at 339. 
32 MARK LITTMAN, England Reconsiders “The Stated Case,” 13 INT. LAWYER 253–259 (1979). 
33 Id. 
34 William W. Park, Judicial Supervision of Transnational Commercial Arbitration: The English Arbitration Act of 
1979, 21 HARV INTL LJ 87 (1980). 
35 Id. 
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conclusion, or the enforcement of the arbitral award. This slowed the arbitration process and 
hampered its effectiveness.36  
Second, although many accepted or tolerated the foregoing factors at the national level, 
international practice in the twentieth century had evolved in a different direction. Successful and 
effective arbitration practice relies on several criteria: 1) acceleration of the process to ensure its 
effectiveness and efficiency in ending disputes in the manner to which the parties agreed; 2) 
protection of the autonomy of the parties and tribunals; 3) limiting the factors that may impede the 
dispute resolution process and adversely affect the conduct of the proceedings or the finality of the 
arbitral award; 4) reducing judicial review and court intervention in the arbitral process.37  
The case-stated procedure not only made domestic arbitration ineffective, but also 
discouraged parties involved in international trade from arbitrating in England.38 Acknowledging 
the issues that prevented England from maintaining its globally-recognized, arbitration-friendly 
reputation accelerated the actions taken to address them and to remove such obstacles.39  
English legislators, therefore, initiated statutory reform that resulted in the exclusion of all 
types of case-stated procedure from the Arbitration Act of 1979.40 The Act granted parties involved 
                                                 
36 Id. 
37 Id.; David W. Shenton & Gordon K. Toland, London as a Venue for International Arbitration: The Arbitration Act, 
1979, 12 LAW POL INTL BUS 643 (1980); for more information regarding the modern principles of arbitration see 
CARBONNEAU, supra note 27 at 49–124. 
38 Park, supra note 34; Shenton and Toland, supra note 37; CARBONNEAU, supra note 27 at 125–26; Conrick, supra 
note 28. 
39 Shenton and Toland, supra note 37. The Commercial Court Committee in its report in 1978 acknowledged several 
drawbacks of the stated case and the rendering of awards without reasoning. Id.; REPORT OF THE COMMERCIAL 
COURT COMMITTEES, CMMD. NO. 7284 (1978). The report was widely perceived as the main reason for subsequent 
reform in the English jurisdiction: it included some suggestions and proposals for such improvements. It called for 
the abolition of the case-stated procedure and for placing limitations on appeals in certain cases. If the parties choose 
a governing law other than English law, the report also called for the enforcement of the parties’ agreement and the 
prevention of court supervision if such prevention aligned with the parties’ intentions. The committee ended the 
report by recommending reform and warning that “England can retain its position as the international leader in 
commercial law and arbitration only if it provides the services that its customers need.” Shenton and Toland, supra 
note 37; see also Peter S. Smedresman, Arbitration Act, 1979, 11 J MAR COM 319 (1979). 
40 ARBITRATION ACT, C. 42. (1979).  
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in arbitration a new restricted appeal procedure to the High Court.41 It also allowed parties to 
exclude the right to appeal from their cases by entering into an “Exclusion agreement” as specified 
by the Act.42 
Many perceived this statutory development as a step forward. The 1979 Act enhanced the 
autonomy of arbitration parties and arbitral tribunals. It aimed to ensure the conclusiveness of 
arbitral awards and to decrease judicial review.43 
Legal commentators and legislators deemed case-stated procedure a direct impediment to 
arbitration in England.44 They predicted serious economic losses if tradesmen continued to refrain 
from choosing London as the seat of arbitration.45 The need for reform in the English jurisdiction 
was therefore quite urgent. The enactment of the 1979 Act demonstrated legislators’ sensitivity to 
business needs. The Act modernized the statutory framework for arbitration with the aim of 
helping arbitration address problems created by previous legislation.46  
Some criticized the 1979 Act for the ambiguity and overly broad nature of several of its 
provisions, especially those related to judicial review and the new appeal process, which, they 
argued, could increase the discretion of the courts;47 however, this statutory reform—particularly 
its elimination of the case-stated procedure—was an essential step toward modernizing the English 
jurisdiction’s arbitration system. The enactment of the 1979 Act showed legislators’ willingness 
                                                 
41 Id. § § 1, 2. The Act allowed parties to appeal to the High Court only after obtaining permission from the court or 
the approval of all other parties. Id.      
42 Id.  § § 3, 4; see also Shenton and Toland, supra note 37; parties may enter into an exclusion agreement after the 
beginning of arbitration proceedings in all national arbitration cases and in international arbitration involving claims 
subject to the admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court, or involving insurance, or commodities. For international 
arbitration related to all other claims, parties are free to exclude the right to appeal at any stage of their contracting 
relationships. Exclusion agreements in such cases may cover both existing and future disputes. Id.    
43 Shenton and Toland, supra note 37. 
44 Smedresman, supra note 39; Conrick, supra note 28. 
45 Id. 
46 Conrick, supra note 28. Shenton and Toland, supra note 37. 
47 See for example, Smedresman, supra note 39; Park, supra note 34. 
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to make the amendments necessary to meet modern requirements and keep pace with 
contemporary arbitration practice as it evolved internationally. 
Arbitration law in England has evolved continuously since its inception in the seventeenth 
century. Legislators, laws, and the courts were the main players in this process until the early 
decades of the nineteenth century when arbitrators began taking on more prominent roles in the 
system’s development. Legislators increasingly recognized the role and autonomy of arbitrators 
and the statutory framework of arbitration from the second half of the nineteenth century onward 
reflects this recognition. 
The case stated procedure exemplified one important aspect of the relationship between 
the bench and arbitrators that legislators observed for many decades. These legislators realized that 
any statutory procedure threatened the autonomy of arbitral parties or the arbitration process itself 
would damage the effectiveness that process and make the jurisdiction unappealing to the 
international eye. This realization led them to abolish the case stated procedure in order to promote 
arbitration and achieve the desired economic objectives.  
The English experience demonstrates that increased judicial supervision in any jurisdiction 
will discourage foreign investors from arbitrating in that jurisdiction, which will result in 
significant economic loss. The legislative branch should therefore closely observe the allocation 
of power between courts and arbitral tribunals to identify the statutory reforms necessary to ensure 
arbitration’s continuing effectiveness and attractiveness.   
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2.3 Regulating court intervention via case law 
The 1979 Act represented a new national trend toward promoting arbitration and reinforcing 
its effectiveness. This trend later found its way into English case law, especially after the 1993 
House of Lords’ in the well-known Channel Tunnel case.48  
The English and French governments signed a construction agreement in the late 1980s to 
build a tunnel linking their countries under the English Channel. The main agreement stated that 
the two parties agreed to submit any dispute between them to arbitration under the Rules of the 
International Chamber of Commerce, and it designated Belgium as the seat of arbitration. A 
dispute arose between the concessionaires and the contractors soon after construction began. The 
contract between the two parties authorized arbitrators to enforce “principles common to both 
English and French law.” Absent such shared principles, it required arbitrators to apply the 
“general principles of international trade law as have been applied by national and international 
tribunals.”49  
This clause made the resolution of any contractual conflict difficult. Arbitrators often struggled to 
identify or address the considerable number of shared principles, and the parties and their 
representatives frequently disagreed about which principles qualified as “common principles.”50 
These difficulties highlight the vagueness and impracticality of the choice of law clause in the 
Channel Tunnel case, which impeded every attempt to proceed with the arbitration.51  
A contractual dispute was brought before the English High Court in November of 1991. 
The court ruled that, notwithstanding the arbitration clause, it would order the interim injunction 
                                                 
48 Channel Group v Balfour Beatty Ltd. [1993] Adj. L.R. 01/21. 
49 Id. 
50 LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 106-07 (Alan Redfern, Martin Hunter, & 
Nigel Blackaby Eds., 4th ed., 2004). 
51 Id. 
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requested by the plaintiff since the defendant had chosen not to perform its contractual 
obligations.52  The court also refused to grant the defendant’s motion to stay proceedings pending 
arbitration.53    
In January 1992, the Court of Appeal reversed the High Court’s decision and enforced the 
arbitration agreement, ruling that the High Court had no jurisdiction to issue the injunction.54 The 
House of Lords dismissed the second appeal in January 1993, handling by essentially splitting the 
difference. The ruling gave the High Court jurisdiction to grant an interim injunction but explained 
that ordering an injunction in an attempt to forestall the authority of the arbitral tribunal and its 
decision would be improper.55 The House of Lords’ ruling, written by Lord Mustill,56 noted the 
sophisticated, well-considered drafting of the arbitration clause and the agreed upon dispute 
resolution framework, which reflected rigorous discussion and thoughtful consideration between 
the parties. The ruling therefore asserted that the parties must accept it in its entirety and bind 
themselves to the system they freely chose. The ruling also confirmed the court’s right to intervene 
                                                 
52 Id. 
53 Channel Group v Balfour Beatty Ltd., supra note 48. 
54 Id. 
55 Id.; see also AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND ADR. 79–
99 (2010). 
56 Before explaining the judgment, Lord Mustill addressed the following areas of disagreement: “1. Should the action 
brought by the appellants against the respondents be stayed? I consider that the action can and should be stayed 
pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the court to inhibit proceedings brought in breach of an agreed method of 
resolving disputes. I thus arrive at the same conclusion as the Court of Appeal, but by a different route. It is therefore 
unnecessary to decide whether, as held by the Court of Appeal, the court would also have power to stay the action 
under section 1 of the Arbitration Act 1975. I nevertheless briefly state reasons for concluding, with some hesitation, 
that such a power does exist in the circumstances of the present case. 2. Is there in fact any dispute between the 
parties with regard to the subject matter of the action? In common with the Court of Appeal I conclude that this 
question should be answered in the affirmative. 3. Does the court have power to grant an injunction to prevent the 
respondents from ceasing work under an agreement dated 13 August 1986 (ʺthe construction contractʺ)? The Court 
of Appeal held that no such power is conferred by section 12(6) (h) of the Arbitration Act 1950, and I agree. The 
Court of Appeal also held that the court had no power to grant the injunction under section 37(1) of the Supreme 
Court Act 1981. As I understand it the Court of Appeal would in any event have declined to uphold the grant of an 
injunction. For my part I consider that such a power does exist, but that it should not be exercised in the 
circumstances of the present case. Again, therefore, I reach the same conclusion as the Court of Appeal but by a 
different route.”   . 
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“in the right case” to reinforce arbitration proceedings by ordering interim relief, but denied such 
a right in this case for the reason explained above. The judgment concluded that granting the 
requested injunction would certainly contradict “the general tenor of the construction contract and 
[…] the spirit of international arbitration.”57 The highest court of appeal in England thus denied 
the request for an injunction that would have prevented the arbitrators from deciding the matter 
freely and conclusively. 
The Channel Group v Balfour Beatty Ltd. judgment clearly demonstrated significant 
judicial support for arbitral processes—enforcing the arbitration clause and reinforcing the 
tribunal’s autonomy. Subsequent developments in case law, nonetheless, added to the vagueness 
surrounding arbitration’s statutory framework. The House of Lords’ ruling in the Channel Tunnel 
case did not, for instance, define what sort of cases would require court intervention to assist the 
arbitral process by granting an injunctive relief.58 The ruling thus failed to precisely define the 
framework of the relationship between courts and arbitral tribunals in this regard.59  
The final judgment in the Channel Tunnel case, in other words, showed judicial support 
for arbitration based on the court’s understanding of the fundamental principles of the international 
practice of the arbitration process, which necessitates protecting party autonomy by upholding 
arbitration clauses. The absence of clear and decisive statutory provisions that enforce arbitration 
agreements and arbitral clauses, however, would put the fate of the arbitral process in the hands of 
the judiciary, enabling it to determine the appropriateness of court intervention on a case-by-case 
basis.  
                                                 
57 Id. 
58 AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 55 at 98. 
59 Id. at 99. 
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The history of Channel Tunnel case demonstrates that the wide exercise of judicial 
discretion will invite uncertainty and unpredictability in any jurisdiction due to the lack of clarity 
in legal frameworks. It will also result in disagreements between courts, which will lead to varied 
practices. Extensive judicial discretion over arbitration does not attract investment in any part of 
the world; nor does it make a jurisdiction an ideal place for arbitration.  
2.4 Arbitration Act of 1996 
The gradual progress of the statutory framework of arbitration in England, especially 
during the twentieth century, and the ongoing development of case law in this area have made 
English arbitration statutes quite sophisticated.60 The Arbitration Act of 199661 has been described 
as “the closest thing to a definitive code of arbitration law that had ever been enacted in England.”62  
The Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration introduced by the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in 1985 influenced the 1996 Act. England 
                                                 
60 NOUSSIA, supra note 11 at 13.; (“Since 1900, the general position has been that a commercial dispute can be speedily 
and efficiently determined in the courts as well as by arbitration, depending on its nature and what common practice 
in the particular sector requires, and that the two systems ought indeed to be properly regarded as coordinate rather 
than rival. The Arbitration Acts 1950, 1975, 1979 and 1996 all encapsulate the need for party autonomy as opposed 
to the previous tradition of judicial intervention.”) Id. 
61 ARBITRATION ACT, C. 23. (1996). 
62 ROBERT MERKIN & LOUIS FLANNERY, ARBITRATION ACT 1996 1 (5th ed. 2014). Also of importance is the fact that 
The Arbitration Act was drafted under the supervision of the Departmental Advisory Committee (DAC). Justice 
Saville was the chairman of DAC at that time while Lord Mustill was the first appointed Chairman for the committee 
when it was founded in 1985. The legislature enacted the Act in 1996 and most of the provisions of the Act went 
into effect in 1997. In this short period of time, DAC released its report about the enacted legislation and the 
supplementary report came out after that. Both reports proved essential in demonstrating the need for the new bill; 
they underlined its purposes and provided a comprehensive illustration of the Act’s provisions. Id. at 1, 432; MARY 
ARDEN, COMMON LAW AND MODERN SOCIETY: KEEPING PACE WITH CHANGE 203 (2015). See also M. J. Mustill, The 
Mustill Departmental Advisory Committee on English Arbitration, 4 ARBITR. INT. 160–161 (1988); see also Lord 
Justice Saville, Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration Law 1996 Report on the Arbitration Bill, 13 
ARBITR. INT. 275–316 (1997); see also Justice Saville, 1997 Supplementary Report on the Arbitration Act 1996, 13 
ARBITR. INT. 317–330 (1997); see generally Lord Justice Mustill, A New Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? 
The Response of the Departmental Advisory Committee to the UNCITRAL Model Law, 6 ARBITR. INT. 3–62 (1990). 
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did not adopt the model law in full as many other jurisdictions did. Justice Mary Arden describes 
the relationship between the 1996 Act and the UNCITRAL Model Law as follows:  
[T]he 1996 Act alters arbitration law by introducing some of the provisions of 
the UNCITRAL Model Law, for example it enables a party to agree to apply 
‘equity clauses’ to the substance of their dispute.  
   The Arbitration Act 1996 is expressed in clear terms. The purpose of the Act 
was to update and modernize arbitration law and at the same time to make 
London an attractive venue for international arbitration.63  
2.4.1 Overview of the 1996 Act 
The 1996 Act requires that arbitration agreements between parties be made in writing.64 It 
stipulates that only parties to the agreement are bound by its terms and that arbitration agreements 
cannot be enforced against non-signatories.65 The 1996 Act also gives courts the authority to 
eliminate arbitrators if they demonstrate bias or if anything appears to challenge their competence 
or credentials.66 In addition, it protects party autonomy by allowing disputants and the arbitrators 
to organize and conduct the arbitration process (i.e. laying down the rules they wish to apply) 
according to their own preferences.67  Another significant feature of the 1996 Act is its recognition 
of the enforcement of arbitral awards.68 It distinguishes between domestic and foreign arbitral 
decisions in terms of enforceability, court intervention, and the grounds for challenging arbitral 
awards.69  
                                                 
63 ARDEN, supra note 62 at 203.  
64 ARBITRATION ACT, C. 23. (1996), § 5. 
65 REGULATING DISPUTE RESOLUTION: ADR AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT THE CROSSROADS, 154–56 (Felix Steffek et al. 
Eds., 2013). 
66 Id.; ARBITRATION ACT, C. 23. (1996), § 24. 
67 REGULATING DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 65 at 154–56. 
68 Section 66 of the 1996 Act states that courts must grant approval before parties proceed with measures to enforce 
an arbitral award within the United Kingdom. ARBITRATION ACT, C. 23. (1996), § 66. 
69 REGULATING DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 65 at 156. Under the provisions of the Act, Local arbitral awards are 
enforced by the same enforcement procedures as traditional court decisions. The Act provides several grounds under 
which local arbitral awards can be challenged. It shows the difficulty of challenging awards made outside of England 
and Wales by applying the criteria of the New York Conventions (Article 5) in this regard—proving the difficulty 
of challenging an international award in the UK. The Act also stipulates that courts have no jurisdiction to intervene 
in the enforcement of arbitral awards that fall under Geneva Convention of 1927, unless otherwise authorized by 
the Act. Id. 
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The 1996 Act grants courts the authority to intervene during arbitration whenever they 
deem such intervention necessary to reinforce the arbitral process.70 This shows that English courts 
still enjoy a certain degree of authority to intervene in the arbitration process.71 Such interference, 
however, whether authorized by legislation or established by the courts themselves, was more 
prevalent in the past.72 Professor Carbonneau described the effect of the 1996 Act as follows:  
The recent legislation replaced an entire section of the 1950 Act and abolished the 
High Court’s common law jurisdiction to vacate an award for manifest error of fact 
or law. Moreover, it replaced the stated-case procedure with a limited right of 
appeal to the High Court.73  
 
The 1996 Act allows parties to appeal to the High Court only after obtaining permission to 
do so. The Act, however, makes it difficult to gain such approval, stipulating that it be granted 
case-by-case and only “for truly significant or highly controversial legal questions.”74 The Act also 
                                                 
70 Sections 42-45 are titled: “Powers of court in relation to arbitral proceedings”. Section 42 addresses the issue of 
Court enforcement of a tribunal’s peremptory orders. Section 43 governs securing the attendance of witnesses. 
Section 44 sets forth Court authority and power granted to be exercised in support of arbitral proceedings. Section 
45 contains provisions relating to determination of preliminary points of law. ARBITRATION ACT, C. 23. (1996), § § 
42-45; The text of the 1996 Arbitration Act can be accessed at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/23/data.pdf (last visited Nov 5, 2016). 
71 The ongoing relationship between courts and arbitration in English history is demonstrated by Lord Steyn’s 
observation: “The supervisory jurisdiction of English courts over arbitration is more extensive than in most 
countries, notably because of the limited appeal on question of law and the power to remit.  …it is certainly more 
extensive than the supervisory jurisdiction contemplated by the Model Law” Johan Steyn, England’s Response to 
the UNCITRAL Model Law of Arbitration, 10 ARBITR. INT. 1–16 (1994); He also emphasized Lord Wilberforce’s 
earlier statement regarding court oversight by quoting the following passage from the Lesotho Highlands 
Development Authority v. Impregilo SpA and others ruling: “Other countries adopt a different attitude and so does 
the UNCITRAL model law. The difference between our system and that of others has been and is, I believe, quite 
a substantial deterrent to people to sending arbitrations here. …It has given to the court only those essential powers 
which I believe the court should have; that is, rendering assistance when the arbitrators cannot act in the way of 
enforcement or procedural steps, or, alternatively, in the direction of correcting very fundamental errors." 
 House of Lords Lesotho Highlands Development Authority (Respondents) v. Impregilo SpA and others 
(Appellants), available at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldjudgmt/jd050630/leso-1.htm (last 
visited Jan 31, 2016); For more information about Lesotho Highlands Authority v Impregilo, see MERKIN AND 
FLANNERY, supra note 62 at 215–16. For more details on Judicial oversight and English arbitration, see generally 
Okezie Chukwumerije, Judicial Supervision of Commercial Arbitration: The English Arbitration Act of 1996, 15 
ARBITR. INT. 171–191 (1999). 
72 REGULATING DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 65 at 154–56.; BUILDING THE CIVILIZATION OF ARBITRATION, supra 
note 19 at 341–42. CARBONNEAU, supra note 27 at 125,125 n.2. 
73 BUILDING THE CIVILIZATION OF ARBITRATION, supra note 19 at 341. 
74 CARBONNEAU, supra note 27 at 125–125 n.2.; BUILDING THE CIVILIZATION OF ARBITRATION, supra note 19 at 341–
42. 
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ensures the jurisdiction’s wide appeal by permitting international agreements to include provisions 
waiving the right to appeal to English courts.75  
The legislative history that led to the Arbitration Act of 1996 in England is a tale of 
significant development made over centuries.76 The modern provisions and all the features of the 
Act have made English arbitration more sophisticated and attractive to foreign businesses and 
trade.77 Gathering all the provisions pertaining to arbitration in one statutory framework was one 
of the1996 Act’s central contributions.78 
Many countries have recently adopted the principles of the Model Law in full, but have 
struggled to enact its provisions in their practices and, therefore, have not yet proved themselves 
arbitration-friendly.79 The 1996 Act, on the other hand, did not fully embrace the UNCITRAL 
Model Law; however, it conforms to modern principles of arbitration and aligns English arbitration 
practice with contemporary international practice by protecting both arbitral and party autonomy.80 
These protections, as the Act recognizes, necessitate reducing the supervisory role of the judiciary 
especially for international arbitration. The recognition of the importance of such principles and 
                                                 
75 Id.; CARBONNEAU, supra note 27 at 125,125 n.2. 
76 Lord Steyn highlights the importance of “the radical nature” of the of the new features of the 1996 Act, quoting the 
following statement made by Lord Mustill and Stewart Boyd QC Commercial Arbitration (2001 Companion 
Volume to the Second Edition, preface): "The Act has however given English arbitration law an entirely new face, 
a new policy, and new foundations. The English judicial authorities . . . have been replaced by the statute as the 
principal source of law. The influence of foreign and international methods and concepts is apparent in the text and 
structure of the Act, and has been openly acknowledged as such. Finally, the Act embodies a new balancing of the 
relationships between parties, advocates, arbitrators and courts which is not only designed to achieve a policy 
proclaimed within Parliament and outside, but may also have changed their juristic nature." House of Lords Lesotho 
Highlands Development Authority (Respondents) v. Impregilo SpA and others (Appellants), supra note 71. 
77 CARBONNEAU, supra note 27 at 125–125 n.2.; BUILDING THE CIVILIZATION OF ARBITRATION, supra note 19 at 341–
42.; GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON ADR, 119–20 (Carlos Esplugues Mota & Silvia Barona Vilar eds., 2014). Recent 
reports deem the 1996 Act efficient and make no recommendations for any amendments. They also reveal that 
corporations would rather refer their disputes to arbitration than to litigation for various reasons. Id.  
78 BORN, supra note 21 at 31, 32. 
79 CARBONNEAU, supra note 27 at 113–23. 
80 See generally BORN, supra note 21; BRUCE HARRIS, ROWAN PLANTEROSE & JONATHAN TECKS, THE 
ARBITRATION ACT 1996: A COMMENTARY (2014); MERKIN AND FLANNERY, supra note 62. 
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their positive impact on economic growth has helped transform London from an arbitration-
unfriendly venue to a “hospitable-to-arbitration” jurisdiction.81 
The success of the 1996 Act suggests that any country can draft a one-of-a-kind arbitration 
law to suit its own needs and to reflect its heritage and established practices as long as the law 
embraces the principles and doctrines of international arbitration practice. Confidence in the 
effectiveness of arbitration in resolving disputes and contributing to economic growth will help 
create a robust framework for such processes.  
Certain jurisdictions could certainly achieve the same result by implementing the 
UNCERTAL Model Law, but the progress made by only a nominal adoption of the Model Law 
will remain slight and superficial. Implementation of the Model Law will not make a jurisdiction 
arbitration-friendly unless a strong belief in the necessity of arbitration and all the newly imported 
principles being introduced into the national law accompanies its implementation. Such an 
approach will ensure the wide acceptance of these principles, the full enforcement of the law, and 
strong support for arbitration. The UNCERTAL Model Law should therefore be seen as a means 
not an end in this regard. 
                                                 
81 Id.; Professor Carbonneau has argued that the English jurisdiction was “less appealing” to arbitration before the 
enactment of the 1996 Act due to the continual existence of the stated case procedure in some former legislations. 
CARBONNEAU, supra note 27 at 125, 125 n.2.; BUILDING THE CIVILIZATION OF ARBITRATION, supra note 19 at 335., 
J Kodwo Bentil, Making England a More Attractive Venue for International Commercial Arbitration by Less 
Judicial Oversight, 5 J. Int'l Arb. 49, 66 (1988). 
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3. The Evolution of Law and Practice in the United States  
3.1 Historical Background: early legal framework and practice 
American arbitration has developed in several phases. During the seventeenth century, some 
Americans considered arbitration a peacemaking process and a community matter.82 Bruce H. 
Mann argues that, in the past, Americans did not recognize the reality of arbitration and all of its 
features because they viewed it as a mean of community peacekeeping.83 This conception 
diminished the role of arbitration.84 Mann also argues that sociological changes over the years 
influenced the popularity and the development of arbitration.85 Informal forms of arbitration 
proved the most effective means of settling disputes in close-knit communities, because they 
sustained community ties and relationships.86 The American arbitration system only developed its 
current level of sophistication as a result of failures in community structures. People began to 
recognize the potential of arbitration as an alternative to cumbersome litigation.87 The 
transformation of communities gave arbitration a new face and character.88 
                                                 
82 BRUCE H. MANN, NEIGHBORS AND STRANGERS: LAW AND COMMUNITY IN EARLY CONNECTICUT 101–21 (1987).He 
wrote: (“Unlike litigation, arbitration was inexpensive, expeditious, and private. Above all, it was, as [Zephaniah] 
Swift recognized, “neighbourly”—uniquely tied to and shaped by the communities in which it existed. The 
community ties were an essential part of arbitration. Without them, arbitration would not have been the popular and 
effective alternative to formal legal process that it was.”) Id. at 101.  
83 Id. at 117–120; ("People tried arbitration ‘for the avoiding of future [trouble] and lawsuits,’ ‘to settle peace between 
the parties,’ ‘for the friendly ending and appeasing of difference and [controversies],’ ‘to the end that justice may 
be done … and that [controversy] may be prevented,’ ‘hoping and [expecting] the difference [would] in love and 
utmost friendship be settled,’ to prevent cost and [trouble] in the law.’ They wanted an end to disputing, not simply 
a resolution of a particular dispute.”) Id. at 118.    
84 Id. at 117-120. 
85 MANN, supra note 82 at 101. 
86 Id; (“… the absence of evidentiary structure, the power of the parties to define the scope of the inquiry, the spirit of 
compromise implicit in the submission, the ability of the parties to choose their arbitrators, the mutuality of awards, 
the privacy of the process, the discretion of the arbitrators—all made arbitration useful in preserving the 
interdependent relations that contributed to the stability of insular communities.”) Id. at 134-35). 
87 Id. 
88 Id., (“As the bonds of community weakened, the legal system appropriated arbitration to itself and turned it into a 
formal process that differed little from legal adjudication.”) Id. 
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[A]rbitration in seventeenth-century Connecticut was a uniquely community-based 
form of handling disputes and was well suited to the needs of the communities it 
served. Communities were not static, however. They grew and changed, often to 
the dismay of their inhabitants. When communities changed, as they inevitably did, 
arbitration changed, also. It was too closely identified with community not to.89  
 
The rudimentary nature of arbitration and the lack of a clear legal framework at that time 
meant that the process was easily confused with other methods of amicable settlement,90 such as 
mediation and conciliation.91 Some scholars have suggested, however, that the historical confusion 
about arbitration was intentional. They contend that the judiciary had a vested interest in 
weakening this alternative and resisting its anticipated popularity by creating ambiguity regarding 
its purpose and its ability to function properly and operate as a reliable form of adjudication.92 
The enforceability of arbitration progressed significantly during the eighteenth century. In 
1753, legislators in the colony of Connecticut passed “An Act for the more Easy and Effective 
Finishing of Controversies by the Use of Arbitration,” which introduced a new legal structure for 
arbitration.93 The desire for enforceability was one of the key factors behind the 1753 legislation. 
Arbitral awards became enforceable through legal procedures that prevented disputants who 
refused to accept the outcome of the arbitration process from ignoring awards.94  Enforceability 
changed the whole process of arbitration and brought it closer to the adjudication process in that 
part of the country. Arbitration's new procedures resembled court procedures, and arbitral awards 
became similar to court judgments. The legislative actions taken in colonial Connecticut started a 
new chapter in the development of the American arbitration system:  
                                                 
89 MANN, supra note 82 at 109. 
90 FRANCES KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS AND ACHIEVEMENTS 3–6 (1st ed. 1984). 
91 Id. 
92 Id.; (“As disputants became more involved in litigation, they neglected to exercise their own powers of self-
regulation. Due to the absence of any contemporaneously organized arbitration machinery or established rules of 
procedure, it became far easier for parties in dispute to litigate than to arbitrate.”) Id. at 5. 
93 MANN, supra note 82 at 134–36. 
94 Id. at 131–36. 
CHAPTER FOUR: CREATING A STRONG ENABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR 




The process still went by the name arbitration, but it was no longer what the name 
once implied. In the course of becoming legally enforceable, a community-bound 
form of handling disputes lost its simplicity, and thus its uniqueness.95   
Connecticut thus made considerable legislative progress regarding enforceability, but 
arbitration continued to suffer in many other parts of the country during the eighteenth and the 
nineteenth century. Numerous obstacles hindered its progress and, among other factors, judicial 
hostility as well as a lack of public confidence in the process and those overseeing it created a 
negative atmosphere for development.96 
The early legal framework and practice of arbitration show the gradual, centuries-long shift 
and development made in the American jurisdiction. Arbitration was the first alternative means of 
dispute resolution to be legislated in the U.S. legal system. Legislative progress, however, was 
made at the state level and only in certain parts of the country. This resulted in varied practices 
nationwide regarding the enforceability granted to arbitration agreements and arbitral awards.  
The evolution of arbitration over time necessitated wider recognition of more sophisticated 
principles to ensure the effectiveness of advanced methods. Federal authorities had to embrace 
fundamental doctrines such as the enforceability of arbitration agreements and the binding 
character of awards. This was important to counter continuing judicial hostility that seriously 
threatened arbitration over the centuries in the American jurisdiction. 
                                                 
95 Id. at 132; (“Arbitration changed because the communities that shaped it changed. Once severed from the 
communities it had served, arbitration, at least insofar as it rested on rules of court or pledged executions, differed 
little from formal legal adjudication. It no longer occupied a niche in the legal structure.”) Id.; (“[Arbitration] was, 
as Zephaniah Swift later wrote, ‘a court created, constituted, and appointed by the parties.’”) Id. at 136. 
96 Id.; BORN, supra note 21 at 156.; CARBONNEAU, supra note 27 at 125–26.; see also NOUSSIA, supra note 11.; see 
also ABRAHAM P. ORDOVER & ANDREA DONEFF, ALTERNATIVES TO LITIGATION: MEDIATION, ARBITRATION, AND 
THE ART OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 141 (2nd ed. 2002); ("In the United States, arbitration historically was not well 
regarded by the courts. They felt that arbitration was a form of judicial ouster. In addition, it allows forum shopping 
through a choice of decision-maker, and it allows circumvention of the protections provided by the courts. The 
courts were concerned that the parties would lose the protections designed into the Constitution by choosing 
arbitration"). Id.; see also GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON ADR, supra note 77 at 490.   
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The early history of arbitration in the American jurisdiction demonstrates that an 
inadequate legislative framework and a lack of judicial support together significantly diminish 
arbitration’s applicability and efficiency. Judicial hostility will decrease the population’s reliance 
on arbitration and hamper its effectiveness in resolving disputes unless countered with a statutory 
framework that ensures the enforcement of arbitration agreements and arbitral awards.  
3.2 The FAA and the modern era of arbitration 
The American Bar Association (ABA) eventually recognized the importance of federal 
support for arbitration and, during a 1920 meeting in St. Louis, directed three of its committees to 
draft a proposed Federal Arbitration Act.97 The enactment of the FAA in 1925 marked a turning 
point in the history of arbitration in the United States. Courts were no longer the only legally 
recognized forums for resolving disputes. The FAA also declared the end of the era of animosity 
between arbitration and traditional courts by creating a powerful “national policy favoring 
arbitration.”98  
3.2.1 Aspects of legislative support 
Many perceived the FAA as more comprehensive and effective in its content and 
provisions than other arbitration laws.99 The Act legitimized arbitration agreements and explicitly 
                                                 
97 Julius Henry Cohen, The Law of Commercial Arbitration and the New York Statute, 31 YALE LAW J. 147–160 
(1921). The first bill was drafted in 1921 by the following ABA Committees: The Committee on Commerce, The 
Committee on Trade and, The Committee on Commercial Law. Id.  
98 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), JUSTIA LAW, available at: 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/465/1/case.html (last visited Aug 15, 2016); (“In enacting § 2 of the 
federal Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require 
a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration”) Id.; see 
also CARBONNEAU, supra note 27 at 125–30, 170–79, 505–22.  
99  Id. at 127. 
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limited court supervision of arbitral awards.100 The FAA aimed to validate arbitration as an 
adjudication method and, to promote efficiency, it granted the method full independence.101  
The FAA enforces both agreements to arbitrate and arbitral awards by outlining the 
required legal mechanisms and procedural rules.102 Section 2 of the FAA states:  
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter 
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or 
any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing 
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity 
for the revocation of any contract.103  
The FAA restrained states from passing laws at the state level disfavoring arbitration or 
preventing the enforcement of arbitration agreements or arbitral awards by the state courts. It 
therefore preempted all possible state or judicial body attempts to act against the declared federal 
policy favoring arbitration or justify such conduct.104  
3.2.2 Judicial support under the FAA 
The success and growth of arbitration in the United States cannot be attributed only to the 
legislative support provided by the FAA and its provisions. Courts also contributed significantly 
                                                 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 128; see also ORDOVER AND DONEFF, supra note 98 at 139–43. It is also worth mentioning that in some cases 
not only did the FAA enforce the recourse to arbitration, but also, some traditional courts in the U.S. granted other 
ADR techniques the same privilege. CARBONNEAU, supra note 27 at 200-09. The case of Fisher V. GE Medical 
System serves as a good example of the broad interpretation of the FAA provisions used by the court to enforce the 
mediation agreement between the disputants in this case. Id. According to Professor Carbonneau “This carefree 
approach is not only silly, but dangerous. The liberal insouciance can have a serious effect on legal rights.” Id. at 
200. The case of AMF V. Brunswick Corp. similarly involves a court ruling that if the dispute parties agree to submit 
their dispute to a third party, the court considers the agreement in this regard an arbitration agreement. Id. The court 
reached this conclusion based on absence of a clear definition for the word “Arbitration” in the FAA Act. Id. Well-
established practice in a large number of the U.S. courts, however, still demonstrates that all ADR methods do not 
fall within the scope of application of the FAA—the main objective of which was to establish a framework to 
regulate arbitration as an adjudicatory means to resolve disputes. Id. at 207-09. Any agreement between parties to 
mediate disputes or achieve consensual settlements through one of the ADR methods are not, based on this 
perspective, governed by the provisions of the FAA. Id. 
103 9 U.S.C, § 2. 
104 GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON ADR, supra note 77 at 488–90. 
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to the success of arbitration practice in the modern era after the enactment of the FAA.105 Many 
U.S. courts moved from extreme hostility toward arbitration to full support.106 The U.S. Supreme 
Court led judicial support for arbitration as a sophisticated and effective dispute-resolution 
venue.107 Scholars have argued in fact that the court created the federal judicial policy that supports 
arbitration.108 
The federal courts’ judicious application of section 10 of the FAA testifies to the judiciary’s 
support for the arbitral process. Section 10 states: 
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district 
wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the 
application of any party to the arbitration— 
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; 
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of 
them; 
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the 
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent 
and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights 
of any party have been prejudiced; or 
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them 
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was 
not made. 
(b) If an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required the 
award to be made has not expired, the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing 
by the arbitrators. 
(c) The United States district court for the district wherein an award was made that 
was issued pursuant to section 580 of title 5 may make an order vacating the award 
upon the application of a person, other than a party to the arbitration, who is 
                                                 
105 Id. at 490–95; BUILDING THE CIVILIZATION OF ARBITRATION, supra note 19 at 348–58. 
106 Id.; Prior to the enactment of the FAA, courts in the U.S. had created a hostile judicial policy against arbitration 
that allows any party to revoke the arbitration clause independently without the consent of the other party at any 
time before rendering the award. CARBONNEAU, supra note 27 at 125, 26.    
107 See Id. at 127 n.6.; GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON ADR, supra note 77 at 495. 
108 BUILDING THE CIVILIZATION OF ARBITRATION, supra note 19 at 350–51.; (“In point of fact, the courts, under the 
leadership of the U.S. Supreme Court, have anchored the statutory law in a “strong federal policy” unequivocally 
supportive of arbitration in all circumstances. Moreover, courts, again, especially the U.S. Supreme Court, have 
purged the statutory text of its limitations on the recourse to arbitration and added content that enables the process 
to operate. The federal judicial policy favoring arbitration was the Court’s invention. Neither the statute nor its 
legislative history gave an inkling of—let alone identified—such a phrase or policy.”) Id. 
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adversely affected or aggrieved by the award, if the use of arbitration or the award 
is clearly inconsistent with the factors set forth in section 572 of title 5.109 
 
This section outlines the specific statutory grounds on which the U.S. court in a district 
where an arbitral award was made can vacate all or part of that award. It “implicitly eliminates the 
review of awards on the merits by not authorizing the supervision of awards on that basis.”110 
Section 10 again highlights the federal policy favoring arbitration by limiting the bases for vacating 
or challenging arbitral awards.111 This section demonstrates the FAA’s support for arbitration, but 
its application by the courts also testifies to the increase in judicial support for the arbitration 
process after the enactment of the FAA. Judicial practice, in other words, reveals the courts’ 
growing acceptance of statutory limitations.112 Such acceptance bolstered the arbitration process 
and protected the enforceability of arbitral awards from potential statutory or judiciary obstacles.113 
Broad application of Section 10, or the misinterpretation of any of its provisions by the courts, 
could have weakened the FAA, but that did not happen. The evidence shows that, on the contrary, 
U.S. courts have supported the arbitral process by enforcing arbitration agreements and awards 
and by making the vacation of arbitration awards an exception rarely granted.114 Professor 
Carbonneau describes the judicial supervision of arbitration under the FAA as follows: 
The courts have acquiesced to the restriction of their supervisory authority in 
arbitration. Any one of the four grounds in Section Ten could have become a 
significant barrier to the enforcement of awards. Courts could have attributed a 
broad meaning and aggressively applied the words “undue means,” “evident 
partiality,” “misconduct,” or “imperfect execution of powers” to the conduct of 
arbitrators and engaged in a rigorous scrutiny of awards. In point of fact, the federal 
courts ordinarily engage in a modest, sometimes perfunctory, review of awards. 
                                                 
109 9 U.S.C. § 10. 
110 CARBONNEAU, supra note 27 at 183; "Moreover, Section Ten does not refer to the subject-matter inarbitrability 
defense or the public policy exception to the enforcement of arbitral awards. There is therefore, no statutory basis 
for challenging awards on those grounds." Id. 
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The federal case law is guided by a nearly irrebuttable presumption that arbitral 
awards, once rendered, are enforceable. The vacatur of an award is a relatively rare 
event.115  
 
Arbitration in the American jurisdiction thus received significant legislative and judicial 
support in the early decades of the twentieth century. The enactment of the FAA helped unify 
judicial practice and the judiciary, in turn, reinforced the FAA by upholding its principles and 
addressing deficiencies arising from improper applications or overly broad interpretations of its 
provisions.  
These developments highlight the crucial and complementary roles the law and judicial 
practice play in supporting the process and effectiveness of arbitration in any jurisdiction. 
Legislation provides the statuary framework for the process and judicial practice should accept 
and protect the law’s restrictions on judicial review and enforce other statutory provisions to the 
fullest possible extent. Legislative and judicial cooperation is essential to ensure any jurisdiction’s 
hospitality to arbitration. The law and the judiciary are both important elements of the success 
equation.   
3.3 Contemporary Issues of Arbitration 
3.3.1 Non-statutory grounds for vacating awards 
The American jurisdiction recognizes several common law grounds for challenging arbitral 
awards besides the grounds specified in the FAA. This recognition expands judicial review of 
arbitral awards.116 The non-statutory grounds exceed statutory grounds by permitting judicial 
review of the merits of arbitral awards.117 They deem arbitral awards unenforceable if: (1) the 
                                                 
115 CARBONNEAU, supra note 27 at 181–82. 
116 Id. at 62, 63, 110, 111, 183-85, 515-20, 524-26.   
117 Id. 
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arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law, (2) the arbitral award, or enforcement of the award, 
would cause a breach of public policy or, (3) the arbitral award reflects irrationality or is 
arbitrary.118 This practice conflicts with federal policies supporting arbitration. The FAA 
strengthened arbitration by including no provisions authorizing judicial review on the merits; 
however, this recognition of common law-based challenges to arbitral awards seriously threatens 
the arbitral process. It extends the judicial supervision and limits arbitral autonomy.119 
The history of arbitration in common law legal systems provides some insight about the 
origins of common law grounds for judicial review. Some scholars suggest that, for example, the 
history of manifest disregard of the law as grounds for judicial interference started in nineteenth 
century England120 and eventually spread to other common law jurisdictions.121 American courts 
                                                 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 110, 111. 
120 Michael H. LeRoy, Are Arbitrators above the Law - The Manifest Disregard of the Law Standard, 52 BOSTON 
COLL. LAW REV. 137–188 (2011). In 1836, a business brought the Symes v. Goodfellow case before the court of 
appeal in England, petitioning the court to vacate an arbitral award on the grounds of manifest disregard of the law. 
The English Court of Common Pleas decided the case. Id., n.73; THE ENGLISH REPORTS: COMMON PLEAS, 208 
(1912). The court found that the award was based on legal error but decided not to intervene as the disputants had 
agreed to submit their dispute to the arbitrator and they “must take his law for better and for worse.” Id. One of the 
judges stated that "An award is final on the merits of everything within the scope of the arbitrator's authority; but 
the reference of this cause gave the arbitrator no authority to inquire into anything beyond the existence of the 
contract. He could not inquire into the fact of adultery unless it were pleaded." Id. Justice Tindal C. J. disagreed and 
expressed his disagreement as follows: "Put it as you please, it is only that an inadmissible witness has been called. 
His admissibility was a question of law, which has been decided by the arbitrator; you must take his law for better 
and for worse." The court, therefore, dismissed the case. Id.; LeRoy, supra note 120. The court held that courts did 
not have jurisdiction to review an arbitral award on the merits even if legal error contaminated the award. Years 
later, however, court interference gradually appeared in other cases Id. 
Hodgkinson v. Fernie case was decided in 1857 and the court set aside the arbitral award on the grounds of a mistake 
of law. THE ENGLISH REPORTS, 712–18 (1913). Some judges stated that: “it is only where misconduct is imputable 
to the arbitrator, or some obvious mistake of law appears upon the face of the award, that the court can interfere.” 
Id. Other judges in the same case went further and determined that the court should always have jurisdiction to 
insure that arbitrators attained justice through proper application of the law; the lack of proper application justified 
interference. Id; they asserted: (“It is a mistake to suppose that the rule is limited, as suggested, to cases of 
misconduct on the part of the arbitrator, or to defects apparent on the face of the award; the court will always 
interfere to prevent injustice, where the arbitrator, intending to act according to law, has decided contrary to law.”) 
Id. 
121 LeRoy, supra note 120. 
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thus came to recognize arbitrators’ legal mistakes as grounds for arbitral award vacation.122 The 
court in Anderson v. Taylor123 nevertheless affirmed the following: 
… [A]rbitrators are the judges of the law … and that the award is final and 
conclusive between the parties, unless attacked in the manner pointed out by the 
statute, for fraud, -accident, mistake, or illegality, and that the Court in hearing the 
objections will not enter into the merits of the award.124  
 
It concluded in 1870 that an arbitrator’s legal mistake should be “gross and palpable” for the award 
to be vacated.125  The court’s ruling in this case demonstrates that American courts at first 
supported arbitration by limiting the likelihood of setting aside an arbitral award.126 Some have 
argued that the term "manifest disregard of the law" corresponds to court’s definition of "illegality" 
because they both “[require] more than the arbitrator’s error in deciding a question of law.” 127 
An 1874 case, United States v. Farragut, signaled a change in judicial attitudes toward 
arbitral awards. The government asked a court with proper jurisdiction to revoke a previously 
rendered arbitral award. The court rejected this request and confirmed the arbitral award.128 On 
                                                 
122 Id.  
123 Anderson v. Taylor, 41 Ga. 10, 21 (1870). 
124 Id. 
125 Id.  
126 The ruling in Anderson v. Taylor makes clear that arbitration enjoyed substantial judicial support even when the 
process involved some mistakes resulting from an arbitrator’s failure to comply with certain statutory requirements. 
Id. It reads: “We are satisfied that the failure of the arbitrators to furnish the party who objects to the award with a 
copy, as directed by Section 4183 of the Revised Code, is not a sufficient cause for setting it aside.” The court 
decided here that the arbitrator’s mistake did not prevent any of the parties from submitting their objection within 
the time specified by the law due to, for example, unawareness of award’s issuance or existence. The court, thus, 
ruled that not every legal mistake made by arbitrators qualified as grounds for attacking an arbitral award. Likewise, 
the court determined that in arbitration “arbitrators are the judges” and their awards are “final and conclusive” unless 
challenged on the specific statutory grounds of “fraud, accident, mistake, or illegality”. The court also clarified the 
terms “mistake” and “illegality”: “By mistake, we do not understand that the statute means a mere error in the 
judgment of the arbitrators. Nor do we understand by illegality, that an award may be set aside because the arbitrators 
erred in deciding a question of law which arose in the case. If they have been guilty of partiality or corruption, or 
have referred any matter to chance or lot, or have made a palpable mistake of law … it will vitiate the award. But 
mistakes must be gross and palpable, and of a character which controlled their decision, or the award will not, on 
that account, be set aside.” Id.; see also GEORGIA SUPREME COURT, REPORTS OF CASES IN LAW AND EQUITY, 
ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, IN THE YEAR ... 11–22 (1918).  
127 LeRoy, supra note 120. 
128 United States v. Farragut 89 U.S. 406 (1874), JUSTIA LAW,  
available at: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/89/406/case.html (last visited Oct 10, 2016);  
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appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a court of any level could nullify an arbitral award based 
on the doctrine of manifest mistake of law.129 It concluded that neither the Supreme Court nor any 
lower courts should enforce arbitral awards if appellants could prove that arbitrators based the 
awards on manifest mistakes of law.130 The Supreme Court decided in this particular case that a 
part of the arbitrator’s judgment was unjust and violated the law.131 United States v. Farragut 
validated manifest mistakes of law along with fraud, and excess of authority as grounds for setting 
aside arbitral awards.132   
This history demonstrates that the emergence of non-statutory grounds for vacating arbitral 
awards preceded the enactment of the FAA in the American jurisdiction. Section 10 of the FAA 
does not include any of these common law grounds,133 but U.S. courts have continued to recognize 
them over the years. Some scholars have linked that recognition to the 1953 ruling in Wilko v 
Swan.134 Other scholars have argued that labor arbitration, specifically collective bargaining 
                                                 
129 Id. 
130 Id.; “… The award was also liable, like any other award, to be set aside in the court below for such reasons as are 
sufficient in other courts. For exceeding the power conferred by the submission, for manifest mistake of law, for 
fraud, and for all the reasons on which awards are set aside in courts of law or chancery. … and unless it can be 
shown that in making this award [arbitrators] have acted upon a manifest mistake of law, the award must be upheld.”, 
Id.   
131 Id. 
132 LeRoy, supra note 120. 
133 Why Section 10 of the FAA does not include manifest disregard of the law remains unclear. Some scholars say 
that the statutory standards in this section came from a statement proposed to the legislators by W.W. Nichols, 
president of the American Manufacturers Export Association. Id. They suggest that the FAA did not include 
manifest disregard of the law because Nichols’s report did not explicitly identify it as it did all other statutory 
grounds. Id. Whether Nichols was referring to manifest disregard of the law when he claimed that an arbitral award 
should be revoked if it contains a “defect so inherently vicious” that appears to contradict common morality also 
remains unclear. Some scholars have argued that “Manifest disregard for the law fits naturally in this expression.” 
Id. 
134 346 U.S. 427 (1953); see LeRoy, supra note 120; the court in this case concisely addressed one of the common law 
grounds. The Supreme Court ruling did not vacate an arbitral award on the basis of any of non-statutory grounds, 
but lower courts have applied manifest disregard of the law since this ruling. It has been recognized along with other 
statutory grounds as a valid basis for reviewing arbitral awards. Id.; But see CARBONNEAU, supra note 27 at 329.; 
(“Manifest disregard, like other two common law grounds, in fact, has little to do with Wilko. The opinion makes 
only an incidental (perhaps accidental) reference to the phrase. The actual doctrine is more likely to arise from the 
special status of the collective bargaining agreement in labor arbitration.” Id. 
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agreements (CBA), gave rise to the application of common law grounds.135 Courts did not initially 
decide cases related to CBAs and labor arbitration under FAA provisions because the courts 
acknowledged the difference between the two forms of arbitration and their governing laws. Those 
who applied common law grounds in labor arbitration intended to fill a legal vacuum in labor 
arbitration by granting jurisdiction to courts to review rendered arbitral awards on the merits.136 
Court supervision in labor law cases and CBAs aimed to maintain the proper application of the 
related statutes and to prevent arbitrator misinterpretations. The years have narrowed the gap and 
decreased, if not eliminated, the differences and special characteristics recognized by the bench 
between arbitration under the FAA and labor arbitration. Common law grounds are now applied 
similarly in both forms of arbitration.137  
The courts added common law grounds to the statutory grounds stated in Section 10 of the 
FAA, but judicial practice varies considerably across jurisdictions in the United States. Circuit 
courts adopt different approaches and attitudes in applying these grounds.138 Several appellate 
courts have conceded the application of common law grounds in the nullification of arbitral 
awards, but other courts at the same level accept only a limited number of these grounds. Some 
argue that, despite the split among circuit courts, judicial precedents show no great negative impact 
on the enforcement of arbitral awards. The application of one or another of the common law 
grounds by some circuits has not resulted in the vacation of a substantial number of arbitral 
                                                 
135 Id. at 329, 516–20, 526. 
136 Id 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 329, 516-20. 
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awards.139 Court-created grounds have thus proven judicially ineffective because judicial policy 
favors the enforceability of arbitration awards.140  
Common law grounds, however, have made the confirmation process of arbitral awards 
lengthy, costly, fatiguing, and difficult.141 Fallacious definitions and significant functional overlap 
between these grounds and Section 10 statutes have also added to the confusion surrounding 
common law grounds.142 Professor Carbonneau acknowledges this ambiguity and, without 
encouraging more controversy about non-statutory grounds, offers a realistic assessment of 
standard practice and the potential consequences of departing from it:143 
While analytical problems can loom large in theory, the basic judicial disposition 
is to defer to the arbitrator by engaging in perfunctory supervision. There are 
occasional accidents that can emanate from otherwise hospitable courts. The 
standard practice, however, is to give true meaning and effect to the adage that there 
is no appeal in arbitration. Every departure from that practice attests to the cost and 
futility of protracted adjudicatory proceedings. 
 
Recent judicial practice, for example in the Supreme Court’s 2008 Hall Street Assocs., LLC 
v. Mattel, Inc., seems to preserve the ambiguity of common law grounds. The court ruled that the 
grounds in Section 10 and Section 11 of the FAA for vacating and/or modifying an arbitral award 
are “exclusive.”144 The court also determined that other grounds, including but not limited to 
                                                 
139 Id. at 516–20, 526. 
140 Id. 
141 Id.; Marcus Mungioli, Manifest Disregard of the Law Standard: A Vehicles for Modernization of the Federal 
Arbitration Act, The, 31 MARYS LJ 1079 (1999). 
142 CARBONNEAU, supra note 27 at 525, 531–32. 
143 Id. at 526. 
144 Id.; The Supreme Court concludes: ”In holding that §§10 and 11 provide exclusive regimes for the review provided 
by the statute, we do not purport to say that they exclude more searching review based on authority outside the 
statute as well. The FAA is not the only way into court for parties wanting review of arbitration awards: they may 
contemplate enforcement under state statutory or common law, for example, where judicial review of different 
scope is arguable. But here we speak only to the scope of the expeditious judicial review under §§9, 10, and 11, 
deciding nothing about other possible avenues for judicial enforcement of arbitration awards.” 552 U.S. 576 (2008); 
see also Hall Street Associates, L. L. C. v. Mattel, Inc., available at: 
  https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/07pdf/06-989.pdf (last visited Oct 16, 2016); it should be noted here 
regarding this part of the ruling that the Supreme Court mentions non-statutory and state law only as examples of 
grounds that allow courts to review arbitral awards. The language of the ruling here is not firm; it leaves open the 
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common law grounds and grounds specified by state laws, are also valid for reviewing an arbitral 
award.145     
The court’s ruling in Hall Street reads as follows: “Maybe the term ‘manifest disregard’ 
named a new ground for review, but maybe it merely referred to the §10 grounds collectively, 
rather than adding to them. … Or, as some courts have thought, ‘manifest disregard’ may have 
been shorthand for §10(a) (3) or §10(a) (4) …”146 This opinion created more doubt about common 
law grounds and led to an increase in controversial and contradictory judicial rulings, reflecting an 
even larger split between courts in different U.S. jurisdictions.147  
Common law grounds continue to exist and remain viable justification for courts to review 
and vacate arbitral awards in the United States. Their continued use, however, runs contrary to two 
fundamental realities of U.S. arbitration history: first, the statutory framework for arbitration in 
the U.S. does not permit any review of arbitral awards on the merits; and second, arbitration has 
enjoyed judicial support in this jurisdiction, represented by the judicial policy favoring arbitration, 
since the enactment of the FAA.    
The confusion created by the Hall Street ruling suggests that expanding the possibilities 
for attacking arbitral awards in any jurisdiction, either by applying or misapplying statutory and 
                                                 
possibility of additional valid grounds and encourages courts to consider them for this purpose. Professor 
Carbonneau notes, "In Hall Street Associates, LLC, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that the FAA statutory grounds 
were the "exclusive" means of challenging the enforceability of arbitral award. … It also implied that the merits 
review of awards could be achieved through other legal means–a claim that continues to baffle most, if not all, 
commentators." CARBONNEAU, supra note 27 at 579. 
145 552 U.S. 576 (2008); see also CARBONNEAU, supra note 27 at 540–41.see generally Paul Bennett Marrow, A 
Practical Approach for Expanding the Review of Commercial Arbitration Awards: Using an Appellate Arbitrator.,  
AVAILABLE SSRN (2016). 
146 3/25/08 06-989 Hall Street Associates, L. L. C. v. Mattel, Inc., supra note 144. 
147 CARBONNEAU, supra note 27 at 541; (“The ambivalent ruling has led courts to reach contradistinctive 
conclusions. For example, several courts asserted that Hall Street Associates, LLC eliminated manifest 
disregard as a basis for the judicial supervision of awards, while an equal number of other courts see it as 
unaffected by the ruling. For the later, it remains a viable basis by which to vacate awards.”) Id. 
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non-statutory grounds, can increase the possibility of attacks on more fundamental principles of 
arbitration. Such a trend would eventually have an adverse impact on arbitration as an effective 
and trusted venue for people to resolve their disputes, especially in commercial scenarios. 
3.3.2 The risk of extended judicial review 
Extending judicial supervision by allowing courts to apply state laws or non-statutory 
grounds in reviewing and vacating arbitral awards will decrease arbitral autonomy and thus 
seriously threaten the finality of arbitral awards. The finality of arbitrator determinations, in fact, 
distinguishes arbitration from other forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR).148 It makes 
arbitration more appealing to disputants than other dispute resolution means.149 Scholars reference 
this principle in describing arbitration as “a double-edged sword”150: the process resolves conflicts 
expeditiously and inexpensively compared to traditional courts; however, parties risk having no 
recourse if they find the arbitrator’s decision incorrect or unjust.151  
Parties seeking to hasten the resolution of potential disputes by entering into arbitration 
agreements implicitly agree to the risk inherent in accepting the finality of arbitral awards.152 
Disputants who submit to arbitration choose the finality offered by the process over protecting 
their procedural rights through traditional litigation.153 Court sanctioned expansion of the number 
of challenged or set-aside awards will adversely impact the feature of finality in arbitration.154 
                                                 
148 Id. at 26-38. 
149 Id. 
150 Marrow, supra note 145. 
151 Id. 
152 CARBONNEAU, supra note 27 at 7; it is said that arbitration is "the choice of parties who want access, neutrality, 
expertise, and a resolutory mechanism that is less intrusive and more effective." Id. at 29. 
153 Id. at 4. 
154 Arbitration parties can overcome this dilemma by designing their own appeal procedures and appointing an appeal 
tribunal, which may consist of one or more arbitrators, to hear the appeal if submitted by any parties after the 
rendering of the award per their agreement. This method is effective for many reasons: first, it accords with the 
basic principles of arbitration; second, it provides a venue through which the tribunal can rectify legal errors found 
in arbitral awards rather than forcing a party to resort to court nullification; and third, it frees arbitration parties to 
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Court appeals of arbitral awards may also increase the number of judges’ orders to arbitrators to 
clarify their awards.155 Such an increase would further undermine arbitration’s finality.156 The 
efficiency of arbitration and the finality of outcomes thus exist in an inverse relationship with the 
power of judicial review.157 Extension of judicial supervision and over-aggressive review by the 
courts will erode the finality of arbitral awards and the efficiency of arbitration.158 Such judicial 
overreach will also impair enforcement.159 Arbitration will thus bear the costly burden of 
inappropriate judicial interference.  
Judicial review also poses a risk to the principle of confidentiality in arbitration. Professor 
Carbonneau explains:160 
A point about vacatur that has never been made with sufficient conviction is that 
such actions breach the confidentiality of the arbitral process. No matter what 
ground serves as the basis of the action, vacatur generally entails the development 
of a full judicial record regarding the underlying arbitration. Any of the statutory or 
common law grounds for vacatur can generate an extensive adversarial 
confrontation about whether the constituent elements are established by the 
evidence. Moreover, the parties can engage in a definitional contest about the exact 
meaning of the ground and debate the impact of that result upon the specific 
circumstances of the case. In effect, many vacatur proceedings result in a complete 
reenactment of the arbitral proceedings on a public record before a court of law. 
                                                 
fashion the procedures they deem helpful for achieving their desired results as they rely on the quickness and the 
effectiveness of arbitration instead of a court trial. Although, including appeal procedures in arbitration agreements 
may narrow the distinction between arbitration and court trials, maintaining all the other advantages of arbitration 
makes such an approach worth the sacrifice. Marrow, supra note 145. 
155 These court orders may serve several purposes: first, they allow arbitrators to correct legal errors by giving them a 
second chance to do so instead of vacating the arbitral awards; second, they remove any ambiguity surrounding 
awards in order to avoid unjust court judgments that lack full legal certainty, which can impose huge financial 
burdens parties. Judicial practice, however, did not succeed in achieving these aims. CARBONNEAU, supra note 27 
at 584. The action to clarify an arbitral award contradicts the maxim of functus officio, which some believe impedes 
acts by an arbitrator subsequent to the rendering of the award because the lack of jurisdiction in the absence of an 
agreement allows such an action. An arbitrator’s job, according to this principle, ends once the decision is made. Id. 
at 515; the. Carbonneau explains the importance of this maxim as follows: “Functus officio, as seen from the 
perspective of modern arbitration law, is neither obscure nor irrelevant; it, in effect, defines and maintains material 
elements of the parties’ bargain for arbitration. It fosters justice, efficiency, and finality.” Id. at xxxiii, 592. 
156 Id. at 579-592.  
157 Id. at 580. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 CARBONNEAU, supra note 27 at 568–69. 
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Once the court ruling is reported, the arbitration has been completely exposed. An 
attempt to vacate the award will, therefore, result in destroying the confidentiality 
of arbitral proceedings, a major business advantage of arbitration. 
 
Arbitration and its principles can be described as a string of beads: if one bead falls off the 
string, the rest will follow. Ensuring the protection of arbitration’s fundamental principles will 
guarantee the effectiveness and success of the process; failing to do so will guarantee the reverse. 
Extended judicial supervision in any jurisdiction will, moreover, increase the anxiety businesses 
feel regarding the practice.161 The ability of arbitration parties to challenge an arbitral award in 
court under vague circumstances undermines arbitration’s “commercial appeal”162 because it 
means that disputes related to business transactions are no longer determined “in-house.”163 
3.3.3 The need for modernization and the role of legal scholars  
Recent court rulings reveal increasing efforts on the part of the judiciary to control the 
arbitration process by expanding supervision and determining the rules by which arbitration should 
be conducted rather than fully enforcing arbitrator’s decisions and the procedures agreed upon by 
the parties.164 Courts no longer promote arbitral autonomy and have become “decisive and 
controlling.”165 
                                                 
161 See generally BUILDING THE CIVILIZATION OF ARBITRATION, supra note 19 at 357. 
162 CARBONNEAU, supra note 27 at 2–4. 
163 Id.; Once again, arbitration parties should create an appeal tribunal and agree on procedures for conducting appeals 
to reduce anxieties regarding arbitration confidentiality. Marrow, supra note 145. 
164 Thomas E. Carbonneau, Rise in Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Revisiting Hall Street Associates, The, 14 
CARDOZO J CONFL. RESOL 593 (2012); the influence of the Hall Street ruling has become clearer in many later 
cases. Scholars believe the court’s holdings in Rent-A-Center and Stolt-Nielsen, for example, have contributed to 
increased judicial supervision of arbitration. Id.; see Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson (06/21/10) - 09-497, 
available at: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/09-497.pdf (last visited Oct 31, 2016); Stolt-Nielsen S. 
A. v. Animal Feeds Int’l Corp. (04/27/2010) - 08-1198, available at: 
  https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-1198.pdf (last visited Oct 31, 2016).  
165 Carbonneau, supra note 164.; see also THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, TOWARD A NEW FEDERAL LAW ON ARBITRATION 
63 (2014). 
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The FAA, which has endured since its enactment in 1925,166 has recently received 
considerable attention and criticism.167 Recent judicial practice, whether supportive or antagonistic 
to arbitration, highlights the necessity for modernization of the FAA.168 Contemporary discussions 
of the FAA focus on issues including: its limited scope—it covers a minimal number of subjects; 
the perception of the statute as obsolete; and the notoriously poor drafting of certain sections.169 
Such criticisms apply to both domestic and international arbitration.170 These flaws are especially 
obvious when one compares the FAA to modern arbitration statutes in other countries.171  
Scholars agree about the need to update FAA provisions and many have proposed different 
approaches172 for adding new sections or amending provisions to make the existing statute 
responsive to current circumstances.173  
In a recent publication, Professor Carbonneau asserts the need for a new arbitration law in 
the United States, emphasizing that it must have a coherent structure and include a provision that 
                                                 
166 GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON ADR, supra note 77 at 497. 
167 See BORN, supra note 21 at 36–41.; see generally ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT, 
(Edward J. Brunet ed., 2006); See also Timothy J. Heinsz, Revised Uniform Arbitration Act: Modernizing, Revising, 
and Clarifying Arbitration Law, The,  J DISP RESOL 1 (2001).  
168 CARBONNEAU, supra note 27 at 572. 
169 BORN, supra note 21 at 36–39; ("Unfortunately, the domestic FAA is not a model of drafting clarity. Its sixteen 
sections are couched in rambling prose and contain a disorganized mix of substantive, jurisdictional, procedural, 
and remedial provisions whose reach and meaning is poorly articulated. As a consequence, U.S. courts have 
struggled with the FAA, particularly in cases involving the enforcement of arbitration agreements.") Id. at 333; 
CARBONNEAU, supra note 168 at 95; (" The FAA cannot remain an archaic statement of law, completely dependent 
upon court interpretation for its contemporary doctrinal meaning. A variety of factors demands that it be remodeled 
into a comprehensive, self-contained statute.") Id.; see also GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON ADR, supra note 77 at 497; 
ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 167 at 202. 
170 CARBONNEAU, supra note 165 at 88. BORN, supra note 21 at 331–407. ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 
167 at 200-07. 
171 Id. 
172 See Mungioli, supra note 141 at 191; ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA, supra note 167 at 207-09;.Griffin Toronjo 
Pivateau, Reconsidering Arbitration: Evaluating the Future of the Manifest Disregard Doctrine, 21 SOUTH. LAW J. 
41 (2011).  
173 Id. 
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explicitly states the federal policy favoring arbitration.174 He proposes a new version of the FAA175 
that confirms the fundamental principles of arbitration well-established by judicial practice. 
Professor Carbonneau argues that the revised law should aim to: decrease the injustice of 
mandatory arbitration; limit judicial review of the arbitral process and its consequences; and 
confirm the “Breyer admonition”, which validates agreements to arbitrate and arbitrators’ 
determinations as final, binding, and enforceable, thereby strengthening freedom of contract and 
narrowing the court’s oversight role.176 Professor Carbonneau’s proposed new version of the FAA 
would include multiple newly devised features to make it compatible with the universal exercise 
of arbitration.177 The proposed Act would, likewise, reflect the accomplishments of the American 
practice and its influence on the development of arbitration.178 The proposed Act would enable the 
United States to maintain its role as one of the most hospitable jurisdictions for arbitration. 
                                                 
174 CARBONNEAU, supra note 165 at 95. 
175 In addition to the Preamble, the proposed Act consists of eight chapters each of which contains several Sections 
deal with various substances related to the Act’s subject. Id. at 99–131; the preamble explains the purpose of the 
proposed Act, clarifies its objectives, and lays down the main principles and the main structure. It underlines the 
two main principles which governs the legal framework of arbitration in the United States, the freedom of contract 
and arbitral autonomy, which make U.S. arbitration fully compatible with the global standards of arbitration. 
Furthermore, it emphasizes the importance of the federal policy favoring arbitration. Then, it puts emphasis on 
arbitration agreement as a legal instrument by which parties can exercise their right to recourse to arbitration. It, 
also, demonstrates the purposes and the benefits of the submission to arbitration. The preamble then deals with 
another vital issue which is the judicial supervision. It asserts that courts should encourage the recourse to arbitration 
by enforcing arbitration agreements as mutually agreed upon by the parties. Hence, it states that Court’s review on 
arbitral process should be restricted, narrowed and for the purpose of preventing the injustice by taking the necessary 
measures , for example, to insure the procedural fairness, or to protect the arbitral process from any misconduct that 
may affect its impartiality. The preamble of the new proposed law is one of the features which distinguishes between 
its provisions and the existing legislation. Moreover, it characterizes the identity, aims and principles of the proposed 
statutes. Id. at 100; the need for a new law of arbitration in the United States is well explained in the following 
statement: “Arbitration has undergone a substantial evolution since 1925. The Court’s decisional law has updated 
the existing statute in many significant respects. Arbitration’s essential role, internationally and domestically, in the 
adjudication of contract and commercial disputes makes an updated and revamped statute an absolute necessity.” 
Id. at 139.   
176 Id. at 96–98. 
177 Id. at 97; Professor Carbonneau has enumerated nineteen “innovative features” for the new Act. To name a few, ‘it 
creates a national policy favoring arbitration,” “establishes exclusive federal question jurisdiction in arbitration,” 
commands courts to implement arbitration agreements despite the existence of preconditions to enforcement,” and 
it “expressly incorporates the separability and kompetenz-kompetenz doctrines into the regulatory framework.” … 
Id. 
178 Id.  
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Academics make essential contributions to the evolution of arbitration. Recent scholarly 
publications have recognized the need to modernize the legal framework for arbitration in the 
United States. This recognition results from thorough observation of the law and practice through 
which recent changes in the judicial attitude toward, and enforcement of, arbitration have been 
closely monitored. Scholars have proposed several reforms and new legal devices to remedy the 
situation and renew legislative and judicial support for arbitration.  
Legal scholars, law professors, and Academic researchers are neutral players in the 
evolution of arbitration in any jurisdiction. Their contributions are therefore valuable and deserve 
recognition from legislators, judges, and practitioners. Academic involvement, moreover, should 
extend beyond the publication of commentaries after the enactment new legislation. Additional 
scholarly roles in this context include: assessing current laws and practices, diagnosing problems, 
underlining concerns that might affect processes, and suggesting effective means of addressing the 
issues that arise. Recent academic discussions and publications regarding the FAA in the United 
State provide valuable lessons to academics in jurisdictions like Saudi Arabia where new 
arbitration laws have been enacted. Saudi academics should observe the current legal framework 
and closely monitor arbitration practice so that they can suggest amendments and reforms when 
necessary. 
4. Conclusion 
Understanding how and why the arbitration has evolved over time in different jurisdictions 
requires close observation of international arbitration practice. Such observation provides useful 
dimensions for comparison that can be used to evaluate the current national legal framework and 
practice. The experiences of other leading countries serve as instructive examples for countries 
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like Saudi Arabia that have limited arbitration experience. Learning from these examples can 
substantially improve the practice at the national level, and may lead to new reforms.  
Learning form the experience of leading arbitration countries like the United Kingdom and 
the United States will prevent Saudi Arabia from having to reinvent the wheel and significantly 
benefit the Saudi arbitration system. This chapter has sought to facilitate this process by identifying 
valuable lessons from the successful English and American jurisdictions. Ensuring effective 
support for arbitration in the Saudi jurisdiction will require careful consideration and 
comprehension of these lessons. 
Implementing these lessons will genuinely improve both the legal framework and practice 
of arbitration in the Saudi jurisdiction, and raise its status domestically and internationally. This 
will help create an enabling environment for the process throughout the country, which will elevate 
the country’s standing on the global scale, improve its reputation in this field, and significantly 
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1. Introduction  
ADR have become the best and preferred means of resolving various types of disputes 
around the world. Lawyers and disputants trust these processes to be both efficient and cost-
effective.1 Courts have, likewise, encouraged, ordered, and adopted ADR processes in many cases 
due to the effectiveness with which these processes resolve different types of disputes.2 The recent 
expansion of ADR in many leading jurisdictions can be partially attributed to the fact that law 
schools now teach its various mechanisms.3  
Chapter 3 used the findings of a brief study of information retrieved from the websites of 
a sampling of Saudi Arabian law schools to stress that Saudi law schools should play an 
instrumental role in shaping the practice of arbitration in Saudi Arabia. The results of that 
examination showed that law schools should reform their existing curricula to teach law students 
the ADR-related knowledge and skills required in contemporary legal practice. This examination 
called attention to the need for a larger study that could provide a more comprehensive view of 
ADR instruction in Saudi Arabia and engender realistic insights regarding the current situation. 
The survey described in this chapter was designed to achieve that goal. 
                                                 
1 See generally GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON ADR, (Carlos Esplugues Mota & Silvia Barona Vilar eds., 2014); JEROME 
T. BARRETT, A HISTORY OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE STORY OF A POLITICAL, CULTURAL, AND SOCIAL 
MOVEMENT (1st ed. 2004); GERALD H. POINTON, ADR IN BUSINESS: PRACTICE AND ISSUES ACROSS COUNTRIES 
AND CULTURES (2011); Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the Vanishing Trial: The Growth and Impact of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, J. EMPIR. LEG. STUD. 843. 
2 See generally MICHAEL PALMER, DISPUTE PROCESSES: ADR AND THE PRIMARY FORMS OF DECISION-MAKING (2nd 
ed. 2005); GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON ADR, supra note 1; Stipanowich, supra note 1; Robert F. Peckham, A Judicial 
Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, 37 RUTGERS REV 253 (1984); Patricia M. Wald, ADR and the Courts: An Update, 46 DUKE LAW J. 
1445–1473 (1997); Louise Phipps Senft & Cynthia A. Savage, ADR in the courts: Progress, problems, and 
possibilities, 108 PENN ST REV 327 (2003); Alternative Dispute Resolution in the United States District Courts | 
Federal Judicial Center, available at: https://www.fjc.gov/content/alternative-dispute-resolution-united-states-
district-courts-english-original (last visited May 4, 2017); see also Wayne D. Brazil, Court ADR 25 years after 
Pound: Have we found a better way, 18 OHIO ST J DISP RESOL 93 (2002); DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE 
ADVERSARIAL MODEL, (Carrie Menkel-Meadow ed., 2nd ed. 2011); J. Clifford Wallace, Judicial Reform and the 
Pound Conference of 1976, 80 MICH. LAW REV. 592–596 (1982). 
3 See infra note 19-21 and accompanying text.  




 This chapter analyzes the status quo of ADR instruction in Saudi law schools by providing 
a clear picture of the reality in this field; it highlights deficiencies, discusses their causes, and 
recommends ways to overcome them, aiming to facilitate development and growth in this area. It 
also compares ADR instruction in Saudi Arabia to ADR instruction in the United States where 
many law schools have long histories of teaching ADR. This comparison is necessary to effectively 
gauge the Saudi jurisdiction’s development in this area and to determine what improvements it 
must make to enhance its position. 
This chapter is organized into five sections. Section two explores the history of ADR 
instruction in the United States throughout the decades and derives useful lessons from this 
experience. Section three explains the survey and its findings. Section four discusses and 
undertakes additional analyses of the findings, and section five concludes the chapter. 
2. ADR Instruction in American Law Schools 
A review of the literature related to ADR in the United States indicates that ADR 
instruction in American law schools has gone through manifold stages. Its development can, for 
the sake of analysis, be divided into three phases. The first phase traces back to the years following 
the famous 1976 Pound Conference.4 Legal education had long emphasized instruction in 
adversarial approaches to conflict resolution, but the early 1980s witnessed the blossoming of a 
new era as some elite law schools, including Harvard University and George Mason University, 
responded to the early development of ADR by designing courses focused on this subject.5 The 
first phase concluded in 1983 by which time one-quarter of U.S. law schools offered at least one 
                                                 
4 For more details about the 1976 Pound Conference see generally Warren E. Burger, Isn’t There a Better Way, 68 
AM. BAR ASSOC. J. 274 (1982); Brian Farkas & Lara Traum, The History and Legacy of the Pound Conferences, 
(2017). 
5 BARRETT, supra note 1 at 209–15. 




program in ADR6 – a significant accomplishment that attracted the attention of the remaining law 
schools and fueled even greater success in the subsequent phases. The number of ADR programs 
and courses offered in U.S. law schools has dramatically increased since then, especially after the 
expansion of the use of ADR in the United States and many other parts of the world.7 The first 
phase can thus be described as a short, one-time phenomenon that had an enormous impact.  
The second phase in the development of ADR instruction began in the late 1980s and 
continued through the 1990s; the vast majority of law schools designed and made available ADR 
programs during this time.8 Professor Lela Porter Love observed “phenomenal growth” in ADR 
instruction during this second phase,9 noting huge increases in: 1- the number of law schools 
teaching ADR; 2- the number of ADR courses and programs offered; 3- the number of ADR 
lecturers and instructors. Professor Lela found: “830 courses and programs [were] offered by 182 
law schools with sixty-two schools offering dispute resolution-related clinics. … [And] more than 
500 law professors identify themselves as teaching ADR.”10 The interest of law schools in ADR 
has had an unquestionably positively impact on the U.S. legal profession.11 
                                                 
6 See AM BAR ASS’N SPECIAL COMM. ON ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, LAW SCHOOL DIRECTORY 
OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAMS (1983); according to this report, forty three law schools in the United States 
were teaching ADR courses at the time of the report’s release. Id. 
7 BARRETT, supra note 1 at 209–11. (“The 1980s witnessed the start of major academic interest in conflict resolution. 
The two most prominent examples began at Harvard University and George Mason University in Virginia.” Id at 
211  
8 Id. at 214. “U.S. law schools began offering courses on ADR in the 1980s. … By 1986, a majority of law schools 
offered courses or clinics on ADR. By 1998, law school accrediting standards began recommending that ADR be 
covered in curricula, and today ADR is a standard law school topic. Some schools even include ADR in all basic 
first year courses.” Id; “By the year 2000, there would be more than a hundred higher education programs offering 
degrees, concentrations or certificates in dispute resolution.”). Id at 211; see also Sidney S. Sachs, ADR is Bigger 
than you Think ADR Report, EXP. 14. (“Law schools have added dispute-resolution courses to the curriculum. As 
of 1989, 164 of 174 ABA-accredited law schools offer at least one course in ADR. Many schools have clinical 
programs and some, such as George Mason University, offer entire ADR programs. Id. See also ALTERNATIVE 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: ANALYSIS & CASE STUDIES, 4, 5 (Otto J. Hetzel, Steven 
Gonzales, & American Bar Association eds., 2015). 
9 Lela Porter Love, Twenty-Five Years Later with Promises to Keep: Legal Education in Dispute Resolution and 
Training of Mediators, OHIO STATE J. DISP. RESOL. 597. 
10 Id. 
11 See generally Karen A. Burch, ADR in the Law Firm: A Practical Viewpoint,  MO J DISP RESOL 149 (1987); Sachs, 
supra note 7; Frank EA Sander, Professional Responsibility-Should There Be a Duty to Advise of ADR Options, 76 




 The third phase began in the early years of the twenty-first century and continues to this 
day. Two main elements characterize this phase. First, the phase witnessed slow and steady growth 
in ADR instruction.12 Michael Moffitt has attributed the steady development of ADR to the fact 
that ADR reached maturity and stability during this phase.13 He pointed out that data made 
available by the American Association of Law Schools Directory (the AALS) for the years 1997-
1998, 2002-2003 and 2007-2008 indicates that ADR ranked among the top 25 out of 96 different 
legal fields of studies. He concluded that ADR has become similar in size to many other fields 
including administrative Law, Tax Law, Civil Rights Law, Environmental Law, and Intellectual 
Property Law.14  
The second element of this phase in ADR development is a shift of focus from quantity to 
quality. Law schools began devoting more attention to the quality and effectiveness of ADR 
curricula than to the quantity of ADR courses. Many scholars have called for reviews and 
evaluations of the courses and programs offered by law schools to respond to labor market needs.15 
The preceding phases were, in short, characterized by a focus on expanding law schools’ ADR 
course offerings, but demand has shifted over the decades and the current phase prioritizes 
assessments of ADR instruction’s responsiveness to the practice’s needs with the aim of ensuring 
that future lawyers possess the skills required in the changing labor market. Those driving this 
                                                 
ABAJ 50 (1990); John Haynes, Mediators and the legal profession: An overview, 1989 CONFL. RESOLUT. Q. 5–12 
(1989); see also Roselle L. Wissler, When Does Familiarity Breed Content--A Study of the Role of Different Forms 
of ADR Education and Experience in Attorneys’ ADR Recommendations, PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUT. LAW J. 
199. 
12 Michael Moffitt, Islands, Vitamins, Salt, Germs: Four Visions of the Future of ADR in Law Schools (and a Data-
Driven Snapshot of the Field Today), 25 OHIO ST J DISP RESOL 25 (2010). 
13 Id.; (“Over the past ten years, the ranks of ADR teachers in law schools has grown at a slow, steady pace of about 
2.25%. This suggests that whatever explosive growth the field may have enjoyed at one point, the field is in a more 
mature, stable phase now. The rate of growth in the ranks of ADR teachers is about half of the rate of growth in the 
ranks of members of the ABA Section on Dispute Resolution.”) Id. 
14 Id.; see also Nancy H. Rogers, The Next Phase for Dispute Resolution in Law Schools: Less Growth, More Change 
Teaching and Technology: Teaching ADR and the Future of Dispute System Design, OHIO STATE J. DISPUTE 
RESOLUT. 1. 
15 Rogers, supra note 14. 




shift aim to prepare prospective lawyers and practitioners to perform their career tasks adequately 
and effectively. Nancy H. Rogers noted this shift in focus among some academics in the early 
twenty-first century: “Their focus seems to be change, even more than continued growth. Some 
teaching changes stem from modifications in dispute resolution practice…”16 She also found an 
increasing tendency toward skills-based learning rather than knowledge-based education. She 
claimed that many academics currently favor an educational approach that enables law students to 
build, develop, and sharpen the essential skills and techniques they will need to undertake 
successful legal careers, as opposed to memorizing laws, policies and regulations. Rogers 
concluded that in the field of ADR teaching “faculty will debate less about bigger and more about 
better.”17 This analysis makes clear that new efforts in ADR instruction aim to bridge the gap 
between legal education and legal practice in the ADR realm.18 
The three phases described above share a common theme: significant scholarly 
contributions drove advancement, development, and growth in the area of ADR instruction across 
the decades. Scholarly contributions spurred similar – if varying in degree – growth and 
development in ADR instruction in other countries.19 The work of scholars has moreover yielded 
                                                 
16 Id. 
17 Id.; see also Michael T. Jr.  Colatrella, A Lawyer for All Seasons: The Lawyer as Conflict Manager, SAN DIEGO 
LAW REV. 93; see generally C. Michael Bryce, ADR education from a litigator/educator perspective, 81 JOHNS REV 
337 (2007); see also Susan Sturm & Lani - Guinier, The Law School Matrix: Reforming Legal Education in a 
Culture of Competition and Conformity 2007 Symposium on the Future of Legal Education, VANDERBILT LAW REV. 
515. 
18 Many scholars have written about the impact of legal education on the profession and practice. See e.g. THOMAS E. 
CARBONNEAU, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MELTING THE LANCES AND DISMOUNTING THE STEEDS 248–52 
(1989). See also Frank E. A. Sander, Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Law School Curriculum: Opportunities 
and Obstacles Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Law Curriculum, J. LEG. EDUC. 229; Harry T Edwards, The 
Role of Legal Education in Shaping the Profession, 38 J. LEG. EDUC. 285–293 (1988). 
19 Similar stories of success in this area have been witnessed in many other jurisdictions, including the United 
Kingdom, Canada and Australia. See e.g. WILLIAM M SULLIVAN ET AL., 2 EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION 
FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW (2007); Julie Macfarlane, The challenge of ADR and alternative paradigms of dispute 
resolution: How should the law schools respond?, 31 LAW TEACH. 13–29 (1997); Tania Sourdin, Not teaching ADR 
in law schools? Implications for law students, clients and the ADR field, IT TAUGHT IT MORE LIKELY BE TAUGHT 
ELECT. RATHER MANDAT. CORE SUBJ. NATL. ALTERN. DISPUTE RESOLUT. ADVIS. COUNC. NADRAC IN (2011). 




substantial results and benefits in the field of ADR in general, and contributed greatly to the growth 
of ADR and the use of its various mechanisms.20 Justice reform initiatives in many jurisdictions, 
for example, stemmed mainly from decisions to embrace ADR – a development that many 
respected academics have long demanded.21 
The growth of ADR instruction in the United States and the phases of development outlined 
above serve as a model for other jurisdictions, especially for developing countries with less 
experience in the area of ADR. Law schools in such jurisdictions must play their roles in the 
development process by offering ADR courses and regularly evaluating curricula to ensure their 
effectiveness in shaping the profession and practice. Academics consider surveys useful 
assessment tools for evaluating progress in this field. Scholars in the U.S. have, for example, 
designed, developed and analyzed many surveys measuring the success of ADR instruction, and 
monitoring and evaluating its progress.22 
3. The Survey  
This study’s survey covered the twenty-one Saudi State Universities that have law schools or 
law departments.23 The author sent it as an attachment to an email that described the nature and 
purpose of the study to all target participants. This email included instructions for returning 
completed surveys and contact information in case participants had questions or concerns 
                                                 
20 See generally Stipanowich, supra note 1.  
21 See e.g., Frank E. A. Sander, The Multi-Door Courthouse, BARRISTER 18; see generally Treyor C.W. Farrow, 
Dispute Resolution, Access to Civil Justice and Legal Education Special Issue - Civil Justice and Civil Justice 
Reform, ALTA. LAW REV. 741. 
22 See e.g. T. Carbonneau, Resource, Teaching Arbitration in US Law Schools, 12 WORLD ARB. MED. REP. 227 (2001); 
for more collected data and information in this regard see Moffitt, supra note 12.; see also Stephen J Ware, Teaching 
Arbitration Law, (2003). 
23 The Saudi ministry of education has indicated that the Kingdom has twenty-six State Universities. Only twenty-one 
of these have law schools or law departments under different names or titles [hereinafter law schools]. For a list of 
public Saudi Universities see State Universities in Saudi Arabia, available at: 
https://www.moe.gov.sa/en/HigherEducation/governmenthighereducation/StateUniversities/Pages/default.aspx 
(last visited Apr 22, 2018). 




regarding the survey. The author made several follow-up calls and sent reminder emails to all the 
initial participants. Only fifteen of the twenty-one law schools responded directly to the survey. 
The remaining six law schools have not responded to emails or to any other communications 
regarding the survey. The author did, however, retrieve information pertaining to these six non-
responding law schools from the internet regarding some of the surveyed topics and issues.      
3.1 The questions 
The author designed the survey to facilitate the collection of as much detailed data about the 
surveyed topics from the participating law schools as possible. It therefore included open-ended, 
close-ended, and multiple-choice questions. Several of the multiple-choice questions also gave 
respondents the opportunity to provide their own input in addition to answering the questions. The 
author used the funnel approach in structuring the survey and designing the questions. This 
technique involves moving from the general to the specific. The author sequenced questions so as 
to initially elicit broad observations and progress to more detailed responses regarding the 
surveyed topic and subtopics. 
The author also carefully considered the wording of the survey questions, aiming to ensure 
that the participants would interpret them as intended, produce accurate data, and thereby facilitate 
a precise analysis. The survey questions can be divided into four main categories: first, general 
opening questions intended for all participants (questions 1 and 2); second, questions designed for 
schools that offer ADR course(s) only (questions 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10); third, a shared question 
intended for all participating schools (question 11); and, finally, questions designed for schools 
that do not offer any ADR course(s) only (questions 12, 13 and 14). 
The survey contained the following questions: 




1) How many total credit hours are allocated for each specialized areas of law in the Study 
Plan for the Bachelor of laws? 
2) Do any of these specialized courses cover ADR methods generally? 
If NO, please answer the following questions (11, 12, 13 and 14) only. 
If YES, please answer the following questions (3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11) only. 
3) Is ADR taught in/as: 
a)  A general course?  If so, please specify the title of the offered course and its credit 
hours. 
b) Multiple separate courses? E.g. an arbitration course, a meditation course … etc. If 
so, please specify the title of each offered course and its credit hours. 
c) A part of other offerings? If so, please specify the title of each course and its credit 
hours. 
4) When did your school begin teaching such course(s)? 
5) Are ADR course(s) taught as: (more than one answer is possible) 
a) Formal academic lectures? 
b) Seminars? 
c) Interactive discussions: practical training and simulations? 
d) All the above? 
6) Are the lecturers assigned to teach ADR course(s) specialized in ADR or in a specific 
area of the field? 
7) If YES, are they: 
a) Saudi citizens? 
b) Non-Saudis? 




8) If NO, please specify the fields in which the lecturers assigned to teach ADR course(s) 
are specialized. 
9) Is arbitration offered in any of the courses mentioned in question No. (3) of this survey? 
10)  If so: 
a) Is arbitration taught as a general subject? Or 
b) Is it taught in specialized courses on different subject areas of arbitration? E.g. 
commercial arbitration, arbitration in civil cases, labor arbitration …etc. Please specify 
these courses and their credit hours. 
11) Does your school organize conferences, seminars, discussion groups or specialized 
workshops in ADR and invite speakers and participants and take part in them? 
12) Why does your school not offer a specialized course(s) in ADR? (More than one answer 
is possible) 
a) The paucity of specialized academics in the field. 
b) The absence of labor market demand at present. 
c) We give priority to more important courses. 
d) Limited credit hours assigned for specialized courses required to complete the degree. 
e) We currently see no need to teach such courses. 
f) Other, please specify. 
13) Will ADR or any of its subject areas be added to your bachelor’s degree plan of study in 
the upcoming years? 
14) If NO, Please specify one or more reasons.  




3.2 The presumptions 
Prior to conducting the survey, the author assumed that Saudi law schools do not give ADR 
instruction the attention it deserves since only a few schools include such offerings in their 
curricula. The author also assumed that the few offered courses are unsophisticated, inadequate, 
and asynchronous, providing only a rudimentary knowledge of the curriculum subject areas. The 
author thus believed Saudi law schools need to modernize their offerings to reflect progress in the 
field of ADR and ensure their effectiveness. The author assumed, moreover, that the lecturers who 
teach ADR offerings are non-Saudis who neither specialize in ADR nor in any of the field’s 
specific areas. Finally, the author assumed that the ADR course(s) Saudi law schools offer provide 
only basic knowledge of arbitration. This limitation results in the exclusion of other ADR 
processes from the subject areas they teach. The survey served as an opportunity to examine the 
validity of these expectations and other important areas of interest. 
3.3 The First Category 
This category contained two questions (questions 1 and 2). The major characteristic of the 
questions in this category was their generality. The survey’s opening questions established a 
foundation that the subsequent categories and questions built on.   
3.3.1 Question one:  
 This question required each school to reveal the total number of credit hours allocated for 
all law offerings, excluding credit hours for non-law modules such as language courses, and 
administration- or business-related subjects, etc. This question was intended to determine whether 
or not law schools have assigned appropriate credit hours to law courses. Participant responses, in 
other words, enabled the author to determine if law schools allocate sufficient credit hours to law 
courses. Insufficient law credit hours could explain the absence of ADR courses at any of the 




participant schools while sufficient law credit hours in schools that still do not teach ADR could 
indicate that the schools in question do not give ADR attention it deserves.   
 Five of the twenty-one participating law schools stated that they require their students to 
complete fewer than eighty credit hours of law modules to receive their law degrees. The other 
sixteen reported that they require their students to complete more than eighty credit hours of law 
courses to graduate. Law schools in the United States – as a point of reference – must require a 
minimum of 83 credit hours to receive approval from the American Bar Association.24 Figure 1 
(below) summarizes responses to the first question. The discussion of the responses to the 
subsequent question will elaborate on these results.  
 
  
Figure 1: Responses to Question One: “How many total 
credit hours are allocated for each specialized areas of law in 
the Study Plan for the Bachelor of Law?” 
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24 Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools 2017-2018 states: “A law school shall require, as a 
condition for graduation, successful completion of a course of study of not fewer than 83 credit hours. At least 64 
of these credit hours shall be in courses that require attendance in regularly scheduled classroom sessions or direct 
faculty instruction.” ABA  Standards  and  Rules  of Procedure  for  Approval  of Law  Schools  2017-2018, available 
at:https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/Standards/2017-
2018ABAStandardsforApprovalofLawSchools/2017_2018_standards_chapter3.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited 
Mar 22, 2018). 




3.3.2 Question two:  
Question two was designed, first of all, to generate a broad overview of the reality of ADR 
instruction in Saudi Law Schools. It asked participants whether or not they offer any ADR courses 
to their students. It solicited “Yes” or “No” responses to obtain definitive and clear answers from 
the respondents. The question was also designed to divide the participants into two main groups 
based on their responses. The first group consisted of participants who answered “No” to question 
two. The survey directed these participants to answer only the third category of survey questions 
(11, 12, 13 and 14). The second group consisted of participants who answered “Yes.” The survey 
directed them to answer only the second category of survey questions (3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 
11). 
Nine of the twenty-one surveyed Saudi law schools stated that they teach ADR in general. 
This, however, does not mean all these schools offer stand-alone courses in this subject area. The 
responses to the second category questions will clarify these results, since those questions require 
participants to elucidate the manner in which their schools teach ADR. Twelve of the surveyed 
law schools reported that they do not teach ADR in any fashion; unfortunately, these twelve 
include the oldest three law schools in Saudi Arabia. The answers to this question indicate that 
nearly sixty percent of Saudi law schools do not offer ADR-related courses. The remaining forty-
plus percent that do offer ADR-related courses will be examined in more detail later. The figures 
derived from the survey show that the majority of Saudi law schools have, to this point, failed to 
recognize the importance of and growing global demand for ADR. Such figures are discouraging, 
but they also serve as a timely reminder of the importance of integrating ADR into law school 
curricula sooner rather than later and of the steps Saudi law schools must take to achieve that 
objective.  




ADR skills are essential in the contemporary legal profession and all potential lawyers and 
practitioners should acquire them. The Hon. Dorothy W. Nelson once observed: 
With regard to legal education, it is clear that good lawyers bring more to 
bear on a problem than legal knowledge and language skills. They bring creativity, 
practical wisdom and good judgment. A real challenge for the law schools is to help 
law students to develop broader problem-solving skills. The curriculum should not 
end with doctrinal analysis, but should include other skills such as counseling, 
planning and negotiation. Unfortunately too few elite schools see this as their 
mission.25 
 
  The absence of ADR courses in Saudi law schools will unquestionably result in a lack of 
skilled lawyers and specialists in the field and exacerbate the skills gap in the labor market. Figures 
2 and 3 show the results of the second survey question. 
 
 
Figure 2: Responses to Question Two: “Do any of these 
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see also Paul Brest, The Responsibility of Law Schools: Educating Lawyers as Counselors and Problem Solvers, 58 
LAW CONTEMP. PROBL. 5–17 (1995). 






The first category questions yield two additional insights. First, none of the schools that 
allocate fewer than 80 credit hours for the various subject areas of law offer any ADR courses. 
Second, only fifty percent of the law schools that assign more than 80 credit hours to law modules 
teach ADR. These findings prove that both assumed causes for not teaching ADR in law schools 
stated above are true and valid. This survey highlights the need for some schools to increase the 
number of credit hours assigned to law courses in order to add subject areas such as ADR to their 
curricula; it also reveals that a significant number of schools with sufficient allocated law credit 
hours do not give ADR the attention it deserves. 
3.4 The Second Category 
The questions in this category were directed to the schools that offer ADR courses to their 





Figure 3: Responses to Question Two: “Do any of these specialized courses 
cover ADR methods generally?”




offer and how they teach them, aiming to measure the effectiveness and quality of the courses 
offered in each school. Obtaining more details from the schools also clarifies how seriously they 
take offering ADR courses to their students and giving them the knowledge and skills they need 
to effectively practice law. This category contained nine questions (questions 3-11) all of which 
were structured to elicit specific, rather than general, information about the surveyed topics.      
3.4.1 Question three:  
This question was designed to move from the general answers participant schools provided 
to question two to more details about the ways in which they teach ADR. The survey directed 
respondents to choose one of the provided multiple choice answers for the sake of accuracy. 
Respondents had to select one of the following descriptions of their ADR offerings: a) ADR is 
taught as a general course; b) The school offers multiple separate courses for this purpose, e.g. an 
arbitration course, a meditation course … etc.; and finally c) ADR is taught as a part of other 
offerings? Each choice asked respondents to specify the title of the offered course(s) and the 
number of assigned credit hours to maximize the elicited information.  
The majority of law schools that teach ADR to their students stated that they do not offer 
stand-alone courses in this subject. The forty-five percent of Saudi law schools that teach ADR 
reported that they do so as a part of other general offerings. The syllabi of several courses in these 
schools – e.g., Introduction to the Study of Law, The Law of Procedure before Sharia Courts, and 
Commercial Law – include ADR lessons. Three law schools reported, moreover, that they offer 2-
3 credit hour stand-alone courses on the subject of arbitration, among all ADR subject areas. These 
three schools constitute less than thirty-three percent of Saudi law schools that teach ADR. Only 
twenty-two percent of these law schools (two out of nine) offer 2 credit hour courses covering 




ADR in general. These percentages suggest that ADR and its various subjects are unpopular even 
in law schools that claim to offer such courses to their students.  
These findings reflect a lack of interest in the field of ADR on the part of Saudi law schools. 
They speak, in fact, to the unwillingness of some schools to provide instruction in ADR subjects 
and thus testify to an imbalance that requires reform. The attempts of schools that claim to teach 
ADR are too inadequate to contribute to the development of the field or to provide students with 
the skills they need. The survey’s findings to this point highlight the troublingly low status of ADR 













3.4.2 Question four:  
Question four was intended to reveal the extent of each law school’s experience in ADR 
instruction. It asked each participant school to list the year it began offering the ADR course(s) to 
A general course  
22%
Multiple separate 
courses offered for 
this purpose
33%
A part of other 
offerings
45%
Figure 4: Responses to Question Three: "Is ADR Taught in/as: A general 
Course, Multiple Seperate Courses, or A Part of Other Offerings?"




its students. Five out of nine participating law schools either provided irrelevant answers or did 
not respond to this question. The responses of the other four schools fit into three categories: five 
or fewer years, between five and ten years, and ten or more years. None of the four respondents’ 
claimed to have ten-plus years of experience teaching ADR. Three participating law schools 
reported that their experience ranges between five and ten years. Only one surveyed law school 
indicated that it has offered an ADR course for five or fewer years. 
The survey shows that most law schools in Saudi Arabia have little or no experience in 
teaching ADR. A few law schools have recently set the wheels in motion by offering a limited 
number of course. The effectiveness of such courses, however, remains unclear and the current 
lack of quantifiable information makes it difficult to measure. This lack of experience, or even 
lack of interest, will yield continued sub-par legal education outcomes if schools do not take steps 
to improve the situation. Figure 5 (below) displays the responses to survey question four.   
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3.4.3 Question five: 
This question was designed to explore and analyze the teaching approaches and methods 
used by law schools that offer ADR courses to their students. It asked respondents to pick any of 
the responses from the following list that apply to their schools: formal academic lectures, 
seminars, interactive discussions, practical training and simulations, or all the above. About fifty-
six percent of the respondents indicated that they use all the listed methods and approaches in 
teaching ADR courses in their schools. Thirty-three percent of the respondents stated that their 
instructors use the classical approach in the offered courses and the most common teaching method 
is the formal lecture. Eleven percent of respondents selected the first and the second options 
together (formal academic lectures, and seminars) as valid answers. 
The information provided in responses to question five raises the possibility of response 
bias, which is always present in surveys and is difficult to gauge or predict. The question of 
feasibility seems particularly pertinent. The majority of respondents indicated that their instructors 
teach ADR modules using all the provided teaching methods, but can the lecturers and tutors in 
these schools truly accomplish all this work given the limited number of assigned credit hours and 
course offerings? Instructors in such circumstances must face substantial pressure to address all 
aspects of their various curricula in such a short period of time; this undoubtedly has a negative 








These findings yield several important conclusions. First, Saudi law schools need to 
embrace new ADR teaching methods rather than relying solely on old-fashioned lectures. Second, 
these schools need to design and offer separate clinical law courses for ADR subject areas. Doing 
so will enable law schools to offer to their students skills-based learning opportunities that will 
allow them to interact in a hands-on educational setting. This will foster a richer and more effective 




3.4.4 Questions six, seven, and eight:  
This section analyzes responses to questions six, seven, and eight together because they 
relate to each other and serve the same purpose. Question six asked participant schools to specify 
whether or not the lecturers teaching their ADR courses specialize in ADR. Question seven asked 









Figure 6: Responses to Question Five: “Are ADR Course(s) Taught as: a) 
Formal Academic Lectures? b) Seminars? c) Interactive Discussions: Practical 
Training and Simulations? d) All the Above?”




lecturers are Saudis or non-Saudis; question eight asked participants who responded “No” to state 
the fields of law in which the ADR lecturers specialized. These three questions were designed to 
determine whether or not specialized faculty teach the ADR courses in these law schools and to 
gauge the extent of the shortage of faculty members in this field. 
The survey shows that unspecialized faculty who lack direct expertise in ADR teach the 
ADR classes in almost fifty-six percent of the respondent law schools. A minority of Saudi law 
schools indicated that lecturers with specialties in ADR teach their ADR courses. One school 
(accounting for about seventeen percent of the sample for this question) among those with ADR-
specialized instructors reported that only Saudi faculty teach its ADR courses. Fifty percent of the 
remaining respondent schools stated that both Saudi and non-Saudi faculty teach their ADR 
courses, while thirty-three percent indicated that only non-Saudis lecture such courses. Seventy-
five percent of the question six “No” respondents reported in question eight that ADR instructors 
in their schools specialize in private law in general or in one of its areas of expertise. Respondent 
schools reporting that their ADR lecturers specialize in Islamic Sharia constituted the remaining 
twenty-five percent of the “No” sample.  
These data verify several presumptions. First, the shortage of ADR faculty members in 
general looms as a serious problem for Saudi law schools. This shortage, if unaddressed, will 
undoubtedly have a negative effect on the quality of ADR instruction in all law schools, which 
will translate into poor outcomes for students. Second, the shortage of Saudi instructors in most of 
the law schools proves that schools have done little to alleviate or overcome this problem. Third, 
the problems this survey highlights stem from a presumed failure to recognize the importance of 
ADR and ADR instruction. Law schools in Saudi Arabia, in other words, underestimate the great 
value and the significance of ADR and fail to recognize the potential consequences of so doing; 




this lack of awareness is the root cause of the problems identified above. The following figures 
show the data gathered from survey questions six, seven, and eight. 
 
 
Figure 7: Responses to Question Six: “Are the lecturers 
assigned to teach ADR course(s) specialized in ADR or in a 


























Figure 8: Responses to Question Seven: “If YES are they: a) Saudi Citizens? 
b) Non-Saudis?”





Figure 9: Responses to Question Eight: “If NO, please specify 
the fields in which the lecturers assigned to teach ADR 








3.4.5 Question nine:  
The survey’s disappointing results to this point might generate a great deal of pessimism, 
but the responses to question nine provide a glimmer of hope. The question asked participant 
schools if they offer instruction in arbitration in any of the forms mentioned in question three 
(general course, a stand-alone curriculum, or as a part of other offerings). The question was 
designed to elicit a clear and comprehensive picture of the reality of instruction in arbitration – the 
most effective and the globally recognized method of resolving disputes. 
The survey shows that all law schools that offer ADR courses teach arbitration. All nine 
respondent law schools confirmed that they offer arbitration courses to their students. This is 
certainly an encouraging sign, signaling that these schools have a positive attitude toward teaching 
arbitration. This is not, however, the whole story; only the schools that offer ADR course(s) 
responded to this question. They represent only forty-three percent of all Saudi law schools, which 
means that the majority of law schools in Saudi Arabia still do not offer instruction in arbitration. 




The content of each offered course and the manner in which these law schools teach arbitration is, 
moreover, a matter that still requires examination.  
The next question addressed some of these issues, but the results of this survey highlight 
that a comprehensive understanding of the reality of ADR instruction in general and arbitration in 
particular will require additional surveys and careful studies. Figure 10 shows responses to survey 
question nine, and figure 11 displays responses to survey questions two and nine together – 
providing a comparison between the number of law schools offering and not offering arbitration 
courses and the total number of law schools in the Kingdom.   
 
 
Figure 10: Responses to Question Nine: “Is Arbitration 
Offered in Any of the Courses Mentioned in Question No. (3) 

















3.4.6 Questions ten: 
This was designed question to gain insight into current approaches to arbitration instruction 
in the Saudi law schools that offer such courses. The information the question elicited makes it 
easy to compare the survey responses to global trends in arbitration education.26 The question was 
also intended to facilitate some degree of evaluation of the ways these law schools can improve in 
this field. The author designed the question to achieve these aims by asking responding schools to 
clarify whether they offer arbitration classes that provide general instruction in this subject area 
                                                 
26 In the United States, for example, a survey conducted by Professor Thomas Carbonneau and the Tulane Arbitration 
Institute showed that arbitration is taught in law schools in several manners. Stand-alone courses in the subject of 
arbitration are offered by the majority of the U.S. law schools. While some of them offer general courses on the 
subject, a substantial number of law schools offer specialized courses which cover the following areas of arbitration 
law: (labor arbitration, International commercial arbitration, commercial arbitration, securities arbitration, 
environmental arbitration, and public-sector bargaining). The survey also showed that arbitration is taught in some 
other law school through a combination of general and specialized courses together. Another trend in which 
arbitration is offered in the U.S. law schools is by offering stand-alone courses (specialized and non-specialized) on 
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and cover arbitration broadly without focusing in any of its specific areas, or if they offer 
specialized courses that focus on individual subject areas of arbitration such as commercial 
arbitration and labor arbitration …etc. It also asked participants who responded affirmatively to 
the latter sub-question to provide course titles and the number of designated credit hours for each 
offered course. 
Six out of nine schools reported that they do not offer specialized courses in specific areas 
of arbitration, meaning sixty-seven percent of responding schools teach arbitration only as a 
general offering. The remaining respondents stated that they offer one course that focuses in one 
specialized area of arbitration: twenty-two percent of the responding law schools reported that they 
teach specialized courses in commercial arbitration and eleven percent reported that they teach 
specialized courses in judicial arbitration as part of the Judiciary’s jurisprudence course. 
The majority of the responding law schools that offer arbitration courses indicated that they 
provide only basic instruction in general offerings. The survey also shows that no law school offers 
more than one course in arbitration, either a specialized or a general offering. Taking into 
consideration the small number of credit hours assigned to the specialized courses (two), this 
suggests that the few specialized courses offered in some of the law schools also provide only 
superficial instruction in arbitration rather than thorough knowledge. In-depth specialized courses 
are of great significance; they deepen student understanding of the subject area, broaden their 
horizons, and sharpen their skills. These types of courses provide students with a depth of learning 
that will help them build the capabilities they need to succeed in the legal profession. The responses 
to this question clearly show that Saudi law schools need to broaden their ADR offerings in general 
and their arbitration course offerings in particular. Offering multiple specialized courses in the 
different areas of arbitration law is crucial to prepare future lawyers to practice law. Doing so will 




enable law schools in Saudi Arabia to keep up with global trends in this field27 and open doors for 
further improvements that will meet the demands of a constantly changing labor market. Figure 
11 (below) displays the responses to survey question ten.  
 
 
Figure 11: Responses to Question Ten: “a) Is arbitration 
taught as a general course? Or b) Is it taught in specialized 
courses on different subject areas of arbitration? E.g. 
commercial arbitration, arbitration in civil cases, labor 








3.5 The Third Category 
This category contained a shared question directed to all participating law schools.  
3.5.1 Question eleven:  
This question addressed an issue that preceding questions and categories did not touch on. 
The author – believing Saudi law schools should organize conferences and other types of meetings 
on ADR and recognizing the profound beneficial impact of so doing on law students, law schools, 
                                                 
27 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.  




and the learning process in general – designed this question to identify and closely observe the 
respondents’ position on this matter. The question asked participating law schools to state whether 
or not they host or organize any form of educational meetings on the subject of ADR such as 
conferences, seminars, discussion groups, or specialized workshops, and whether they invite 
distinguished speakers and participants to take part in such events.  
This analysis only considers the responses received directly from the schools that 
participated in the survey; it excludes information retrieved from the internet concerning six of the 
Saudi law schools. The majority of the fifteen responding law schools (eight out of fifteen or fifty-
three percent) reported that they do not host conferences or any form of the listed events on ADR. 
The responses to question two indicate that seven of these schools offer ADR courses (out the nine 
total that do so). The analysis of the responses shows, in other words, that about seventy-eight 
percent of the law schools that teach ADR do not host any meetings for educational purposes on 
that subject. The provided information also reveals that seven out of the fifteen responding schools 
(about forty seven percent) host conferences, seminars, discussion groups, or specialized 
workshops on ADR. Interestingly, five of these schools (over seventy-one percent) do not teach 
ADR at all based on their responses to question two. The majority of the law schools that host 
ADR conferences or similar meetings, in other words, do not offer ADR courses to their students. 
This group includes the three oldest law schools in the country. Only two law schools that teach 
ADR claimed that they host such educational events. The effectiveness of the organized meetings, 
however, remains unclear, requiring further additional research and analysis.  
The responses to question ten, discussed above, can be divided into two main categories. 
The first category contains the disappointing findings that both the majority of responding law 
schools and the majority of the law schools that teach ADR in general do not host ADR 




conferences or any type of related meetings. This indicates that these schools either fail to 
recognize or simply ignore the significance of such educational gatherings in enhancing ADR 
education. The second category includes the unexpected finding that the majority of law schools 
that claim to host ADR events do not (based on their responses to previous survey questions) offer 
ADR courses to their students. This finding suggests that these schools may still be examining the 
importance and the effectiveness of ADR courses, limiting their involvement to hosting such 
educational meetings without teaching ADR or any of its subject areas. Taking such steps may or 
may not lead these law schools to offer ADR courses in the future. This assumption raises several 
questions, however. How, for example, do the schools that do not teach ADR aim to benefit their 
faculty and students by offering such platforms? What can these schools do to ensure the success 
and effectiveness of such conferences, seminars, and workshops? Who is the target audience for 
these events – assuming students’ lack of exposure to ADR-related topics translates into a lack of 
interest? All of these considerations suggest one thing above all: hosting ADR-related educational 
activities will not necessarily directly enhance the quality of ADR learning or teaching in schools 
that do not offer ADR courses to their students. The rewards will certainly be greater for schools 
that do offer such courses.   
Hosting ADR conferences and other ADR-related educational meetings can serve many 
purposes for law schools. Such events can, for example, increase student awareness of and 
knowledge about ADR, and enable interested students to find channels for sharing, exchanging, 
and discussing their knowledge and ideas. Finally, adopting this approach can encourage new 
studies of ADR instruction and thus promote ADR in general throughout Saudi Arabia. Law 
schools, therefore, should take the lead in this effort. Indeed, the findings of this survey highlight 
the importance of law schools organizing various types of educational platforms and inviting 




distinguished speakers and experts in the field to the events they host. The findings also emphasize 
the importance of faculty, student, and invited guest participation in such effective and valuable 
gatherings, since such participation will generate long term and cumulative educational benefits. 
Figures 12 and 13 (below) show the analysis of the question eleven responses and relevant results 
from earlier in the survey. 
 
 
Figure 12: Responses to Question Eleven: “Does your school 
organize conferences, seminars, discussion groups or 
specialized workshops in ADR and invite speakers and 















3.6 The Fourth Category 
The questions in this category were intended for schools that do not offer ADR course(s) 
to their students. They were designed to acquire additional information about the exclusion of 
ADR subject areas from these schools’ curricula, to identify the circumstances that produced these 
exclusions, and to acquire insight regarding the possible future development of ADR instruction. 
This category contained three questions (questions 12, 13, and 14). 
3.6.1 Question twelve:   
This question was intended to identify the main factors and causes that have led schools in 
this category of the survey not to offer ADR courses. Question twelve, a multiple-choice, close-
ended question, reads: “Why does your school not offer a specialized course(s) in ADR?” The 
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academics in the field; b) The absence of labor market demand at present; c) We give priority to 
more important courses; d) Limited credit hours assigned for specialized courses required to 
complete the degree; e) We currently see no need to teach such courses; f) Other, please specify.  
The websites of the six law schools that did not respond to the survey gave no hints as to 
their possible responses to this question, so the author excluded them from survey question twelve. 
The remaining six law schools that do not teach ADR course(s) responded as follows: the first law 
school selected c) (“We give priority to more important courses”); the second selected d) (“Limited 
credit hours assigned for specialized courses required to complete the degree”); the third selected 
both c) and d); the fourth law school selected c), d), and e) (“We currently see no need to teach 
such course”); and the fifth and sixth schools both selected f), preferring to provide reasons other 
than those listed. The first of these schools explained that a lack of conviction regarding the 
importance of teaching ADR in the past drove the decision to exclude such courses when the school 
created its plan of study; the other stated that it does not offer ADR instruction because of its plan 
of study – offering no further clarification, but stating that it is in the process of adding such courses 
to its curriculum. 
Taking into consideration that some of the responding schools select more than one of the 
provided answers, an analysis of the relative frequency of each selected response provides insight 
into these results. Figure 14 (below) shows a choice selection frequency table for all the listed 
responses to question twelve; the six responding law schools only selected four of the listed 
choices. They made these selections (c, d, e and f) nine times in total. Respondents selected the 
listed choices c) (“We give priority to more important courses”) and d) (“Limited credit hours 
assigned for specialized courses required to complete the degree”) three times (about thirty-three 
and a third percent for each choice). Choices (c) and (d) were thus the most selected responses. 




Respondents selected f) (other) two times (about twenty-two percent) and e) (“We currently see 
no need to teach such course”) only once (about eleven percent). 
The responses to question twelve provide more in-depth insight into Saudi law schools’ 
rationales for not offering ADR courses. Schools offer more specific reasons in their responses to 
question twelve than in their earlier general responses. These responses confirm the initial 
interpretation of survey question two – that many Saudi law schools have ignored the growth of 
ADR and the expanding applications of its various processes. School responses that they do not 
offer ADR courses because they currently see no need or because they give priority to other subject 
areas make this point readily apparent. The responses to question twelve confirm two additional 
facts. First, some law schools need to increase the total number of required credit units to expand 
their curricula to include ADR courses and offer them to law students. Second, the survey indicates 
that some law schools still question the importance of offering ADR courses; although they assign 
sufficient credit hours to law subject areas, these courses do not yet include ADR. The next 
question was primarily to obtain more details from those schools about their future plans in this 
regard. Figures 14 and 15 illustrate the analytical points outlined above.     
  





Figure 14: Frequency of Choice Selections in Responses to Question Twelve 
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3.6.2 Questions thirteen and fourteen: 
The survey’s final two questions were designed to facilitate analysis of another dimension 
of the surveyed issues: the status of ADR instruction. The author sought to use these two questions 
to predict the future of this field. The results of the survey to this point shed light on the reality of 
the studied field, reveal the number of law schools that have chosen not to teach ADR to their 
students, and identify several causes for the exclusion of ADR from Saudi law school curricula; 
these final questions take the survey to a new level, looking toward the future of ADR instruction. 
The author designed both questions to explore changes the law schools in question could initiate 
as well as the challenges they could face. Analysis of the responses to these two questions 
illuminates the direction of future trends in this field.    
c) We give priority 
to more important 
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d) Limited credit 
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Figure 15: Relative Frequency for Each Choice Selected by Respondents 
to Question Twelve




Question thirteen asked the responding law schools to indicate whether or not they plan to 
add new courses in ADR or any of its subject areas to their bachelor degree plans of study in the 
upcoming years. The survey directed only the “No” respondents to proceed to question fourteen, 
which asked them to list any obstacles, barriers, or reasons preventing them from doing so. Five 
of the six question thirteen respondents (about eighty percent) reported that they plan to expand 
their curricula to include ADR courses. This is an indisputably positive step, signaling approaching 
changes that will have a profound impact in the field. Achieving such goals, however, will require 
additional effort and commitment from the law schools since they still have a long way to go. The 
majority of the responses to question thirteen, in other words, provide a glimpse of a possible 
future path for development in legal education. The next objective for law schools in this regard 
should be to learn from the experience of other law schools in the country that teach ADR and to 
observe global ADR instruction trends and thereby benefit from the long histories and considerable 
successes of other law schools in this area. Doing so will help each law school identify the proper 
direction to pursue to ensure qualitative results and accomplishments.  
Only one question thirteen respondent reported that it does not intend to include ADR 
courses in its plan of study in the near future. This law school specified in its response to the 
subsequent question that the limited number of credit hours allocated for law courses is the source 
of its reluctance to add such offerings to its curriculum, which includes both law and sharia 
specializations. This is, for many reasons, an insufficient rationale for not teaching ADR. First, the 
term sharia law has largely the same meaning as the word law, as interpreted in many western 




jurisdictions.28 The dissimilarity between the two terms mainly concerns their respective sources.29 
ADR instruction thus has a place in both institutions as Chapter 2 illustrated.30 Second, many law 
schools in Saudi Arabia now teach sharia modules and law courses to their students. Many newly 
opened schools in Saudi Arabia are actually called “school of sharia and law” and, as this survey 
shows, this has not prevented some of these schools from offering ADR courses. Third, the 
school’s claim that its reluctance to add ADR courses to its curriculum stems from credit hour 
limitations is inadequate, since, as the survey illustrates, other law schools have the same concerns 
but still demonstrate a desire to offer such courses in the future. This school’s resistance thus 
proves that teaching ADR in law schools requires genuine willingness, ability, and commitment 
to take serious steps toward improving legal education. Law schools that lack such dedication will 
struggle to overcome any obstacle or difficulty they may encounter in this regard. Providing future 
lawyers courses in ADR has become a fundamental obligation for law schools; such courses enable 
students to acquire the knowledge and skills that they will need to practice law effectively. The 
results of the survey show, in short, that ADR is more important than some law schools believe.31 
Figure 16 (below) displays participant responses to survey question thirteen. 
 
                                                 
28 See e.g. Issam Saliba, WHAT IS SHARIA LAW?, LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (2011), available at: 
www.loc.gov/law/help/sharia-law.php (last visited Apr 22, 2018); see also JAN MICHIEL OTTO, SHARIA AND 
NATIONAL LAW IN MUSLIM COUNTRIES: TENSIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR DUTCH AND EU FOREIGN POLICY 
(2008); SHAHBAL DIZAYEE, A COMPARISON STUDY BETWEEN SHARIA AND LAW (2003). 
29 Id. 
30 Also see generally NOEL J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW (1964); Alternative Dispute Resolution & Islam, 
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION & ISLAM, available at: https://islamadr.wordpress.com/ (last visited Feb 17, 
2015); JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW (1982); ̒ ABD AL-ḤAMĪD AḤDAB & JALAL EL-AHDAB, 
ARBITRATION WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES (3rd rev. and expanded ed. 2011); George Sayen, Arbitration, 
conciliation, and the Islamic legal tradition in Saudi Arabia, 24 U PA J INTL ECON L 905 (2003); RALPH H. SALMI, 
ISLAM AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORIES AND PRACTICES (1998); MOHAMED M. KESHAVJEE, ISLAM, SHARIA 
AND ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MECHANISMS FOR LEGAL REDRESS IN THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY (2013); 
FRANK E. VOGEL, ISLAMIC LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM: STUDIES OF SAUDI ARABIA (2000). 
31 This meaning is borrowed from an article written by Sidney S. Sachs: “ADR is bigger than you think”, see Sachs, 
supra note 8. 






Figure 16: Responses to Question Thirteen: “Will ADR or 
any of its subject areas be added to your bachelor’s degree 















A general glimpse at the current curriculum of the majority of Saudi law schools indicates 
that they mainly focus on teaching litigation and its related subject areas. Previous chapters 
discussed the shortcomings of litigation, asserting the importance of ADR processes.32 This 
assertion should not be interpreted as an argument against teaching litigation; it aims to highlight 
the importance of strengthening the legal education system, especially in the field of dispute 
resolution, by not solely teaching litigation to law students, but also offering contemporary ADR 
modules in which students can acquire the knowledge and skills needed in contemporary legal 
practice.33 As professor Carbonneau noted: 
The consideration of other dispute resolution methods needs to supplement 
the interdisciplinary study of disputes and the exposure to the ethic of legal 
adjudication. Having gained an understanding of how disputes arise and what they 
imply in human and social terms, law students should be introduced to the panoply 
of possible remedies—of which adversarial litigation should be only one possible 
remedy.34  
 
                                                 
32 See generally Burger, supra note 4; Jon O. Newman, Rethinking fairness: Perspectives on the litigation process, 94 
YALE LAW J. 1643–1659 (1985); Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons from the alternative dispute 
resolution movement, 53 UNIV. CHIC. LAW REV. 424–439 (1986). 
33 John Lande & Jean R. Sternlight, The Potential Contribution of ADR to an Integrated Curriculum: Preparing Law 
Students for Real World Lawyering, 25 OHIO ST J DISP RESOL 247 (2010). (“Law schools should not merely make 
sure that all law graduates understand the differences between negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and litigation 
(though this is surely desirable), but should also do a better job of enhancing all the knowledge and skills that 
attorneys need to be effective. For example, law schools should teach students such insights as: facts are often 
contested, some disputes are not best resolved through litigation, not all disputes boil down to money, emotions 
should not necessarily be ignored, and other disciplines can be very helpful to attorneys. Lawyers must be able to 
understand parties' interests, communicate effectively, and develop options that may be acceptable to disputing 
parties. Moreover, the curriculum should teach these lessons not only in a few elective skills courses but also as an 
integral part of core doctrinal courses. In other words, law schools should generally convey a broader and more 
realistic conception of what it means to "think like a lawyer"—"and act like a lawyer"—in practice. ADR instruction, 
explicitly or implicitly, raises fundamental issues about lawyers' identity and roles. Thus, ADR instruction is an 
important corrective to a legal curriculum which routinely conveys erroneous assumptions about what it means to 
be a lawyer when virtually the only dispute resolution process considered is litigation.”) Id. 
34 CARBONNEAU, supra note 18 at 249. 




Saudi law schools should take this perspective into account, as it will help them reshape the 
Kingdom’s legal education and reform its law school curricula to respond effectively to the needs 
of contemporary legal practice.   
ADR instruction in the United States has undergone multiple stages of development and 
each phase resulted from earlier progress.35 Considerable work and dedication, in other words, 
drove the great achievements and accomplishments of U.S law schools in this field.36 Progress in 
the U.S. came in response to the need to close the gap between the theories taught in law schools 
and legal practice in the real world. It took several years to bridge this gap, but U.S. law schools 
finally managed to reach the desired result whereupon they set new objectives and targets to ensure 
they sustained the progress they had made and continued to develop.37 Many lessons can be derived 
from the experience of U.S. law schools in this area. The scholarly contributions and the 
“pioneering” efforts that fueled gradual growth in that jurisdiction are among the main headlines 
of this trailblazing experience.38 This chapter also highlights the importance of assessing the 
quality of achieved outcomes through research and empirical studies.39 
Analysis of the survey results makes it clear that Saudi law schools do not fit into any of 
the developmental phases of ADR instruction in the United States. The current status of ADR 
instruction in Saudi law schools arguably resembles the first phase of progress made in the United 
States, since, as the survey shows, several law schools have started to introduce these subjects.40 
The fact that the ADR movement in the United States was a well-planned effort resulting from 
                                                 
35 See supra notes 4-22 and accompanying texts.  
36 Id.  
37 Id. 
38 Id; see also Sander, supra note 18; Love, supra note 9. 
39 See e.g. Carbonneau, supra note 22; Steve Toben, A Funder’s View-ADR in the Year 2010: Reflections on a Decade 
of Progress, 6 DISP RESOL MAG 6 (1999). 
40 See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying texts.  




great scholarly contributions and academic support that fueled huge accomplishments that 
impacted the development of ADR instruction in law schools throughout all three developmental 
phases counters the contention. The movement’s progress was, in short, notable from early 
attempts to teach ADR during the first phase.41 These attempts increased the likelihood that the 
number of law schools including ADR subjects to their curricula would increase. The status of 
ADR instruction in Saudi law schools clearly diverges from the U.S. model. The lack of genuine 
recognition among Saudi law schools and academics of the significance of ADR and competence 
in dispute resolution in contemporary legal practice and of the necessity of teaching this subject to 
the future lawyers to arm them with the skills they need to practice law sharply distinguishes the 
early stage of the U.S’s historical development and the current status of ADR instruction in Saudi 
Arabia. The current status of ADR instruction in Saudi law schools, moreover, provides little 
evidence of a possible rising trend in ADR instruction that would signal a movement comparable 
to that of the United States. 
Saudis have devoted considerable effort for more decades to promoting and enhancing the 
capabilities of the court system.42 Many remedies have been proposed to address justice system 
defects such as court delays and the excessive caseloads.43 Two central points warrant attention 
here. First, introducing ADR processes into the court system will quickly and efficiently facilitate 
the achievement of the desired improvements in the court system. Those spearheading ongoing 
efforts to improve the country’s judicial system, however, have yet to demonstrate a genuine 
willingness and desire to include ADR among the recommended reforms. Second, law schools 
should recognize that teaching ADR to their students does not conflict in any way with government 
                                                 
41 Id. 
42 See e.g. Richard Dekmejian, The liberal impulse in Saudi Arabia,  MIDDLE EAST J. 400–413 (2003); see also Rashed 
Aba-Namay, The recent constitutional reforms in Saudi Arabia, 42 INT. COMP. LAW Q. 295–331 (1993). 
43 Id.  




initiatives to reform the justice system. ADR provides the dispute resolution system, which should 
include adjudicatory and non-adjudicatory processes, more possible venues. Teaching ADR will 
make the shift to the use of these methods easier in the event that litigation is deemed insufficient 
in the future as has been the case in some other parts of the world.44  
5. Conclusion 
It has been said that “the best way to predict the future is to create it.”45 This maxim rings 
true in the suggestion that legal education should play a leading role in promoting ADR in general 
and enhancing its various processes in Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom can undoubtedly build a strong 
dispute resolution system through a robust and effective legal education. Law schools in Saudi 
Arabia, therefore, should recognize the significance of teaching ADR subject areas and skills. This 
survey suggests that Saudi law schools should reform their curricula to eliminate ADR illiteracy. 
It highlights the need for reforms addressing an array of issues; examples include the expansion of 
curricula to integrate multiple ADR courses and the need for a thorough evaluation of the few 
current ADR courses to ensure their effectiveness and success. This survey also emphasizes the 
need for additional studies to ensure continued growth and improvement in this field. 
A final analysis of this chapter’s findings – especially in the light of the fact that the 
survey’s negative results overweigh the positive – yields two additional observations. A 
pessimistic view, on the one hand, would suggest that law schools have failed so far to give ADR 
the attention it deserve. This interpretation supports the earlier statement that ADR is of greater 
significance than many Saudi law schools realize.46 An optimistic view, on the other hand, would 
                                                 
44 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.  
45 This quote has been credited to many authors with different but similar versions, see e.g. FRED R. SHAPIRO, THE 
YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 415 (2006); see also Quote Investigator, available at: 
https://quoteinvestigator.com/2012/09/27/invent-the-future/ (last visited Apr 29, 2018). 
46 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 




regard ADR as still a fertile virgin area in the country that should attract law schools since it 
promises huge success should they invest in it. Perhaps it is not too optimistic to hope that this 
survey will serve as a departure point for bigger future projects on the subject of ADR instruction 
that either thoroughly investigate the ways ADR is offered in each law school or that examine the 
subject in a broader sense with the aim of providing a careful evaluation of legal education in 
general in Saudi Arabia.
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The initial success of ADR (largely ad-hoc in its early history) and growing worldwide 
demand resulting from the recognition of ADR’s promise in resolving disputes eventually 
generated a modernization movement. Modernization efforts initially focused on promoting ADR 
and facilitating access to its various mechanisms. The spread of terms such as 
“institutionalization,” “mainstreaming,” and other fashionable phrases around the world in the late 
decades of the twentieth century marked a new phase in ADR’s development.1 This phase led 
innovators to propose a whole new generation of ADR in which systematic and more efficient 
approaches to dispute resolution would replace older ad-hoc forms.2 
Modernizers sought to institutionalize ADR for various reasons. They sought, for example, 
to attract more people, including skeptics, to use its various techniques.3 Such efforts also sustained 
ADR’s growth and helped the ADR movement pursue its objectives.4 Efforts to institutionalize 
ADR focused on relieving caseload pileup and alleviating case congestion in courts, promoting 
ADR and the use of its various mechanisms, enhancing “access to justice,” and offering additional 
efficient ways to resolve disputes.5 The success of institutionalization efforts thus, arguably, 
depended on the achievement of the abovementioned objectives.6 
                                                 
1 Harry N. Mazadoorian, Institutionalizing ADR: Few risks, many benefits: Some guidelines for system design, 12 
ALTERN. HIGH COST LITIG. 45–46 (1994). 
2 Id; (“Initial successes in the ADR movement came from ad hoc efforts at creative problem-solving. Further 
experimentation led to new successes and the development of even more innovative procedures. 
     After many publicized early successes with ADR, innovators tried to design ‘systems’ to increase ADR use. Their 
goal was to facilitate ADR use by interested parties and to counteract resistance by opponents. Buzzwords such as 
‘mainstreaming,’ ‘institutionalizing’ and ‘systems design’ came to represent the next generation of ADR 
initiatives.”) Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Frank EA Sander, Alternative methods of dispute resolution: an overview, 37 U FLA REV 1 (1985).  
5 Id. 
6 See generally Bruce Monroe, Institutionalization of Alternative Dispute Resolution by the State of California, 14 
PEPP REV 943 (1986); (“One of the leaders of the movement, Frank Sander, has set forth four major goals of the 
ADR movement: ‘1) to relieve court congestion, as well as undue cost and delay; 2) to enhance community 




Many scholars in the United States have closely observed the development of ADR in U.S. 
jurisdictions. Frank E Sander asserts that institutionalization symbolizes the last of the three 
distinct stages in the development of ADR.7 The initiation of this third stage (institutionalization) 
has enabled scholars to contribute to ADR’s growth by identifying emerging issues, examining 
potential developments, and providing insight regarding the future of the field to address any 
potential difficulties or challenges.8 
The institutionalization of ADR in Saudi Arabia, by contrast, requires additional attention 
and development. The Saudi legal system has institutionalized ADR at a markedly slow pace and, 
despite the recent establishment of the Saudi Center for Commercial Arbitration, its progress 
remains insufficient compared to the advances made in other successful jurisdictions in recent 
decades.9 The growing importance of institutionalization and its success in many parts of the world 
makes clear that legislators, the government, and public and private bodies in Saudi Arabia must 
take more serious steps in this regard.  
                                                 
involvement in the dispute resolution process; 3) to facilitate access to justice; 4) to provide more 'effective' dispute 
resolution.’”) Id.  
7 Frank EA Sander, The Future of ADR-The Earl F. Nelson Memorial Lecture, J DISP RESOL 3 (2000); Sander asserts 
that ADR has gone through three main stages of development in its modern history. The first stage, which he calls 
“[l]et a thousand flowers bloom,” took place between 1975 and 1982. The second stage, “[c]autions and caveats,” 
was characterized by expressions of hesitation and worry and lasted from 1982 until 1990. The third and final stage, 
“institutionalization,” thus started around 1990. Id; see also Frank EA Sander, Ways of handling conflict: What we 
have learned, what problems remain, 25 NEGOT. J. 533–537 (2009); (“In an earlier article … I identified three 
periods of ADR development since the seminal 1976 Pound Conference in St. Paul, Minnesota… The first period 
was one of wide-ranging experimentation (“Let a Thousand Flowers Bloom”). … Following this exploratory period 
involving new applications of familiar processes as well as the invention of new processes, there came a second 
period characterized by cautions and criticisms. Perhaps the best known of these was Professor Owen Fiss’s 
‘Against Settlement,’ ... We are now in the third period whose theme is institutionalization …” Id. 
8 See e.g. STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, ARBITRATION, AND OTHER 
PROCESSES (6th ed. 2012); Monroe, supra note 6; F Sander, ADR: expansion, perfection and institutionalization, 26 
ABA DISPUTE RESOLUT. 1ff (1990). 
9 See Saudi Center for Commercial Arbitration, available at: https://www.sadr.org/ (last visited Nov 2, 2018); “The 
SCCA was founded in 2014 by Cabinet Resolution 257 (2014) “to administer arbitration procedures in civil and 
commercial disputes.” Id. 




This chapter presents a thorough analysis of successful institutionalization efforts in 
leading jurisdictions. It provides clear insights regarding the aims Saudi Arabia should set and how 
it should endeavor to achieve them. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 
2 defines the institutionalization of ADR; Section 3 analyzes institutionalization-related 
phenomena in the public sector; Section 4 examines examples of institutionalization efforts that 
aim to promote and develop ADR; Section 5 focuses on administrative ADR; Section 6 analyzes 
the institutionalization of ADR in the private sector; and Section 7 concludes the chapter.    
2. Institutionalization of ADR Defined 
The institutionalization of ADR has advanced steadily in public systems of justice and in 
the private arena over the past few decades.10 Both governmental and non-governmental efforts 
have driven this advancement.11 Institutionalization can, however, take many forms and its 
implementation often varies from one area to another;12 in fact, the past three decades have 
witnessed the introduction of several approaches to institutionalization around the world.13 The 
definition of the term “institutionalization” thus varies depending on its context, use, function, and 
                                                 
10 DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS, 26 (Leonard L. Riskin ed., 4th ed. 2009). 
11 Sander, supra note 7; (“We are now in the third period whose theme is institutionalization: making those innovations 
that turned out to be viable a regular part of the dispute resolution machinery in businesses, law firms, and the courts. 
Some examples of this effort have been: 
• the creation of the International Institute of Conflict Prevention and Resolution, a major player on the ADR scene 
involving some Fortune 500 companies and leading law firms devoted to the task of exploring methods of dispute 
settlement other than litigation; 
• extensive state and federal legislation mandating, or at least encouraging, the use of various nonbinding court-
annexed dispute processes (such as arbitration and mediation) as a preliminary to litigation; 
• creation of the Dispute Resolution Section of the American Bar Association, which now comprises more than 17,000 
members and sponsors a well-attended conference each spring that brings together ADR practitioners from various 
sectors, and publishes a leading quarterly, Dispute Resolution Magazine; and 
• extensive developments in the academic realm, evidenced by one or more ADR courses at most law and many other 
professional schools, as well as the emergence of a vast literature on all aspects of dispute resolution… “) Id.  
12 DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS, supra note 10 at 26–33; Bruce Monroe, Institutionalization of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution by the State of California, 14 PEPPERDINE LAW REV. 16 (2013). 
13 See generally DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS, supra note 10. 




the purpose it serves. A review of relevant literature reveals that each available ADR-related 
definition of “institutionalization” deals with the phenomenon from a specific angle that either 
explains one aspect of institutionalization or limits the word’s application to one of the various 
methods of ADR. The definitions in both cases provide a proper understanding of the term in 
particular senses or contexts. They do not, however, encompass the term’s full meaning, providing 
limited, partial, and context-specific definitions. One definition, for example, describes 
institutionalization as “[t]he process of integrating ADR processes into a community's formal, 
public system of justice,”14 clearly excluding many possible means of institutionalization. 
These varied definitions highlight the absence of a comprehensive understanding of 
“institutionalization.” Defining the term in a manner that encompasses all its basic and 
fundamental elements is essential to analyzing it coherently. The author of this dissertation 
therefore proposes the following definition: any effort, in the public, private or administrative 
sectors, led by governmental or non-governmental bodies, whether service-providing or not, that 
aims to streamline, regulate, formalize, supervise, or promote ADR, and/or to administrate or 
facilitate the use of any of its various mechanisms, or to provide support, advice, training or 
specialized expertise in the field, in any form or fashion that conforms with ADR objectives and 
serves its purposes.  
3. Public Institutionalization of ADR:  
Institutionalization in the public sphere refers to “[t]he process of making alternative forms 
of dispute resolution … part of a community's formal, public system of resolving disputes.”15     
                                                 
14 Monroe, supra note 6. 
15 Monroe, supra note 10; Institutionalization in the public system of justice can also be defined as the process of 
“[b]uilding systems within the court structure or through an outside but affiliated agency, that ‘[r]egularize the 
process by which ADR services are made available, or through which court personnel & potential users are asked 




The inability of courts to reduce caseloads and address other issues—including delays and the high 
cost of litigation—that impact the effectiveness of traditional systems of justice has forced 
legislative branches in many countries to find alternate ways to help judiciary systems cope with 
these concerns.16 Legislators have prompted national courts at different levels in many 
jurisdictions to design and implement various ADR programs for this purpose.17 The multi-door 
courthouse model proposed by Professor Frank E. A. Sander is an exemplary approach to the 
integration of ADR methods into formal court system structures, as pointed out in Chapter 2 of 
this dissertation. The implementation of Sander’s model would give disputants more dispute 
resolution options and improve the timeliness and cost-effectiveness of administering civil 
justice.18 It would also help courts effectively reduce caseloads, which, in turn, would improve 
access to justice.19  
Recent decades have witnessed a substantial increase in the use of ADR as governments in 
many countries have begun funding court-implemented ADR programs.20 This innovation 
unfolded in the United States in several stages during the late decades of the twentieth century, but 
the most substantial progress followed the enactment of the 1990 Civil Justice Reform Act 
(CJRA).21 This Act allocated government funding to federal district courts and encouraged them 
                                                 
to consider using ADR processes.’” F. E. A. SANDER ET AL., EMERGING ADR ISSUES IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 
97 (1991). 
16 GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON ADR, 7–9 (Carlos Esplugues Mota & Silvia Barona Vilar eds., 2014). 
17 DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS, supra note 10 at 26, 27; REGULATING DISPUTE RESOLUTION: ADR AND ACCESS 
TO JUSTICE AT THE CROSSROADS, (Felix Steffek et al. eds., 2013); DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL 
MODEL, 577–79 (Carrie Menkel-Meadow ed., 2nd ed. 2011); GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON ADR, supra note 16 at 1–
9. 
18 Sander, supra note 4; Monroe, supra note 12. 
19 Monroe, supra note 12; Sander, supra note 4.  
20 DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 17 at 577–79; Sander, supra note 4; Monroe, supra note 12. 
21 ADR in the Federal District Courts: An Initial Report | Federal Judicial Center, available at: 
https://www.fjc.gov/content/adr-federal-district-courts-initial-report-0 (last visited Apr 27, 2017). 




to take all necessary steps to reduce litigation time and expenses by adopting ADR methods.22 U.S. 
law did not, however, require that courts offer ADR until the enactment of the Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Act in 1998.23  
The provisions of the 1998 ADR Act stipulate that all federal district courts must allow the 
use of ADR methods in all civil lawsuits.24 The Act thus requires every court to formulate and 
execute ADR programs that foster, support, and facilitate the resort to ADR in its jurisdiction.25 
The Act also mandated that all existing court-connected ADR programs in federal district courts 
should, at the time of the enactment of the Act, undergo evaluation to gauge their efficiency and 
identify any changes necessary to align them with the law’s objectives.26 
The 1998 ADR Act clearly sought to promote the use of ADR within the court system, but 
the broad drafting of its provisions gave rise to several issues. First, the Act empowers courts to 
freely design and conduct their ADR programs as they deem proper and appropriate, providing no 
clear directions regarding how courts should plan and execute such programs. Second, the Act 
provides no framework for the evaluation process it mandates for programs that existed prior to its 
                                                 
22 Id. 
23 Id.; Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998; Section 2 of the Act reads: “Congress finds that-- 
(1) alternative dispute resolution, when supported by the bench and bar, and utilizing properly trained neutrals in a 
program adequately administered by the court, has the potential to provide a variety of benefits, including greater 
satisfaction of the parties, innovative methods of resolving disputes, and greater efficiency in achieving settlements; 
(2) certain forms of alternative dispute resolution, including mediation, early neutral evaluation, mini trials, and 
voluntary arbitration, may have potential to reduce the large backlog of cases now pending in some federal courts 
throughout the United States, thereby allowing the courts to process their remaining cases more efficiently; and 
(3) the continued growth of Federal appellate court-annexed mediation programs suggests that this form of alternative 
dispute resolution can be equally effective in resolving disputes in the federal trial courts; therefore, the district 
courts should consider including mediation in their local alternative dispute resolution programs.” Id.; see also 
REGULATING DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 17 at 434–38. 
24 Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, § 3. 
25 Id.; for more information regarding the ADR rules of all federal district courts, see Compendium of Federal District 
Courts’ Local ADR Rules | OLP | Department of Justice, available at: https://www.justice.gov/olp/compendium-
federal-district-courts-local-adr-rules (last visited May 2, 2017); see also ADR in the Federal District Courts-
District-by-District Summaries, available at: https://www.justice.gov/olp/file/827536/download (last visited May 
2, 2017). 
26 Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, § 3. 




passage. Courts could therefore use different assessment methods, making it difficult to determine 
the success or failure of a given program. Finally, these varied evaluation methods could yield 
unclear results regarding the country’s best models and practices and the standards for program or 
practice efficiency and effectiveness. Such imprecise outcomes surely will not help accomplish 
the statutory objectives.  
The 1998 Act thus grants courts broad authority in fulfilling the obligations it specifies. 
Some might view this pliability as one of the Act’s advantages, but the potential variations in 
practices produced by courts’ contrasting interpretations of the Act’s provisions could create 
problems. It could result in some successful practices in some jurisdictions and unsuccessful 
practices in others. 
A recent study shows that mediation and arbitration are the most used and preferred 
alternatives to litigation in a number of courts.27 The court-connected mediation and arbitration 
programs in Florida state courts—designed, implemented, and made accessible to parties 
beginning in 1988—are great examples of effective U.S. court ADR programs.28 Courts refer cases 
                                                 
27 ADR in the Federal District Courts: An Initial Report | Federal Judicial Center, supra note 22; the study shows that: 
“… ADR is now an established part of many districts’, or many judges’, regular case management practices. Even 
so, of course, ADR use varies from district to district.” Id. The study also finds that “Although … no district courts 
authorize only arbitration … twenty-three districts, or nearly a quarter, include it among other forms of authorized 
ADR. Among these twenty-three districts are seven of the ten that were authorized in 1988 to mandate use of 
arbitration and seven of the ten that were authorized to offer voluntary use of arbitration; nine additional courts 
authorize use of this procedure. Today only three of the ten mandatory arbitration districts continue to require use 
of arbitration for the full portion of their caseload that meets the statutory requirements; four others have made 
arbitration an ADR option, and three no longer authorize this procedure.” Id. It also reveals that: “For each of the 
three distinct types of ADR—mediation, arbitration, and ENE—the majority of districts authorize some degree of 
required use, either by giving judges the authority to refer cases on their own initiative without party consent or by 
mandating referral for some or all civil cases. This approach is especially apparent for mediation, where fifty-eight 
districts authorize required use of mediation, including twelve districts that mandate use (that is, referral is automatic 
for all or a specified set of cases). Judges have authority to order ADR in half the districts that authorize ENE as 
well, and in half of those that provide general authorization to use ADR.” Id.; see generally ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: ANALYSIS & CASE STUDIES, (Otto J. Hetzel, Steven Gonzales, & 
American Bar Association eds., 2015). 
28 Recommendations for Alternative Dispute Resolution Services in Florida’s Trial Courts, (2008), 
http://www.flcourts.org/publications-reports-stats/publications/ (last visited Apr 29, 2017).  For more examples 




to ADR in conformity with Section 44 of the Florida Statutes, which authorize judges to divert 
disputes into mediation and arbitration.29 This legislation has enabled court-connected ADR 
programs to prosper to the degree that all parties involved in these processes, including the bench 
and the bar and the disputants themselves, now agree to first attempt to resolve cases using ADR 
methods, and only set hearing dates if those methods prove ineffective.30 Data suggests that court-
based ADR programs have succeeded in Florida: the number of cases diverted into ADR increased 
from 103,494 in 2006-200731 to 121,938 in 2009-2010,32 and has continued to increase steadily 
ever since.33  
Available data and empirical studies indicate that ADR programs have succeeded in many 
U.S. courts of different levels.34 The following remarks, nonetheless, warrant attention: 
                                                 
about court-connected ADR programs, see generally ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS, supra note 27. 
29 Id.; the full text of the Florida Statutes can be accessed at: https://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes (last visited 
Apr 29, 2017). 
30 Recommendations for Alternative Dispute Resolution Services in Florida’s Trial Courts, supra note 28. 
31 Id. 
32 Uniform Data Reporting Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs: Cases Ordered Fiscal Year 2009-10, available 
at: http://www.flcourts.org/core/fileparse.php/250/urlt/UDRMediationFY09-10.pdf (last visited Apr 29, 2017). 
33 More recent statistics and data regarding case referral to ADR in Florida courts are available at: Uniform Data 
Reporting, available at: 
  http://www.flcourts.org/publications-reports-stats/statistics/uniform-data-reporting.stml#ADR (last visited Apr 29, 
2017); some scholars have raised concerns regarding court-linked ADR program practices in the U.S. see for 
example, Louise Phipps Senft & Cynthia A. Savage, ADR in the courts: Progress, problems, and possibilities, 108 
PENN ST REV 327 (2003). 
34 See for example, Nicole L. Waters & Michael Sweikar, Efficient and Successful ADR in Appellate Courts: What 
Matters Most?,  (2006); see also Recommendations for Alternative Dispute Resolution Services in Florida’s Trial 
Courts, supra note 28.; court-connected ADR has been an established practice in Florida state for many decades. 
The main progress in this regard occurred after the implementation of the amendments to Section 44 of the Florida 
Statutes, which granted judges the power of case referral to ADR. Id. The court-based mediation program in the 
state of Florida has become one of the best programs nationwide. Id.; but see Wayne D. Brazil, Court ADR 25 years 
after Pound: Have we found a better way, 18 OHIO ST J DISP RESOL 93 (2002); Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the 
limits of court-connected ADR: a critique of federal court-annexed arbitration programs, 141 UNIV. PA. LAW REV. 
2169–2259 (1993); but see Nancy A. Welsh, The Current Transitional State of Court-Connected ADR The Future 
of Court ADR: Mediation and Beyond, 95 MARQUETTE LAW REV. 873–886 (2011); ("Court ADR is no longer an 
innovation and has existed long enough to develop its own bureaucracy. Over the past ten years, however, court 
administrators and scholars have repeatedly reported that all was not well. They detailed significant reductions in 
court ADR staffing and in the amount of time parties are expected to spend in mediation, threats to cut ADR 
programs unless they could justify themselves as ‘core’ to the mission of the courts, and pressures to produce high 
settlement rates. Some proponents of family-court ADR have urged a move away from mediation and toward hybrid 




[T]he State of California has now established a significant base in the 
institutionalization of ADR, but several key challenges remain. Will legislators and 
other State officials be able to expand upon this base in a manner that will be at 
once reasonable, politically acceptable, and salutary for the resolution of a large 
number of conflicts? Can we avoid making ADR a second-class system of justice 
for the [nonaffluent]? And finally, as institutionalization of ADR advances, will it 
survive its success, or will it join the court system it supplements in “suffer[ing] 
from the woes common to other heavily used institutions—increasing costs and 
delays, bureaucratization, and perfunctory performance?”35 
 
These questions remain valid and worthy of consideration; however, the positive findings of many 
studies and related periodic assessments have continued to strengthen support for the 
institutionalization of ADR in the U.S., providing clear justification for its importance and 
effectiveness and highlighting the increasing demand for court-instituted ADR.36 
Traditional courts in England and Wales began designing and implementing ADR between 
the last decade of the twentieth century and the early years of the twenty first century.37 The Central 
London County Court, for example, launched the first court-instituted mediation program in 1996, 
and other courts subsequently established similar platforms.38 These programs were initially non-
mandatory; the government later encouraged their development, supplied funding, and subjected 
them to assessments with the aim of fostering the use of ADR and making it workable within the 
formal system of justice.39 The Central London County Court established a one-year program for 
                                                 
ADR processes that pair strongly evaluative or adjudicative functions with facilitative or mediative functions, in 
order to assure finality. Obviously, such developments could threaten the primacy of, and courts' support for, 
mediation.”) Id.; see also Yishai Boyarin, COURT‐CONNECTED ADR—A TIME OF CRISIS, A TIME OF 
CHANGE, 50 FAM. COURT REV. 377–404 (2012). 
35 Monroe, supra note 6; see also GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 8 at 46–50. 
36 Nicole L. Waters & Michael Sweikar, Efficient and Successful ADR in Appellate Courts: What Matters Most?,  
(2006); for more information about ADR in the U.S. courts, see Alternative Dispute Resolution in the United States 
District Courts | Federal Judicial Center, available at: 
https://www.fjc.gov/content/alternative-dispute-resolution-united-states-district-courts-english-original (last 
visited May 4, 2017).  
37 REGULATING DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 17 at 141–44. 
38 Id. at 141–44. 
39 Id. at 144–48.; Hazel Genn et al., Twisting arms: court referred and court linked mediation under judicial pressure, 
1 MINIST. JUSTICE RES. SER. (2007). 




obligatory court-instituted mediation in 2004 that diverted disputes directly into mediation.40 
Disputants could oppose these referrals, but unjustifiable objections would result in the imposition 
of monetary penalties against objectors.41 This initiative did not, unfortunately, have the expected 
outcome; data at the time showed major opposition to the mandatory diversion to mediation, and, 
as evidence of its lack of success, this proved sufficient justification for terminating the program.42  
A report evaluating voluntary and mandatory ADR schemes in the Central London County 
Court shows that these practices generated many valuable lessons that can aid in designing future 
programs.43 First, disputant readiness and enthusiasm for settling disputes can significantly impact 
the accomplishment of desired dispute resolution objectives in mediation.44 Parties should be 
encouraged to use mediation and assisted in doing so without feeling unduly pressured.45 Second, 
lawyers have clearly made great progress over the years in understanding mediation, but many 
remain unpersuaded of mediation’s effectiveness in resolving various conflicts.46 Third, courts 
need to develop new and more creative ways to communicate with the disputants to promote the 
use of ADR.47 Finally, cultivating interest and desire in using ADR processes is crucial to the 
success of court-instituted ADR; courts can accomplish this via educational and motivational 
initiatives and by facilitating the use of ADR.48 
                                                 
40 REGULATING DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 17 at 144–48. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Genn et al., supra note 39. 
44 Id. 
45 Id.; see also REGULATING DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 17 at 147, 148. (“Put simply, cases are more likely to 
settle at mediation if the parties enter the process voluntarily rather than being pressured into the process, and 
increased pressure to mediate depresses settlement rates.”) Id. at 148. 
46 Genn et al., supra note 39. 
47 Id. 
48 Id.; The report also emphasizes the following: “The evidence of this report suggests that an effective mediation-
promotion policy might combine education and encouragement through communication of information to parties 
involved in litigation; facilitation through the provision of efficient administration and good quality mediation 
facilities; and well-targeted direction in individual and appropriate cases by trained judiciary, involving some 




 The findings of this report support the contentions of certain scholars that all parties 
involved in disputes—from legislators to governmental authorities to judges and lawyers to neutral 
third parties and, of course, the disputants themselves—play significant roles in court instituted 
ADR.49 50 Their combined efforts contribute to the success of the process—achieving the desired 
results. This will eventually improve access to justice considerably; confidence in court-instituted 
ADR will increase as disputants become more aware of the efficiency of these techniques, which 
will increase demand for these procedures and programs. Education and training are essential to 
ensure the effective operation of implemented programs. The provision of funds for court-based 
ADR programs also contributes significantly to their success, as Frank Sander emphasizes and 
other scholars recognize.51 Wayne D. Brazil asserts the following: 
In this area, institutionalization should mean, among other things, building in, from 
the outset, structural support (financial and administrative) that will fully meet the 
needs of the program and that is not dependent on the energy and interest of any 
one human being or small group of human beings.52 
 
                                                 
assessment of contraindications for a positive outcome. A critical policy challenge is to identify and articulate the 
incentives for legal advisers to embrace mediation on behalf of their clients.” Id. 
49 Bobbi McAdoo, Nancy A. Welsh & Roselle L. Wissler, Institutionalization: What do empirical studies tell us about 
court mediation, 21 GPSOLO 34 (2004). 
50 Id.; this article provides, for example, comprehensive recommendations regarding how future court ADR programs 
should be structured or designed and how to enhance current programs. It asserts that “… mediation programs that 
obtain the input and support of the bench and the bar and that involve mandatory consideration or mandatory referral 
are more likely to be successfully institutionalized.” Id. It also concludes that third parties should encourage 
disputants and their representatives to cooperatively participate in the process. Id. The article then explains the role 
of the bar in making the process successful. Id. It also provides some recommendations for enhancing recourse to 
court instituted ADR programs such as urging the judges and lawyers in each society to design programs that reflect 
their traditional practices of law. Id.; Another study concludes that “… successful resolutions are more often in 
court-sponsored ADR programs in which the court commits to overseeing the program.” Waters and Sweikar, supra 
note 36. Brian Dorini, Institutionalizing ADR: Wagshal v. Foster and Mediator Immunity, 1 HARV NEGOT REV 185 
(1996). For more information regarding the importance of the role of legislators and legislation in the development 
of the institutionalization of ADR, see generally ADR in the Federal District Courts: An Initial Report | Federal 
Judicial Center, supra note 21. see also Monroe, supra note 12. see also Senft and Savage, supra note 33.  
51 SANDER ET AL., supra note 16 at 106; Steven Gonzales draws the following conclusion from his observations of 
different examples of ADR programs: "The real lesson may simply be that ADR programs will stall and fail to 
progress until sufficient funding is secured. They simply cannot grow beyond a certain level based solely on 
volunteer labor, no matter how well intentioned that support may be." ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN STATE 
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, supra note 27 at 98. 
52 Id. at 57, 58. 




This assertion acknowledges the importance of both administrative and financial support in any 
practice. The lack of both efficient administration and adequate financial sources will obviously 
result in the failure of any court-based ADR program.53 The crucial importance of administrative 
preparations for potential challenges and obstacles resulting from the implementation of ADR 
programs in securing successful institutionalization warrants mention alongside the monetary 
support provided by governments.54   
4. Institutionalization for ADR Promotion and Development: 
Many governments have supported and promoted ADR in recent decades. They have 
sought to implement statutes encouraging and promoting the use of ADR generally in their 
countries or specifically within their public systems of justice. Governments have sought to 
accomplish these aims by, for example, establishing new governmental bodies or assigning 
existing institutions to facilitate the expansion of ADR. They have also participated in creating 
new quasi-governmental or independent bodies whose functions they then recognize and support 
in various ways. These nonprofit institutions generally do not provide ADR services to private 
                                                 
53 Id.  
54 In this context, see Id. at 89–92.; Frank Sander highlights the importance of considering concerns and possible 
consequences of ADR institutionalization within the court system as follows: “In designing our programs we should 
strive to identify as many of the negative effects of institutionalization as possible, then build in a measures to 
prevent or correct them.” Id. at 90. He also explains that institutionalization can have major impacts as it can expose 
many parties to consequences beyond the ADR programs themselves: “Institutionalizing ADR programs could have 
negative effects on courts, on lawyers and litigants, on the neutrals, and on the ADR processes themselves. For 
example, once an ADR program is institutionalized for certain kinds of cases, judges might be tempted to shift their 
energy and attention away from those cases and toward other matters. In some circumstances, that loss of judicial 
attention could result in serious harm to the efficiency and fairness of the pretrial process. It also could result in 
second-class judicial service for entire categories of cases.” Id. He therefore proposes the following administrative 
measures to protect the process of institutionalizing ADR and all involved parties: “To avoid these pitfalls, ADR 
program designers should plan periodic reviews of the ways the cases assigned to the program are handled in the 
formal adjudicatory process. Id. He concludes with the following remarks: “… Just as we are recognizing that 
‘institutionalization’ is essential to realizing the full potential of ADR, we must also recognize that it could threaten 
the spirit that has been so central to the innovation in this movement.” Id. at 92.   




persons; they primarily provide support, expertise, counseling, and training to service-providing 
bodies. 
4.1 The Federal Judicial Center of the United States 
The ADR Act of 1998 entitled The Federal Judicial Center (FJC) and the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts to support the U.S. federal district courts in achieving optimal 
results in fulfilling their statutory obligations by creating and developing ADR programs.55 The 
Federal Judicial Center was founded in 1967 to advance progress in implementing enhanced 
judicial management in the U.S. courts.56 The law authorizes it to, for example, to conduct research 
regarding the courts’ functionality and to design and offer trainings to all persons involved in the 
public system of justice, including neutral third parties conducting ADR processes.57 The Center 
thus serves as an educational and research arm of the judicial branch of the U.S. government.58  
The Center drafted and publicized a procedural handbook on ADR in 2001 to provide the 
courts guidance regarding proper procedures for referring cases to ADR and managing said 
cases.59 The “Guide to Judicial Management of Cases in ADR” provides detailed explanations of 
matters related to court-ordered ADR processes and offers solutions and answers to several 
                                                 
55 Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, § 3 (f). 
56 28 U.S.C. § 620. 
57 Id. 
58 The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts was created in 1939 to supervise the administrative affairs of judicial 
bodies; however,   special body, the FJC, conducted research and education tasks to avoid overloading the AO with 
other new functions that might hamper its performance of its core tasks. This separation would also protect the funds 
allocated to carry out these functions from being diverted to other spending channels. See The  Federal  Judicial 
Center, Education and Research For The U.S. Federal Court, 
available at: https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2015/About-FJC-English-2014-10-07.pdf (last visited May 5, 
2017); see also Federal Judicial Center, available at: https://www.fjc.gov/ (last visited May 5, 2017).  
59 Guide to Judicial Management of Cases in ADR (2001), available at: 
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/ADRGuide.pdf (last visited May 5, 2017); see also Federal Judicial 
Center, supra note 58. 




potential questions and problems that may arise prior to or during ADR processes.60 The Center 
also completed a cost-effectiveness analysis of court-based ADR programs in federal district 
courts in 2015,61 at the request of two Judicial Conference of the United States committees62—the 
Committee on Court Administration and Case Management and the Judicial Resources 
Committee.63 The study involved extensive data collection and analyses of numerous U.S. court 
cases, as well as interviews with judges, judicial officers, lawyers, and ADR practitioners.64 Note 
that the center has no regulatory role and functions primarily to provide precise, impartial input 
and information, and to scrutinize various aspects of the judicial system including its performance, 
strategies, programs, and processes.65 
The Federal Judicial Center thus plays a vital and unique role in the process of 
implementing court-annexed ADR schemes. It provides essential logistical support to help courts 
achieve the statutory goals of improving the court system in general and increasing access to 
justice. Other jurisdictions including Saudi Arabia should seriously consider following in the 
footsteps of the United States by creating bodies similar to the Federal Judicial Center for many 
reasons. First, such institutions can facilitate comprehensive evaluation and assessment of court 
ADR programs by collecting and analyzing relevant data to gauge their success and efficiency. 
                                                 
60 Guide to Judicial Management of Cases in ADR (2001), supra note 59. 
61 Federal Judicial Center Annual Report 2015, available at: 
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/materials/2017/Annual-Report-2015.pdf (last visited May 6, 2017). 
62 “The Judicial Conference of the United States is the national policy-making body for the federal courts.” See 
Governance & the Judicial Conference, UNITED STATES COURTS, available at: http://www.uscourts.gov/about-
federal-courts/governance-judicial-conference (last visited May 6, 2017). 
63 Federal Judicial Center Annual Report 2015, supra note 61. 
64 Id. 
65 The center receives a budget from the government to cover its expenses. The center’s 2016 budget was about $28 
million. See Federal Judicial Center Annual Report 2016, available at: https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/FJC-
Annual-Report-2016.pdf (last visited May 6, 2017); For more information about the role of this center and its tasks, 
see Federal Judicial Center, supra note 58.; see also The  Federal  Judicial Center, Education and Research For The 
U.S. Federal Court, supra note 58. 




Second, they can use these assessments to outline visions for the future of court ADR programs. 
This includes identifying strengths to be maximized, difficulties to be surmounted, and weaknesses 
to be overcome or rectified, as well as suggesting needed improvements. Finally, assigning the 
abovementioned tasks to bodies other than the courts can enable the courts to focus more fully on 
effectively running the implemented ADR programs.  
4.2 The Civil Mediation Council of England and Wales 
The English have also undertaken institutionalization efforts that aim to promote and 
develop ADR. A joint effort by the government and other parties, including practitioners, yielded 
a positive result—the establishment of The Civil Mediation Council (CMC) in 2003.66 The CMC 
has received recognition as a national authority for the mediation of all type of disputes except for 
family-related matters since its establishment.67 The Board of Members, including an official of 
the Ministry of Justice who represents the government body as a member of the Council, supervises 
the Council’s activities.68 The CMC’s constitution outlines the following objectives: to promote 
ADR, to advance improvements in the legal system, and to enhance the system of justice by 
fostering competence and ensuring accessibility.69 It also aims to “create a culture of good practice 
                                                 
66 FIONA COWNIE, ANTHONY BRADNEY & MANDY BURTON, ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM IN CONTEXT 197 (6th ed. 2013). 
67 Civil Mediation Council, available at: http://www.civilmediation.org/ (last visited May 7, 2017); REGULATING 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 18 at 168–71.GLOBAL TRENDS IN MEDIATION, 173, 174 (Nadja Marie Alexander 
ed., 2nd ed. 2006); The Family Mediation Council in England and Wales (FMC) serves as the coordinating body 
for all family mediation for service-providing members. “It publishes a code of practice, provides initial training 
and continuing professional development.” Id. at 171; see also FAMILY MEDIATION COUNCIL, available at: 
https://www.familymediationcouncil.org.uk/ (last visited May 7, 2017). The government supports the role of the 
FMC in many ways, including by providing the council with financial support and public funding to ensure it 
functions properly and achieves its objectives. The FMC annual report for 2016 states that the council receives £ 
150.000 from the government every year after the agreement signed between the FMC and the Ministry of Justice 
in 2014. See FMC & FMSB Annual Reports and FMC Accounts 2016, FAMILY MEDIATION COUNCIL (2017), 
available at: https://www.familymediationcouncil.org.uk/2017/08/11/fmc-fmsb-annual-reports-fmc-accounts-
2016/ (last visited Sep 9, 2017). 
68 The CMC Constitution, available at: civilmediation.org/downloads-get?id=357 (last visited May 7, 2017). 
69 Id. 




by encouraging research, continuing education and quality standards in the field; by issuing codes 
of good practice; and by conducting accreditation of mediation providers and through them 
individual mediators.”70 The CMC also strives to provide reliable provenance information about 
ADR to those interested, including government bodies.71 It works to accomplish these objectives 
by building bridges of communication with governmental bodies, practitioners, and ADR service 
providers.72 The CMC does not play a supervisory role, but many believe its membership 
regulations have greatly contributed to making the ADR practices of its members more uniform.73 
Two examples of the government support for the CMC are particularly noteworthy. The 
first is the launching of an online service called the Civil Mediation Directory by the Ministry of 
Justice. The creation of this useful directory—listing all practitioner members by region and 
available to anyone searching for service providers at reasonable fixed costs throughout the 
country—testifies to the government’s commitment to promoting the use of ADR.74 The 
government further demonstrates its support for the CMC by requiring that all service providers 
in this directory receive CMC accreditation.75 The second example of government support is the 
presence of government representation on the CMC’s Board of Members, discussed above.76  
                                                 
70 Id.; see also MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND REGULATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, 371 (Klaus J. Hopt & Felix 
Steffek eds., 1st ed. 2013); (“[The CMC] carries out a level of voluntary private regulation by issuing guidance 
notes for practitioners, maintaining a list of accredited mediation providers, and running a complaints resolution 
service.”) Id.   
71 The CMC Constitution, supra note 68. 
72 Id. 
73 PENNY BROOKER, MEDIATION LAW: JOURNEY THROUGH INSTITUTIONALISM TO JURIDIFICATION 183 (2013); see also   
REGULATING DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 18 at 168–171; ("The CMC … provide[s] accreditation schemes for 
mediation providers which require the providers to demonstrate that their schemes meet the requirements regarding 
adequate training and insurance, supervision and mentoring, efficient administration and allocation of mediators, 
and the adoption of a code of conduct. Thus the CMC takes on a quasi-regulatory role.”) Id. at 169.      
74 See the Civil Mediation Directory, available at: http://civilmediation.justice.gov.uk/ 
75 Id.; see also COWNIE, BRADNEY, AND BURTON, supra note 66 at 197. 
76 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 




Several issues warrant emphasis here. First, the government’s recognition of the role 
played by ADR authorities in promoting the use of the various ADR techniques is very significant. 
Such recognition, for example, facilitated the establishment of the CMC and other similar bodies 
in the UK, as previously pointed out. Second, established ADR-related entities must acquire all 
possible means of governmental support to successfully perform their tasks. The UK Ministry of 
Justice’s requirement that all providers receive CMC accreditation exemplifies how government 
support boosts the authority of such entities by reflecting the government’s confidence in their 
criteria. Finally, enhancing the justice system in any jurisdiction by promoting ADR and its use 
requires collaboration between governments and entities committed to promoting ADR and its 
continued development. Such collaboration will indeed produce significant consequences—better 
results in a shorter time.    
5. Administrative Institutionalization of ADR: 
Government efforts to institutionalize ADR in official bodies are another dimension of 
governmental support for ADR. A large number of government-involved cases stem from various 
types of administrative disputes, including contractual consumer disputes, employment-related 
cases, and other disputes with private persons.77 Resolving government-involved disputes in the 
courts, as with other types of cases, is time consuming, costly, and increases government 
                                                 
77 DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS, supra note 10 at 817, 818. (“ADR has seen explosive growth in administrative 
agencies. … One reason might be the extraordinary number and range of disputes with which administrative 
agencies get involved. One class of disputes includes those that arise during the course of the fulfillment of their 
statutory regulatory obligations. … However, agencies are also involved in disputes in their capacity as employers, 
and most federal agencies now have alternative dispute resolution programs for the handling of such claims. Finally, 
administrative agencies are involved in disputes in their capacity as consumers of good and services, and have made 
extensive use of ADR  to resolve public contract disputes.”) Id at 817. 




expenditures; parties should therefore seek to avoid court adjudication in such cases.78 These issues 
have fueled efforts to institutionalize ADR in the administrative sector. Such efforts, in many 
jurisdictions around the world, thus aim to improve administrative justice and to enhance 
accessibility to it under the umbrella of administrative law. The achievement of these objectives 
will have significant positive impacts for both public and private sectors.  
The United States, again, provides an illuminating example. The large number of cases 
related to administrative disputes compared to the number of other cases filed in federal courts led 
the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) to recognize in one of its 1986 
recommendations that government agencies needed to adopt ADR, which had proved effective in 
the private arena.79 The absence of a legislative umbrella, however, prevented the government 
from mandating the use of ADR, especially if its use conflicted with an agency’s statutory 
framework.80 The lack of such a mandate contributed to a continual increase in the number of cases 
filed in court involving the government or any of its bodies. The government, for instance, was 
                                                 
78 142 Cong. Rec. (Bound) - Volume 142, Part 10 (June 10, 1996 to June 21, 1996); JEFFREY M. SENGER, FEDERAL 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: USING ADR WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 1–10 (1st ed. 2004). 
79 1986 ACUS Rec. 86-3; Recommendation 86-3/A states: “1- Administrative agencies, where not inconsistent with 
statutory authority, should adopt the alternative methods … 2- Congress and the courts should not inhibit agency 
uses of the ADR techniques mentioned herein by requiring formality where it is inappropriate.” Id.; the full text of 
1986 ACUS report can be accessed at: ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS 
AND REPORTS, (1986), available at: http://archive.org/details/gov.acus.1986.rec (last visited Oct 8, 2017). For a brief 
history of the administrative dispute resolution system, see Henry H. Perritt Jr, Administrative alternative dispute 
resolution: the development of negotiated rulemaking and other processes, 14 PEPP REV 863 (1986). The author 
notes the following regarding the necessity of ADR institutionalization in the administrative sphere:  
“A built-in conflict exists in the search for meaningful administrative ADR. On the one hand, meaningful 
simplification of procedure is unlikely to extend very far unless it is institutionalized to facilitate the transfer of 
information about what works well, and to reduce the transaction costs of setting up a rule negotiation or an 
adjudicatory ADR technique. Such institutionalization is consistent with the maxim that the government should be 
"of laws, not of men." Many of the advantages of ADR, however, depend on the personal skills of a mediator, the 
sensitivity of a policy maker to the real needs of interest groups, and the creativity of an administrative lawyer in 
structuring a process that serves the spirit of the APA and the substantive statute. Too much institutionalization 
makes it difficult to bring these inherently personal traits to bear on particular problems.” Id. 
80 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 79. 




named as a party in about twenty five percent of all cases filed in federal courts during the last 
years of the 1980s.81 Senator Carl Levin once noted: 
It's a fact of life that many people have disputes with the Federal Government. In 
the late 1980's, of the 220,000 civil cases filed on Federal court, more than 55,000 
involved the Federal Government in one way or another. Resolving these disputes 
costs taxpayers billions of dollars.82 
 
The failure to deal with such issues in an effective and timely manner can cost governments dearly 
and cause harm to both administrative systems and national economies, which the potential 
consequences of disregarding such dangers and warnings can seriously affect.83 Legislators have 
therefore proposed using ADR in government agencies to resolve all administrative disputes and 
avoid these dilemmas.84 Government agencies’ use of ADR to resolve administrative disputes thus 
served as a tool of legal reform in this area, where ADR has expanded significantly in recent 
years.85 Government authorities seeking to identify the most cost-effective and efficient ways to 
resolve such disputes have, over time, come to recognize the suitability of ADR for resolving 
“appropriate cases”86 of administrative disputes.87 
                                                 
81 142 Cong. Rec. (Bound) Volume 142, Part 10 (June 10, 1996 to June 21, 1996), supra note 79. 
82 Id. 
83 See generally Id. 
84 Id.; Senator Levin suggests: “Resolving [Government-involved disputes] before they become courtroom dramas is 
one way to make a dent in this billion-dollar drain on taxpayer funds. Mediation, arbitration, mini-trials, and other 
methods offer cheaper, faster alternatives to courtroom battles.” Id.  
85 SENGER, supra note 78 at 1–10. 
86 On January 9, 2017, the Attorney General issued a report titled: “2016 Report on Significant Developments in 
Federal Alternative Dispute Resolution” which was an update to the report which was submitted in 2007. See 2007 
Report for the President on the Use and Results of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Executive Branch of the 
Federal Government: Giving the American People Better Results and More Value, available at: 
https://www.adr.gov/pdf/iadrsc_press_report_final.pdf (last visited Apr 27, 2018) [hereinafter, the 2007 Report]. 
The updated report concludes that despite the fact that ADR has proved an efficient means of dispute resolution in 
many cases, resorting to ADR may not be appropriate in certain cases. The report explains: “Since the interests of 
the United States often are unique and may involve many interested parties, federal officials must resolve cases in 
ways that will not undermine important positions, jurisdictional defenses, or policy interests. However, federal 
agencies are finding that, in appropriate cases, alternative dispute resolution is a cost-effective and time-efficient 
option which can give parties control over the outcome and involve stakeholders in decisions that affect them.” See 
2016 Report on Significant Developments in Federal Alternative Dispute Resolution, available at: 
https://www.adr.gov/pdf/2016-adr-rpt.pdf (last visited Apr 27, 2018) [hereinafter, the 2016 Report]. 
87 Id. 




The ADR legal framework for administrative disputes in the U.S. consists of three main 
elements: first, the legislation that authorizes governmental agencies to use ADR to resolve 
administrative disputes (the legislative step); second, the assigned governmental authority tasked 
with promoting the use of ADR in the administrative arena (the promoting body); and third, the 
supervision and assessment of the use of ADR by the concerned governmental bodies (supervision 
and evaluation process). Accomplishing the latter may, for example, involve periodically 
evaluating the designed ADR programs and the effectiveness of their implementation as well as 
closely monitoring any progress made in this area.  
5.1 The Legislative Steps: 
The U.S Congress enacted several laws to promote the use of ADR in the administrative 
sector in the last decade of the twentieth century.88 These included the Administrative Dispute 
Resolution Act of 1990 (ADRA of 1990)89 and the amended Administrative Dispute Resolution 
Act of 1996 (ADRA of 1996).90 Legislators enacted these laws to promote ADR in the 
administrative sector with the aim of ensuring the sector’s optimal performance, success, and 
growth. They also sought to ensure the successful use of ADR and the effectiveness of the various 
ADR methods within the administrative law system. 
Analysis of the legislative history of ADR in the U.S. administrative sector yields several 
noteworthy points. First of all, legislators attempting to achieve the objectives mentioned above 
adopted a gradual legislative approach from the outset—beginning with the enactment of the first 
legislation in this area. Second, this gradual approach proved effective in progressively introducing 
                                                 
88 See 2007 Report supra note 87.  
89 See Infra note 91-103 and accompanying text. 
90 See Infra note 104-11 and accompanying text. 




major reforms to the administrative sector. The shift from complete reliance on litigation to the 
effective use of ADR represents a fundamental transformation of the field that legislators 
accomplished in a smooth and efficient manner. Finally, the gradual transition from legislatively 
encouraging ADR to making it a legal requirement served many purposes; it ensured, for example, 
that all federal agencies accepted and implemented the new methods of dispute resolution without 
any resistance.  
5.1.1 The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990 
The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act (ADRA) of 1990 was the first legislative step 
permitting governmental agencies to use various means of ADR in resolving disputes with the 
consent of the parties.91 The enactment of this Act resulted from congressional recognition of the 
inefficiency of administrative litigation resulting from the great complexity and increasing costs 
and durations of trials. Congress recognized the effectiveness of the ADR and its success in the 
private sphere and, therefore, aimed to improve government performance by encouraging 
government agencies to benefit from ADR methods.92 Section 3 of the ADRA of 1990 sought to 
                                                 
91 ADRA of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-583 (1994)) [hereinafter, ADRA 
of 1990]. 
92 Id. § 2; Section 2 states: “The Congress finds that—  
(1) administrative procedure, as embodied in chapter 5 of title 5, United States Code, and other statutes, is intended to 
offer a prompt, expert, and inexpensive means of resolving disputes as an alternative to litigation in the Federal 
courts;  
(2) administrative proceedings have become increasingly  
formal, costly, and lengthy resulting in unnecessary expenditures of time and in a decreased likelihood of achieving 
consensual resolution of disputes;  
(3) alternative means of dispute resolution have been used in the private sector for many years and, in appropriate 
circumstances, have yielded decisions that are faster, less expensive, and less contentious;  
(4) such alternative means can lead to more creative, efficient, and sensible outcomes;  
(5) such alternative means may be used advantageously in a wide variety of administrative programs;  
(6) explicit authorization of the use of well-tested dispute resolution techniques will eliminate ambiguity of agency 
authority under existing law;  
(7) Federal agencies may not only receive the benefit of techniques that were developed in the private sector, but may 
also take the lead in the further development and refinement of  
such techniques; and  




accomplish this aim by requiring all federal agencies to perform several tasks. First, it required 
that each agency implement an ADR policy declaring and clarifying the use of its various 
techniques.93 Second, the section sought to ensure the proper implementation of ADR policies by 
requiring all federal agencies to create a new role titled Dispute Resolution Specialist and assign a 
“senior official” to that position to oversee the proper application of both the ADRA of 1990 and 
the agency’s ADR policy.94 Third, Section 3 stipulated that each federal agency should regularly 
offer and implement ADR training programs for employees to improve their performance and 
sharpen their skills in the field. The section indicated that the agencies should design these training 
programs for dispute resolution specialists and other employees involved with ADR policy and 
encourage these individuals to participate.95 Finally, the section required all federal agencies to 
revise their standard form contracts and make all the necessary amendments to reflect the agency’s 
newly implemented ADR policy by authorizing and encouraging disputing parties to resort to 
ADR.96 
Section 4 of the ADRA of 1990 amended the Administrative Procedure Act,97 adding 
definitions for several terms including alternative dispute resolution.98 It also gave all federal 
agencies the authority to use its means for resolving disputes.99 It conditioned this authorization 
                                                 
(8) the availability of a wide range of dispute resolution procedures, and an increased understanding of the most 
effective use of such procedures, will enhance the operation of the  
Government and better serve the public.” Id. 




97 5 U.S.C. §551 (1994). 
98 Id. §581. The Act contains various ADR-related terms and definitions, including the following definition of ADR: 
“any procedure that is used, in lieu of an adjudication … to resolve issues in controversy, including but not limited 
to, settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, fact finding, mini trials, and arbitration, or any 
combination thereof.” Id. § 581. 
99 Id. §582. 




on the consent of the disputing parties, however, and also specified certain cases in which federal 
agencies could not utilize ADR.100 The Act also authorized the use of arbitration to resolve disputes 
of administrative nature if all parties agreed to arbitrate the disputed matter.101 
The most distinctive feature of the ADRA of 1990 was its voluntary nature, granting federal 
agencies broad discretion in fulfilling their statutory tasks. The language used in drafting the Act’s 
provisions granted federal agencies flexibility in exploring, testing, using and even developing the 
various techniques of ADR specified by the Act. Section 582, for example, states: “c) Alternative 
means of dispute resolution authorized under this subchapter are voluntary procedures which 
supplement rather than limit other available agency dispute resolution techniques.”102 Such 
language clearly indicates that the legislators passed the Act to test the waters rather than fully 
committing to using ADR in the administrative law system at this initial stage. This gradual 
approach, as pointed out earlier, ensured that concerned agencies properly implemented the new 
dispute resolution system and monitored their practices and performance under the newly enacted 
legislation. Legislators also designed the Act as a means of observing the effectiveness of ADR 
                                                 
100 Id.; Section 582 Section reads: “(a) An agency may use a dispute resolution proceeding for the resolution of an 
issue in controversy that relates to an administrative program, if the parties agree to such proceeding.  
(b) An agency shall consider not using a dispute resolution proceeding if—  
     (1) a definitive or authoritative resolution of the matter is required for precedential value, and such a proceeding is 
not likely to be accepted generally as an authoritative precedent;  
     (2) the matter involves or may bear upon significant questions of Government policy that require additional 
procedures before a final resolution may be made, and such a proceeding would not likely serve to develop a 
recommended policy for the agency;  
     (3) maintaining established policies is of special importance, so that variations among individual decisions are not 
increased and such a proceeding would not likely reach consistent results among individual decisions;  
     (4) the matter significantly affects persons or organizations who are not parties to the proceeding;  
     (5) a full public record of the proceeding is important, and a dispute resolution proceeding cannot provide such a 
record; and  
     (6) the agency must maintain continuing jurisdiction over the matter with authority to alter the disposition of the 
matter in the light of changed circumstances, and a dispute resolution proceeding would interfere with the agency's 
fulfilling that requirement.  
(c) Alternative means of dispute resolution authorized under this subchapter are voluntary procedures which 
supplement rather than limit other available agency dispute resolution techniques.” Id.  
101 Id. §585. 
102 Id. §582. 




methods in tackling administrative disputes, and thus as a basis for determining the future direction 
of the practice. The sunset provision in Section 11, which specified a date on which the legislation 
would expire, testifies to the law’s experimental function.103 The most important function of the 
ADRA of 1990 was, in short, that it lay the groundwork for new developments and additional 
reforms in the administrative dispute resolution system.   
5.1.2 The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996 
The second legislative step in the field came a few years after the enactment of the 
experimental legislation of 1990. Legislators enacted the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act 
(ADRA) of 1996104 to achieve various aims. First, the enactment of this new legislation, following 
the successful implementation of ADR methods by many federal agencies, revealed the intention 
of both the legislature and the government to continue using these techniques to resolve disputes 
in the administrative sphere. The elimination of the sunset provision in the new Act evinces this 
intention.105 Second, legislators enacted the ADRA of 1996 to amend provisions in the 1990 
                                                 
103 For more information about sunset provisions and experimental legislation, see generally SOFIA RANCHORDÁS, 
CONSTITUTIONAL SUNSETS AND EXPERIMENTAL LEGISLATION: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2014). Section 11 of 
the ADRA of 1990 states: “The authority of agencies to use dispute resolution proceedings under this Act and the 
amendments made by this Act shall terminate on October 1, 1995, except that such authority shall continue in effect 
with respect to then pending proceedings which, in the judgment of the agencies that are parties to the dispute 
resolution proceedings, require such continuation, until such proceedings terminate.” ADRA of 1990, § 11. 
104 ADRA of 1996, Pub.L. No. 101-320 (codified at 5 USC 571, et seq.) [hereinafter, ADRA of 1996]. 
105 In this context, see H. Rept. 104-597 - ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION ACT OF 1996, available 
at:  https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/104th-congress/house-report/597/1 (last visited Sep 18, 2018). 
The report, for example, states the following: “The Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS), which 
was given responsibility under the Act to survey and facilitate its use, has reported that several ADR techniques 
have been promising. It indicated that partnering, for example, was responsible for a dramatic decline in the volume 
of contract claims and appeals experienced by the Army Corps of Engineers (from 1,079 claims in 1988 to 314 in 
1994, and from 742 appeals in 1991 to 365 in 1994). The Air Force successfully resolved over 100 Equal 
Employment Opportunity disputes through mediation in 1992 and 1993, saving more than $4 million in complaint 
processing costs. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Resolution Trust Corporation have reported that 
mediation of claims and disputes among failed financial institutions they control has resulted in savings of $13 
million in legal costs over three years for the FDIC and more than $115 million over four years for the RTC.” Id.; 
see generally Robin J. Evans, The administrative dispute resolution act of 1996: improving federal agency use of 
alternative dispute resolution processes,  ADM. LAW REV. 217–233 (1998); but see Lisa B. Bingham & Charles R. 
Wise, The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990: How do we evaluate its success?, 6 J. PUBLIC ADM. RES. 
THEORY 383–414 (1996). 




legislation, aiming to overcome its shortcomings and facilitate the effective and efficient 
achievement of its statutory objectives. 
The ADRA of 1996 permanently reauthorized the use of ADR in the executive branch.106 
It also contains several amendments that introduce major improvements to the Act’s main 
subjects.107 Amended areas in the 1996 legislation concern, for example, confidentiality, arbitral 
awards, and neutrals.108 The amended Act, for instance, “clarifies and enhances confidentiality 
protections,” “authorizes, for the first time, ‘true’ binding arbitration for all federal agencies,” 
“broadens the Act’s coverage,” and “encourages greater use of negotiated rulemaking.”109 
Legislators made these adjustments to support ADR and the recourse to its various methods by 
federal agencies; the protections the new Act grants to governmental bodies by enhancing the 
confidentiality of the dispute resolution process support this view. Charles L. Howard explains the 
amendment pertaining to the confidentiality provisions of the Act as follows: 
[T]he 1996 act added a new provision that provided that ADRA confidentiality 
trumped disclosure required by the [Freedom of Information Act] FOIA. … [the 
ADRA of 1996] provides the general rule that a neutral in a dispute resolution 
proceeding should not voluntarily disclose or be compelled to disclose any dispute 
resolution communication or any communication provided in confidence to the 
neutral unless certain conditions are met. … The inclusion of this high standard 
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specific dispute resolution mechanisms, like ombudsmen; (4) takes steps that should make it easier for agencies 
expeditiously to acquire the services of mediators and neutrals; (5) directs the president to find a new home in the 
federal government for some of the coordinating, consulting, and other functions that had been performed by the 
Administrative Conference of the United States before its elimination by Congress in October, 1995; (6) encourages 
greater use of negotiated rulemaking by promoting actions to simplify the procedures that agencies must follow in 
establishing the negotiation committees that craft the substance of proposed regulations.”) Id.  




underscores the importance of preserving the confidentiality of … ADR 
communications to the extent possible.110 
The establishment of a new governmental body (discussed below) tasked with enhancing ADR 
and encouraging its use among all federal agencies also exemplifies the 1996 Act’s support for 
ADR.111 
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ADRA of 1996 §3. 
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5.2 The Promoting Body: 
The ADRA of 1996 authorized the establishment or designation of a new agency or 
interagency committee to promote ADR in the administrative sector. The Act gives this promoting 
body authority over facilitating and encouraging federal agencies to use ADR.112 It also charges 
the body with creating new ways that allow governmental authorities to quickly and efficiently 
benefit from services provided by skilled neutrals.113 Legislators established the Interagency ADR 
Working Group in 1998 during the Act’s implementation to achieve the Act’s statutory objectives. 
The Working Group, led by the Attorney General, works closely with all concerned federal 
agencies to accomplish its obligations and to meet the objectives mentioned above.114 It plays a 
significant role in facilitating exchanges of data, visions, and ideas regarding ADR and its 
implementation between federal agencies.115 It has served since its establishment “as a resource 
for developing ADR programs and sharing information to support the use of ADR.”116 It promotes 
ADR by coordinating “multi-agency initiatives,” promoting “best practices and programs,” and 
diffusing “policy and guidance.”117 The Working Group performs these tasks through its various 
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departments, which include Workplace Conflict Management, Contracts and Procurement, 
Administrative Enforcement and Regulatory Process, and Litigation.118 It contains several 
subcommittees as well that specialize in various subjects such as Arbitration, Ethics, Collaborative 
Governance, and Environmental ADR.119 The Working Group provides federal agencies 
considerable assistance through its various departments by hosting regular meetings and seminars 
with federal agency officials to exchange knowledge and share experiences, best practices, and 
solutions regarding the implementation of ADR and related difficulties and concerns.120 It also 
organizes training sessions for governmental employees in charge of ADR and its implementation 
in their workplaces, aiming to ensure their development and enhance the quality of their work.121 
These functions highlight the important roles promoting bodies like the Working Group 
play in the institutionalization of ADR in administrative areas in any jurisdiction. The absence of 
such a body would clearly create a great vacuum whose negative impacts would eventually impede 
institutionalization efforts. Simply establishing a comparable body, however, will not ensure the 
accomplishment of statutory objectives; full recognition of their importance and support for their 
significant roles by the government must accompany the creation of such bodies. Governmental 




121 Id. The Working Group hosted “a kick-off meeting hosted by the Attorney General …” during its first year of 
operation. “More than one hundred high-level representatives from nearly sixty federal agencies attended this 
meeting.” Jeffrey M. Senger, Turning the Ship of State Symposium, J. DISPUTE RESOLUT. 79.  “Also present were 
the 20 top ADR experts within the federal government who would play a vital role in the activities of the Working 
Group. Many of these experts already had established successful dispute resolution programs at their own agencies, 
and the leadership of the attorney general provided them with the long-sought opportunity to make ADR a 
government-wide movement.” Peter R. Jr. - Steenland, The Government Federal Agencies Implementing Reno’s 
Vision for Dispute Resolution, DISPUTE RESOLUT. MAG. 23. The Working Group has also organized “more than 
fifty training sessions, meetings, and colloquia on all aspects of ADR” in which “more than five hundred 
representatives from across the government have been participating. Topics have included ‘Incentives for Federal 
Employees to Use ADR,’ ‘Finding Quality Neutrals,’ ‘Designing an ADR Training Program,’ ‘Dispute Systems 
Design,’ ‘Evaluation of ADR Programs and Outcomes,’ ‘Obtaining Resources for ADR Programs,’ ‘Overcoming 
Barriers to ADR,’ ‘Ethics, Confidentiality, and Conflicts of Interest,’ and ‘Conflict Assessment/Case Selection.’” 
Senger, supra note. 




funding is one crucial form of recognition that will enable such institutions to effectively carry out 
their tasks and aid in the promotion of ADR.  
5.3 Supervision and Evaluation Processes: 
The third component of the legal framework for the institutionalization of ADR in the U.S. 
administrative sector is supervision and evaluation. Legislators established processes to assess all 
efforts to institutionalize ADR in all concerned federal agencies and periodically measure and 
evaluate the effectiveness of the implemented methods and all programs designed for these 
purposes. The Interagency ADR Working Group is, in part, responsible for monitoring progress 
in these areas in the U.S. jurisdiction. This supervisory role gives the work of the Group a new 
dimension. The Working Group has submitted several reports to the U.S. president regarding the 
success of federal agencies in fulfilling their statutory obligations pertaining to the use of ADR in 
administrative dispute resolution. The president thus clearly plays a higher supervisory role in this 
process. The U.S. jurisdiction, in other words, features a two-stage supervision and review process 
regarding efforts to institutionalize ADR in the executive branch.    
5.3.1 The 2000 Report: 
The Interagency ADR Working Group submitted its first report to the president at the end 
of its first year of operation, explaining the progress it made through the year and the goals it had 
achieved.122 The 2000 Report confirmed the growing number of implemented ADR programs 
throughout the administrative sector.123  It also made clear that the Working Group had succeeded 
in developing good relationships with federal agencies and establishing open dialogue channels 
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among them to pursue its tasks successfully. The Report indicated that governmental bodies had 
used these channels to effectively enhance the use of ADR in administrative-related disputes.124 
The Working Group also outlined its future vision and established new objectives for the upcoming 
years in the 2000 Report. These objectives included offering more meetings and workshops to all 
federal agencies and their officials, focusing on working closely with all federal agencies to design 
new ADR programs or to develop currently implemented schemes to enhance their effectiveness, 
and finally deploying ADR experts and highly skilled specialists to offer guidance and assistance 
to federal agencies.125  
The Working Group’s accomplishments in its first year of operation thus proved 
reasonably satisfactory and efficient. The Group demonstrated the importance of its role and its 
competence and full readiness to fulfill its obligations. Its acceptance by federal agencies was also 
quite significant. Such acceptance—testified to by the integration and engagement of the agencies 
detailed in the report—was essential, helping to facilitate the success of the Working Group and 
expedite its pursuit of statutory goals and all other desired objectives.    
5.3.2 The 2007 Report 
The Working Group submitted another evaluation report to the president about ten years 
after the enactment of the ADRA of 1996. The Report for the President on the Use and Results of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Executive Branch of the Federal Government: Giving the 
American People Better Results and More Value126 confirmed the increasing acceptance and 
recognition of ADR and detailed the use of its techniques in many cases, including labor and 
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employment conflicts, where ADR had become “part of standard practice.”127 The 2007 Report 
also acknowledged the great progress that ADR had continued to make in other cases, including 
disputes related to claims against the government.128 It detailed developments in the use of ADR 
in federal agencies, confirmed several achievements and advantages of ADR in the administrative 
sphere such as “promoting a citizen-centered government, managing the costs of government, and 
supporting the strategic management of government resources,” and previewed the future use of 
ADR by addressing various problems and difficulties that arose during the report period and 
discussing potential development in these areas.129 The 2007 Report concluded with the following 
optimistic remark: “Today, ADR is an important part of our work, and tomorrow the promise of 
ADR will be an integral part of our government, business and society. …Tomorrow will bring 
ever-expanding uses of appropriate dispute resolution.”130 This statement sums up the Working 
Group’s positive evaluation of the use of ADR and the promising benefits of implementing ADR 
programs throughout the administrative sector, which the Group had observed since the enactment 
of the ADRA of 1996. 
This evaluation of the first decade following the enactment of the ADRA of 1996 produced 
one significant outcome. The Report provided evidence that federal agencies had achieved many 
of the Act’s statutory goals regarding the use of ADR and the implementation of ADR programs 
during this ten-year period. It also indicated, however, that many additional objectives remained 
to be met in subsequent years. The 2007 Report thus served as a reliable instrument for evaluating 
the effectiveness of this important piece of legislation.   









5.3.3 The 2016 Report 
The Working Group continued to work closely with all federal agencies during the ten 
years following the submission of the 2007 Report, monitoring the progress of the use of ADR in 
the executive branch over that period of time. It submitted an updated report titled, 2016 Report 
on Significant Developments in Federal Alternative Dispute Resolution131 in 2017. The 2016 
Report identified four new developments. First, it indicated that federal agencies had begun using 
ADR to prevent disputes rather than resolve them. This increasingly early application of ADR 
highlights the agencies’ growing recognition of the advantages, especially those related to cost and 
efficiency, of using ADR as early as possible. Second, the 2016 Report documented a dramatic 
expansion of ADR programs and the use of ADR methods in general within the administrative 
system during the period it covered. It also recognized that this expansion had made federal 
agencies unprecedentedly competent in resolving various administrative disputes.132 The 2016 
Report states: 
In addition to expanding the types of ADR processes used, agencies have 
expanded the application of ADR to cover broader ground. Agencies have 
expanded their use of ADR beyond specific disputes involving individually 
impacted parties and are incorporating ADR methods as tools for achieving their 
mission. Agencies are using a variety of consensual and collaborative processes to 
engage multiple and varied constituents in open dialog about policy and regulation 
using techniques such as focus groups, surveys and consensus building through 
stakeholder discussions.133 
 
Third, the Report highlighted a substantial increase in federal ombuds offices and in the variety of 
implemented ombuds programs. Finally, it indicated that the increasing use of technology had 
proved effective and useful in providing and supporting ADR within federal agencies.134 The 2016 
                                                 








Report concluded by emphasizing the great importance of ADR and the benefits of implementing 
ADR programs within administrative systems. It stated that the use of ADR in the administrative 
sector had increased the reactiveness, efficiency, collaboration, and transparency of government; 
improved the productivity and satisfaction of federal employees; and created an effective dispute 
resolution system. It asserted that these accomplishments undoubtedly boosted “the functioning 
and accessibility of government” and greatly benefitted the nation and society.”135 
The results of the three evaluation reports discussed above indicate that these reports 
functioned as an effective basis for development and further advancement. They documented the 
progress made by governmental bodies and the work these bodies completed to meet statutory 
goals. They also carefully evaluated the expansion of ADR in the administrative sector. The 
effectiveness of these reports highlights the critical importance of establishing supervision and 
evaluation processes in institutionalizing ADR in the administrative sector. These processes have 
produced neutral and trustworthy assessments during the past several decades in the U.S. 
jurisdiction, evaluating the effectiveness with which all federal agencies have fulfilled their 
statutory obligations. Achieving such encouraging results so efficiently, moreover, would have 
proved difficult without presidential supervision and the Working Group’s effective monitoring of 
the advancement of the dispute resolution system in federal agencies.     
6. Private Institutionalization of ADR: 
Parties can undertake ad hoc ADR processes (non-institutional ADR) or engage the 
services of specialized institutions that supervise dispute resolution (institutional ADR).136 Arbitral 
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institutions currently provide the most popular recognized form of institutional ADR.137 They offer 
professional forums and sophisticated platforms to which parties can resort to resolve their disputes 
through arbitration and other ADR means.138 The rules and procedures introduced and applied by 
these institution are widely recognized as workable, coherent, and examined.139 They are also 
recognized as effective in helping parties navigate their way toward reasonable outcomes.140  
Private arbitral institutions have three distinguishing characteristics:141 1) their 
permanence, which applies to both their existence and physical locations, and distinguishes such 
institutions from other impermanent ADR-related bodies, such as the appointed tribunals that 
conduct arbitration proceedings; 2) their competence in designing and implementing arbitration 
and other ADR rules (some institutions have developed their own arbitration and mediation rules, 
while others have implemented model rules like the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or the newly 
introduced Paris Arbitration Rules);142 and 3) their methods of service, including the selection of 
channels through which parties can select dispute resolution techniques, and the institutions’ 
supervision over dispute resolution processes until their resolution.143        
Institutional ADR has become increasingly popular and sought-after in the international 
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trade arena in recent decades. John-Tieder identifies several reasons for the reliance of 
international businesses on arbitral institutions to resolve business and commercial disputes: first, 
the use of “settled and often-tested arbitration rules;” second, the capability of such institutions to 
either appoint highly skilled arbitrators capable of efficiently conducting the dispute resolution 
process or at least provide the disputants a list of experienced neutrals to choose from; and, finally, 
the “long experience” and “proven integrity” of arbitral institutions in administering arbitration 
and other ADR processes.144      
6.1 Functions of Private Arbitral Institutions:  
The fact that service-providing ADR institutions such as arbitral institutions do not conduct 
dispute resolution processes themselves and therefore do not play any direct role in making final 
decisions regarding disputed matters warrants emphasis.145 The neutrals (e.g., the arbitrators or 
mediators) appointed by disputants in their agreements perform this function.146 ADR institutions, 
based on their implemented roles, will appoint neutrals on the parties’ behalves absent such 
agreements between the disputing parties.147 That does not mean, however, that arbitral institutions 
have limited or circumscribed roles. Arbitral institutions today contribute significantly to 
supporting and promoting ADR and ensuring the efficiency, effectiveness, and proper 
functionality of its various techniques.148 Such institutions, for example, manage and supervise the 
process of dispute resolution to help parties to effectively resolve their disputes. They do so by 
fostering and expediting the resolution-making process and by providing the parties with all the 
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assistance and support they need.149 They carry out other vital functions as well, providing several 
additional important services to the disputing parties. These services include: designing effective 
procedural rules for dispute resolution processes; enhancing capacities related to arbitration and 
other ADR methods and thereby encouraging the use of these methods; urging the modernization 
of current national and international laws related to the various ADR methods;150 contributing to 
soft-law considerably by drafting and laying out all necessary guidelines and ethical codes to 
ensure the success of the practice;151 and finally, raising public awareness, spreading knowledge, 
and enhancing education related to arbitration and other ADR methods, in theory and in actual 
practice, among natural persons, lawyers and non-lawyers alike, and all concerned legal entities.152 
Note that expansion and development have led some arbitral institutions to recently 
undertake new roles and functions. A subsequent section in this chapter will discuss the impact of 
some of these new roles.153 
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6.2 Distinguishing between Institutional and Non-institutional ADR:   
Institutional ADR differs qualitatively from ad hoc ADR. The advantages of ad hoc ADR 
include flexibility and cost-effectiveness,154 but most believe the advantages of institutional ADR 
outweigh these potential benefits.155 The latter has proved preferable, more convenient, and 
advantageous for international businesses for many reasons.156 Gary Born argues, for example, 
that “… many experienced international practitioners prefer the more structured, predictable 
character of institutional arbitration, at least in the absence of unusual circumstances arguing for 
an ad hoc approach.”157 This section aims to clarify the distinction between institutional and ad 
hoc ADR services by summarizing the benefits parties can acquire by resorting to institution-based 
ADR services. First, institutional ADR gives disputants access to multiple ADR techniques to 
resolve their disputes; the availability of the various ADR techniques in one place can save parties 
time and expedite the resolution process.158 Second, arbitral institutions ensure that specialized 
and impartial third parties administer all the ADR methods they offer; acquiring such benefits from 
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ad hoc ADR can be difficult, time-consuming, and costly compared to the services offered by the 
institutional-based service providers.159 Third, arbitral institutions tend to offer administrative 
services and support for ADR processes in general with professional employees who ensure the 
processes run efficiently, effectively, and in accordance with institutional rules.160 Fourth, 
institutional supervision over dispute resolution processes helps reduce, if not prevent, potential 
unethical behavior or misconduct by the impartial third parties involved in resolving disputes 
because institutions implement rigorous ethical codes.161 Fifth, one study shows the chances of 
enforcement for institutional ADR outcomes (e.g. arbitral awards), are higher than for the 
outcomes of ad hoc processes.162 The courts will, in other words, expedite and facilitate outcomes 
produced by well-known and respected arbitral institutions because the well-established practices 
of these institutions have earned them trust and recognition from traditional courts.163 This proves 
advantageous particularly for the enforcement of awards in less sophisticated jurisdictions known 
to be less hospitable or completely inhospitable to arbitration.164   
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6.3 Challenges and Concerns: 
Arbitral institutions have encountered numerous challenges and concerns as institutional 
arbitration has expanded. The following subsections provide examples of some of the issues 
encountered in the current international arbitration system, especially in institutional arbitration. 
6.3.1 The Evolving Competition among Arbitral Institutions 
The growing number of service providers and increasing global demand for institutional 
arbitration has generated significant competition among arbitral institutions in recent years. This 
increasing competition has led some institutions to take on more responsibilities and implement 
functions that have introduced new characteristic features to the profession.165 Some arbitral 
institutions have, for example, begun assuming new “public” roles that run counter to their 
traditionally private natures.166 These institutions have apparently taken on these roles without 
obtaining consent from their clients (the disputants).167 Many believe such steps have the potential 
to negatively impact the future of arbitral institution practices and that they will pose new 
challenges to growth in this area. Barbara Warwas describes these new developments as follows: 
This is in contrast with the principle of party autonomy and therefore may invite 
public criticism regarding the increasing functions of arbitration (and arbitral 
institutions). … not only have arbitral institutions developed new procedural 
functions that often limit party autonomy in traditional, commercial arbitration 
proceedings, but also, mostly due to the universalization and formalization of 
institutional arbitration rules, arbitral institutions have begun to adapt their rules to 
new types of disputes involving public entities or non-commercial parties by 
compromising the traditional commercial model of arbitration procedure. This, in 
turn, questions the traditional understanding of private institutional arbitration as a 
process of solely private dimension, hence limiting to the resolution of individual 
disputes with no impact on third parties. Notably, these changes have occurred with 
either express or tacit support from the broader arbitration community and/or public 
authorities such as policy-makers in the field of arbitration and legislators.168 
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Several new trends in current practices thus exemplify the new “public function” of arbitral 
institutions. First, the “universalization” and “formalization” of arbitration rules in response to 
increasing competition has narrowed the gap between arbitral and formal judicial processes.169 
Arbitral institutions have, for instance, begun demanding greater authority and expanded 
supervisory roles to support the interests of disputants by ensuring the enforcement of arbitral 
awards in the absence of parties’ consent. They have attempted this in a number of ways, including 
by widening interpretations of the term “administrative tasks” to encompass such 
responsibilities.170 This practice certainly endangers the fundamental principle of party autonomy. 
It also marks a major change in arbitration practice that, if continued, will impact arbitration in 
general and especially the capacity of arbitral institutions to serve as a trusted venues for resolving 
disputes among commercial parties.171 Second, the expansion of services itself has become another 
area of competition among arbitral institutions. Some institutions have, for example, recently 
attracted non-commercial public cases and disputes.172  
Competition among arbitral institutions has, in short, evolved over the past decades. It has 
led to the identification of new areas for competition and the recent introduction of elements 
beyond cost efficiency and expedited resolution processes.173 Understanding the causes of these 
recent shifts in arbitral institution practices is crucial. The new practices provide evidence that 
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these institutions may have begun to fall short of meeting the needs of commercial disputants, 
failing to offer and deliver the expected outstanding results in a cost-effective and timely 
manner.174 This diversification of services also indicates, however, that these institutions have 
started responding to increasing “public interest.” These institutions’ recent amendments to their 
rules and procedures reflect this objective.175 The “commercial function” of arbitral institutions 
has, consequently, decreased and the new “public function” has become a key element of the 
rivalries among them.176 
These developments have clearly generated new challenges for arbitral institutions. Such 
competition can, of course, have a positive impact on the growth of arbitral institutions. Arbitral 
institutions’ openness to new areas of expertise and business is not the core of the problem. It could 
actually serve as a sign of growth and expansion, which could lead to greater results in the future. 
It could, moreover, reshape the practices of these institutions in ways that contribute to the growth 
of ADR and to the promotion of its use in different types of disputes including those (e.g., public 
or administrative disputes) that have not experienced the levels of professionalism, efficiency, and 
impartiality arbitral institutions offer. This would bolster efforts to enhance access to justice and 
support the systems of justice in any jurisdiction. Commercial parties will also benefit from such 
developments since they regularly conduct business with public bodies and government entities. 
These changes could, in short, signal positive progress for arbitral institutions under two 
conditions: 1) if arbitral institutions manage to maintain balance between their offered services for 
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all their clients, of all types, and the quality and efficiency of the outcomes; and 2) if the new 
growth does not detract from other areas of practice by, for example, hampering the main functions 
of these institutions.  
The current competition among arbitral institutions, however, appears increasingly 
unhealthy, introducing significant risks that may negatively influence the future success of these 
institutions. These risks will increase if arbitral institutions remain fixated on besting their 
competitors as opposed to delivering the high quality services their clients expect and resolving 
disputes as efficiently as possible. The new competition-fueled arbitral practices will also have a 
wider impact on arbitration itself and its capacity as a trusted long-standing venue for resolving 
disputes, if these institutions continue to neglect the fundamental principles of arbitration. 
6.3.2 Governmental Intervention 
Many States have embraced arbitration and arbitral institutions to achieve economic 
benefits and expand international trade. These States restrict the supervisory roles of traditional 
courts over arbitration processes and arbitral awards, signaling their willingness to surrender some 
amount of sovereignty.177 Some States have, however, found new ways to reassert control over 
such processes. Many countries, like China for instance, have begun creating national arbitral 
institutions in their jurisdictions.178 These institutions are ostensibly private but the extensive 
support they receive from governments makes their private natures questionable.179  
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Government involvement in creating or supporting new arbitral institutions, though marred 
by potential pitfalls, may prove necessary in some circumstances.180 The need for such 
involvement becomes more apparent in the early stages of the establishment of new private 
institutions or in cases where extant institutions face difficulties due, for instance, to financial 
problems.181 The absence of other support channels and resources in such cases may necessitate 
governmental interference, but only until these institutions regain the confidence to carry on their 
functions independently, or until they have become financially independent.182 The fact that, in 
many jurisdictions, governmental interference and participation in such processes continues 
indefinitely or becomes permanent is a significant problem.183 Government intervention in some 
jurisdictions appears intended to help these institutions “run the whole course” instead of simply 
enabling them to “get on the horse.” 184  
Current government involvement in arbitration institutions and arbitral processes raises an 
important question: given the existence of traditional court systems, what motivates governments 
to establish “private” arbitral institutions in their jurisdictions? Various factors have contributed 
to this growing tendency. First, the elevated status and reputation of arbitral institutions as forums 
for international trade parties to resolve commercial disputes has made them a preferred alternative 
to court systems. This preference corresponds to the pressure governments feel to support 
economic growth. Second, countries seeking to bolster their positions in economic rankings by 
meeting certain criteria and satisfying conditions set by international organizations such as the 
World Bank, which tracks global indicators in this regard, has also driven government efforts to 
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support arbitration institutions. The Arbitrating and Mediating Disputes indicators, for instance, 
aim to evaluate alternative dispute resolution systems for commercial disputes (arbitration and 
other ADR methods), focusing specifically on the simplicity of said systems.185 The evaluation 
process covers all stages of disputes from the initial steps through the rendering of arbitral awards 
or settlements between the parties and the enforcement thereof.186 Evaluators use these indicators 
to assess around 100 jurisdictions, and investors rely heavily on these assessments when making 
decisions about future investments.187 Many countries therefore attempt to improve their ranking 
on these indicators to attract more international investors. Creating arbitral institutions is among 
the fastest and most effective ways for governments to improve their dispute resolution systems, 
enabling them to nominally meet the requirements of such indicators and, thus, improve their 
rankings. Third, governments also establish arbitral institutions and provide them with varying 
degrees of support to bolster their own interests and, in a wider sense, protect national interests.188 
The trend toward governmental intervention in arbitral institutions is increasing. A Beijing 
Arbitration Commission / Beijing International Arbitration Center (the BAC) study189 shows, for 
example, that in China less than 14 percent of the 80 surveyed institutions regard themselves as 
purely private bodies.190 The rest have acknowledged varying degrees of governmental 
interference.191 The establishment of such institutions also stemmed from “administrative needs” 
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and not efforts to meet commercial demand.192 The following remarks demonstrate the Chinese 
experience in this regard:  
[D]espite legislative attempts to respect institutional independence and restore 
the private nature of arbitration, their goal of achieving full independence of 
Chinese arbitration institutions at the national and at the local levels has not been 
achieved in reality. The difficulties come from government control and 
intervention …193 
   
This undoubtedly represents a challenge to arbitral institutions as the Chinese government could 
gradually strip away the initial commercial functions and competence of these institutions. The 
continued expansion of arbitral institution authority and power through state mechanisms as 
opposed to their own rules and procedures will deplete and weaken their commercial functions.194 
Arbitral institutions will, consequently, struggle to put food on the table, which will lead to 
expanded governmental intervention in the name of financial assistance and support.195 
Commercial parties will, in other words, look for new dispute resolution methods or alternate 
investment locations, once they recognize the potential impact of government involvement on the 
impartiality of these institutions. This constitutes a major challenge and threat not only to arbitral 
institutions, but also to the economies of the countries in which they operate.    
6.3.3 Liability in Institutional Arbitration  
Human error is inevitable—an assumed risk associated with any work done by human 
beings. Humans must therefore accept and pardon to a certain extent unintentional or minor 
mistakes resulting from simple human, or institutional, failures.196 Such failures, however, have 
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major repercussions in institutional arbitration systems.197 An increasing number of arbitral 
institution clients have begun suing the institutions and the arbitrators who conduct arbitration 
processes under their rules for liability.198 The parties who file such actions have varying 
motivations. One-time users of arbitral institution services have contributed to the growing number 
of liability cases against arbitral institutions, as one scholar explains:  
Today, given the increasingly aggressive tactics deployed by one-off users of 
international arbitration with no interest in the arbitral system beyond winning (or 
not losing) their case, there is clearly a growing problem with regard to the potential 
legal liability of an arbitral institution for its product, namely impartial arbitrators 
deciding a dispute with a valid award.199 
 
Actions brought by repeat users, mainly commercial parties, also highlight an enormous growing 
discontent among commercial disputants with many service providers and an increasing lack of 
trust between the two sides.200 The parties involved in institutional arbitration have begun 
questioning arbitral institutions’ abilities to effectively and efficiently perform their roles in 
dispute resolution processes.201 This trend has, unfortunately, steadily worsened recently;202 its 
potential impacts include the serious possibility that commercial parties will begin to have second 
thoughts about resolving their disputes institutionally. This development thus poses significant 
challenges regarding both one-time and repeat users for all arbitral institutions and the international 
arbitration system in general—challenges that require immediate attention before the damage 
becomes irreversible.203Arbitral institutions have sought to protect themselves against liability 
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actions by modifying their rules to include new provisions that grant them immunity from 
liability.204 
6.3.3.1 The French Experience     
The statuary framework in the French legal system offers meager protections to arbitral 
institutions.205 Arbitrators do not receive the same immunity as judges, but they enjoy more 
protection than arbitral institutions.206 The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) is a leading 
arbitral institution in the world today. It was, for many years, a party in numerous liability cases 
brought before French courts. It amended its rules to include a “liability exclusion” provision in 
1998. Article 34 of the 1998 International Chamber of Commerce rules states:  
Neither the arbitrators, nor the Court and its members, nor the ICC and its 
employees, nor the ICC National Committees shall be liable to any person for any 
act or omission in connection with the arbitration.207 
 
The broad drafting of this provision extends absolute immunity from any sort of liability not only 
to the ICC, but also to the arbitrators, the International Court of Arbitration, and all the individual 
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administrative workers and other staff and professionals of the two organizations for the services 
they provide or work they perform.  
The judiciary responded to this development in a somewhat expected way, however.208 The 
courts confirmed in many cases the liability of arbitral institutions, widening the scope of their 
liability in direct contrast to the extensive liability protections in the regulatory framework the ICC 
had established. A court held, for example, in the famous 2001 case Cubic v. ICC209 that the 
commitments and responsibilities created or established by contracts between parties prevent the 
exclusion of arbitral institution liability.210 The court in this case asserted that, although providing 
ideal arbitration hearings does not fall within the obligations of arbitral institution, the liability of 
such institutions stems from their commitment to ensuring the efficiency of arbitration and taking 
all the necessary measures to provide effective services.211 This ruling established the important 
notion that courts can hold arbitral institutions liable for any damage caused by their failures to 
responsibly administer arbitration and provide the best possible services in ways that serve their 
clients’ best interests. This ruling thus established a new legal framework for the liability of arbitral 
institutions.  
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Article 34 of the 1998 ICC rules remained the same until 2009 when the Paris Court of 
Appeals issues its ruling in SNF SAS v. ICC.212 The court found that despite the liability exclusions 
in Article 34 of the 1998 ICC rules, parties could bring court actions related to liability claims 
against the ICC regarding any breaches of contract or failures to fulfill contractual obligations.213 
The court, thus, ruled against the legality and legitimacy of Article 34 in the French legal system.214 
This ruling led the ICC to publish its revised rules in 2012215 in which Article 40 amended and 
replaced Article 34.216 The revised rules, first of all, changed the name of this provision from 
“Exclusion of Liability” to “Limitation of Liability.”217 They also changed the language of the 
provision slightly, adding the following phrase at the end: “except to the extent such limitation of 
liability is prohibited by applicable law.”218 Some perceive this addition as the remedy proposed 
by the ICC in the light of its ruling in the 2009 SNF case.219 The revision aims to eliminate 
exclusions, or limitations, of liability granted by the ICC rules deemed unlawful under the applied 
law. Professor V. Veeder questions the usefulness of the liability exclusions in the ICC rules in the 
first place as well as the effectiveness of this alteration, noting: 
There were, of course, a number of "I told you so's." But, "I told you" is never a 
solution. …Will this exclusion work any better than the old wording? Only time 
will tell. It will not be a benevolent arbitrator who will so decide, but a state court 
and not necessarily a court in France.220 
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The refusal of the judiciary to authorize any arbitration centers’ liability exclusions or 
limitations has its own advantages.221 This practice, on the one hand, sends the message to these 
institutions that the courts have supervisory authority over them as service providers since 
competent courts regularly scrutinize the services they deliver and the tasks they perform.222 The 
practice, on the other hand, has the potential to seriously impact both arbitral institutions and the 
international arbitration system in general. First, the courts did not hold the ICC liable in either the 
Cubic or SNF cases, but the practice still has the potential to reignite judicial hostility to arbitration, 
which ought be avoided and reversed. Reopening the door to such hostility will jeopardize 
arbitration and its effectiveness and efficiency. It will, moreover, potentially harm arbitration and 
the reputations of arbitration centers as reliable venues for resolving disputes. Such developments 
will undoubtedly occur aggressively and rapidly in jurisdictions known for their unfriendliness 
toward arbitration. The courts thus appear to hold the fate of arbitration in their hands and whether 
they support or undermine arbitral processes and awards will play a crucial role in the development 
of the practice. Second, the supervisory role of the courts over the arbitral institutions constitutes 
a major challenge to one of the most fundamental concepts upon which international arbitration 
has long relied. Court supervision can necessitate public disclosures of documents related to 
arbitral proceedings or court review of arbitral awards, which can lead to violations of the 
confidentiality of arbitration. Such supervisory measures run directly counter to the private nature 
of the international arbitration system and to the motives behind the growing demand for 
arbitration among businesses. 223 The Court of Appeals in Paris ordered the disclosure of classified 
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information and documents related to the arbitral proceedings and to the award-rendering process 
in the 2009 case, for example.224 The court ruling, moreover, directed unprecedented public 
criticism toward the ICC for its hesitation to submit the requested documents.225 “It was a bad 
omen.”226 The court eventually ruled in favor of the ICC, finding that it was not liable after 
reviewing the submitted confidential documents, but the breach of confidentiality was irrefutable. 
Recent developments in the international arbitration system have resulted in challenges to 
arbitral awards before traditional courts and lawsuits against arbitral institutions in their capacities 
as service providers. These trends highlight the increasing risk of liability these institutions face in 
performing their work. This applies to the employees and professionals in these institutions as 
well; they have become increasingly vulnerable to risks and exposure that lead to greater potential 
liability and increased chances that parties will bring liability cases against arbitral institutions. 
This will definitely affect the arbitration system in general and spread uncertainty and concerns 
about its competence and effectiveness in resolving disputes.  
These issues are sources of serious concern for the international arbitration system; 
identifying ways arbitral institutions can overcome them and forestall the snowball effect they 
could cause necessitates immediate attention and the collaborative effort of everyone involved or 
interested in the field of arbitration. Arbitral institutions, moreover, should take the lead in efforts 
to develop useful solutions, put them to the test, and review them periodically or as needed. Some 
have proposed liability insurance as a possible solution. Advocates of such an approach contend 
that, in many legal systems where the law grants little or no immunity to arbitrators and arbitral 
institutions, liability coverage and insurance are the most efficacious, if not the only, option for 
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protecting arbitrators and arbitral institutions from the increasing number of liability lawsuits.227 
Caution is warranted here, however, since the existence of such coverage and awareness thereof 
could yield rapid increases in liability actions against arbitral institutions.228 
Additional methods for controlling the liability of arbitral institutions and their 
professionals and mitigating associated risks do exist. Arbitral institutions should tackle this issue 
with multi-level approaches. First, they should begin to design and implement liability-avoidance 
programs. Such programs should pursue the following goals: 1) anticipating any potential liability 
risks and promptly reporting any identified issues to competent officials or departments to facilitate 
necessary measures in the earliest stage possible; 2) providing comprehensive assessments of the 
risk associated with each reported case; 3) offering recommendations regarding the mitigation of 
risks or losses in general until the resolution of the issues in question; and 4) monitoring and 
managing the risks and all potential liability cases as they advance, recede, or decline.  
The second means of minimizing the liability losses of arbitral institutions concerns the 
creation of litigation-avoidance systems in arbitral institutions. Arbitral institutions can achieve 
this by developing and implementing alternative dispute resolution programs exclusively designed 
for parties who appear likely to sue the institutions for liability. Arbitral institutions should address 
any disputes between them and arbitration parties, including those related to arbitration fees or 
administrative services, via settlement processes. They can accomplish this by either including 
ADR clauses in the institutional arbitration agreements signed with the parties prior to the 
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occurrence of any such dispute, or by making ADR processes available after such disputes arise 
and endeavoring via all possible means to obtain aggrieved parties’ consent to resolve the matters 
amicably. Offering such processes at no cost will increase the likelihood that parties will accept 
them. 
Resolving liability-related disputes internally will help arbitral institutions mitigate 
liability costs and other potential negative consequences; it will also benefit institutional arbitration 
parties by enabling them to maintain and protect the confidentiality of arbitrated cases and all 
related confidential documents from any possible public disclosure that might occur during 
litigation. Many parties, especially commercial businesses, prioritize and highly value the 
maintenance of confidentiality; it is, in fact, one of the most important reasons for the popularity 
of arbitration.  
Finally, arbitral institutions should expand their educational efforts in various areas. They 
should, for example, organize training sessions for arbitrators and their staff members and experts, 
and host conferences, forums, workshops, and seminars on the subjects of liability or arbitrators 
and arbitral institutions. They should design these efforts to spread knowledge and awareness of 
the importance of these issues and their development. Such educational initiatives would serve as 
great opportunities for arbitral institutions to share the information and knowledge they have 
gleaned from relevant experiences.  
7. Conclusion 
The institutionalization of ADR modernizes ADR by accomplishing several specific 
objectives. Institutionalization efforts seek to improve the effectiveness of ADR techniques and to 
promote its use in various fields. These efforts also aim to improve traditional justice systems and 




enhance access to justice. Many areas in any legal system can benefit from efforts to 
institutionalize ADR. The institutionalization of ADR has proven successful and effective in the 
public, administrative, and private spheres. Challenges remain, however, and institutionalization 
advocates must find ways to overcome them to achieve all desired outcomes. The problems that 
arise in the institutionalization process should not, however, dissuade institutionalization efforts; 
no jurisdiction should disregard or miss out on the promised opportunities of such progress. This 
chapter’s analysis indicates that many significant areas for development and growth remain open 
for exploration in the field of ADR in Saudi Arabia. Providing foreign investors a reliable, 
effective, and strong dispute resolution system is a significant step the country needs to consider 
in pursuing its goal of economic growth. The institutionalization of ADR will enhance the dispute 
resolution system and accelerate the achievement of the Kingdom’s aims. This chapter outlines 
the goals and improvements necessary to obtain the desired results and ensure effective 
implementation, and explains why and how the Kingdom should take the steps in question and 





CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 
 
1. Concluding Thoughts ....................................................................... 279 
2. Chapters Summary .......................................................................... 283 
2.1 Chapter One: ...............................................................................................283 
2.2 Chapter Two: ..............................................................................................283 
2.3 Chapter Three: ............................................................................................283 
2.4 Chapter Four: .............................................................................................284 
2.5 Chapter Five: ...............................................................................................285 
2.6 Chapter Six: .................................................................................................285 
2.7 Chapter Seven: ............................................................................................286 
3. Recommendations: ........................................................................... 286 
 
  




1. Concluding Thoughts 
Efforts have been underway since the announcement of the Saudi 2030 Vision to 
modernize the country and undertake reform that will contribute effectively in achieving the 
desired objectives of the Saudi vision. This dissertation provide a reform plan form a legal 
perspective for one vital area in the Saudi legal system. One of the aims of this dissertation is to 
support the efforts of achieving the goals for the vision 2030 especially the ones that concerning 
building a strong economy away from the reliance on oil revenues by inviting international 
businesses and merchants to invest in the country. One of the arguments this dissertation makes is 
that attracting foreign investment requires building a strong and clear dispute resolution that 
international investors can understand and rely on. This constitutes an indispensable need for many 
parties of international trade. From history to modern times, practice tells us that international trade 
parties tend to resort to means other than litigation in order to resolve their disputes.1 This is due 
to various reasons such as high cost, slowness of litigation or fear of uncertainty or biased decisions 
by the public system of justice in any jurisdiction.2 These concerns become greater when they deal 
with a foreign party or when it comes to resorting to a foreign legal system or laws to decide 
commercial disputes, no matter how sophisticated that system was. Traders have always preferred 
to use their own method of dispute resolution to decide such matters.3 This dissertation argues that 
if Saudi Arabia is heading toward opening its doors to foreign investments to seek economic in the 
post oil era then, there are two significant issues that needs to be taken into consecration in  this 
regard: 1- understanding “the fabric of international commerce and trade”4 and 2- establishing a 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Earl S Wolaver, The historical background of commercial arbitration, 83 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 
LAW REVIEW AND AMERICAN LAW REGISTER 132–146 (1934). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) 




strong legal protection to prevent any risk or damage to international investment that may 
discourage foreign investors from engaging in commercial activities in the country.5 Doing so will 
ensure achieving the desire results and benefits successfully. It illustrate and analyze that this what 
some of the leading jurisdictions in the world have realized decades ago when they recognized the 
importance of endorsing party autonomy and enforcing the parties agreement by which they freely 
agree upon the method they deem most appropriate for them to resolve any dispute when arise 
between them. In shows how the FAA in the U.S. for example, establishes and embodies a strong 
public policy favoring arbitration. Also it proves how the case law gives a full support to such 
policy and to the aims of the arbitration Act. Since the enactment of the FAA, the Supreme Court 
have always realized the significance of arbitration and its role in promoting economic growth and 
development in country by encouraging international trade in the country. Such judicial practice 
has been upheld through the history by the Supreme Court.6 The most recent opinion of the court 
in Henry Schein, Inc., v. Archer & White Sales, Inc.7 case gives a great evidence of such argument. 
The court decision in this case, which was delivered by Justice Kavanaugh states the following: 
“Just as a court may not decide a merits question that the parties have delegated to an arbitrator, a 
court may not decide an arbitrability question that the parties have delegated to an arbitrator.”8 By 
such decision the court continues to protect all the fundamental principles of modern arbitration 
and that, clearly, what makes the U.S.  a hospitable jurisdiction to arbitration. The same is also the 
                                                 
5 Id. 
6 See e.g. Id. ; The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), in this case the supreme court ruled: “We 
cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our 
laws, and resolved in our courts.” Id.; Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985); see generally 
THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION (5 ed. 2014). 
7 Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 586 U.S.  (2019) 
8 Id. 




case in the English jurisdiction as it has been illustrated and analyzed in Chapter 2 and 4 in this 
dissertation.9 
The aims of this dissertation have been to understand the reality of the current legal 
framework of ADR in Saudi Arabia, examine its performance, effectiveness and its appeal to 
foreign investors and parties of international trade. It stresses, as a result, the importance of creating 
a clear and effective ADR legal framework and the need for a major reforms in many relative 
areas. The suggested reform shall help the Saudi jurisdiction in overcoming many of the faced 
issues effecting the public system of justice and those that have been the reasons behind distancing 
the country from been considered as a hospitable jurisdiction to ADR means. Such reform, hence, 
aims to enhance the effectiveness of not only the traditional courts in the country, but the whole 
dispute resolution system in the country. 
The international experiences and practices as have been analyzed and illustrated in this 
dissertation tell us that ADR has been used recently for many purposes. Several jurisdictions have 
implemented ADR and support its use to: 1- enhance the performance, the effectiveness, and the 
accessibility of the traditional court system, 2- achieve great economic gains and growth through 
international trade and commerce. On this basis, the dissertation has emphasized the need for a 
clear, strong and effective dispute resolution in the Kingdom in order to create an attractive 
environment for foreign direct investments. This dispute resolution system, thus, should include 
the various alternative to litigation techniques such as arbitration mediation...etc. The dissertation, 
therefor, has provided a thorough examination to various critical issues such as the rent status of 
ADR in the Saudi legal system and the reasons behind classifying the Saudi jurisdiction as non-
hospitable to arbitration or other means of ADR. This dissertation, has provided a multilevel 
                                                 
9 Michael John Mustill, Arbitration: History and background, 6 J. INT’L ARB. 43 (1989). 




comparative analysis as follow: 1- it has investigated the origin, history, evolution of the dispute 
resolution system in the country compared to its modern position and current status, 2- another 
level of comparison has been introduced by analyzing the contemporary system to its root as can 
be found in the Islamic history. 3- The Saudi current law and practice has also been compared to 
some of the best practices and leading jurisdiction in order to critically evaluate the effectiveness 
of such system and propose the possible remedies to enhance its efficiency. 
The dissertation has, furthermore, proved that not only the use of ADR will be fruitful in 
creating an enabling atmosphere and environment for international foreign investors, but also the 
public system of justice in general will benefit from these efforts. The dissertation has explored 
and analyzed all the possible channels through which ADR means can be implemented and 
effectively used at the national level, either outside or within the court system. The dissertation 
has thoroughly investigated and proved that the efforts to modernize the ADR law and practice in 
the kingdom in order to match the international standards and the global practice can be achieved 
in accordance with both Islamic law and Saudi national laws. By doing so, the dissertation has 
emphasized that the Saudi jurisdiction will be able to find “a better way” through which it can 
build a strong dispute system that will have many benefits at the national level and will also help 
in achieving the economy objectives that the country seeks in the future. 
In the final analysis, the dissertation does not seek or intend to achieve any quick wins, but 
rather to help in building a national strategic long term plan that will benefit the country in the 
long run and to aid the efforts, from a legal perspective, that aim to accomplish many legitimate 
and valuable economic goals in years to come and to maintain the country’s gains. It provides a 
solid basis on which progress can be made and advanced in the field of ADR toward a clear and 
effective dispute resolution system in the kingdom.  




2. Chapters Summary 
2.1 Chapter One: 
This chapter sets the scene as it provides a brief background introduction followed by a 
clear description of the problem of the research. The aims and objectives of the research are also 
clearly stated in this chapter. Research questions are, then, given and finally the structure and 
organization of the dissertation is outlined.     
2.2 Chapter Two: 
This chapter studies the development of ADR in the contemporary legal system in Saudi 
Arabia. Along with explaining the history of the ADR in the country and its growth up to the 
present time, the chapter also explains the many stages through which ADR has evolved in the 
international practices and examines the recent progress of the concept of justice that has taken 
place in different parts of the world today. This is essential for the purpose of evaluating the 
efficiency of the ADR framework at the national level and finding the areas where reform and 
improvements are needed to increase the capacity of the ADR system in the country. It clarifies 
the movements of “Access to Justice” which have impacted the advancement of ADR in different 
parts of the world. It gives, furthermore, a background introduction to Islamic law, confers the 
concept of justice from an Islamic perspective and shows the origin of ADR in the Islamic practice. 
In sum, this chapter underlines the significance of use of ADR and the importance of such means 
for the purpose of improving the dispute resolution system in the country. 
2.3 Chapter Three: 
This chapter provides a thorough and critical analysis of arbitration in Saudi in terms of 
the law and the practice. It demonstrates the history of such institution in Saudi jurisdiction and 




provides a careful assessment of the current Law of Arbitration and compares it to the preceding 
laws. It also distinguish between tahkim and arbitration as globally practiced today. It, then, shows 
how the shift was gradually made in the Saudi legal system from tahkim to arbitration. It discusses 
in depth the reasons that distance the Saudi jurisdiction from being considered a hospitable to 
arbitration. This is followed by offering recommendations for the needed reforms. 
This chapter, moreover, provides an in depth analysis of the most recent enacted law of 
arbitration in the kingdom and highlights many potential problems that may occur in the practice. 
Finally, it underlines some significant and recent developments in the international practice of 
arbitration.     
2.4 Chapter Four: 
This chapter is titled: “Creating a strong enabling environment for arbitration: Learning 
from other legal systems.” It explores the history of arbitration in two leading jurisdictions; the 
U.K. and the U.S. It, then, draws valuable lessons both experiences in order to lead to a better 
understanding of such process and its principles in order to ensure the functionality and 
effectiveness of arbitration practice in the Saudi jurisdiction. The implementation of the identified 
key lessons will contribute to the improvement of the arbitration law and practice in the Saudi 
jurisdiction and enhance its effectiveness in the national level and will help to boost the country’s 
position at the international level in this regard. All of which will eventually aid the efforts of 
creating an enabling environment for arbitration in the kingdom and, hence, will impact the 
economic growth for the country and will lead to achieve many desired objectives. 




2.5 Chapter Five: 
This chapter is designated to the survey that was conducted to respond to the need for a 
clear picture of the reality of ADR instruction in Saudi Arabia. The survey in Chapter 2 was 
designed to accomplish that objective. It highlights many issues that are faced in this field and 
offers ways of improvements and reform that will contribute to the growth of ADR in Saudi 
jurisdiction. This chapter also provides a useful comparison between ADR instruction in Saudi 
Arabia and in the United States. It discusses the history of ADR instruction in the United States 
throughout the decades and derives useful lessons from this experience. This chapter, then, 
explains the survey and discusses and analyzes the findings. Chapter 2 emphasizes the need for 
additional studies and a bigger project in the subject of ADR instruction in the Saudi jurisdiction 
or concerning the legal education in the country in general in order to indicate the necessary reform 
in this area.   
2.6 Chapter Six:  
Another critical issue is presented and analyzed in this chapter. Institutionalization of ADR 
is proposed as a remedy and a modernizing step that is yet to be taken seriously by the Saudi legal 
system. This chapter has argued that the Saudi legal system has witnessed a slow and insufficient 
effort to institutionalize ADR means and, thus, it urges more serious efforts in this regard due to 
the success and the rising popularity of the institutionalized ADR worldwide. This chapter 
discusses, through analysis and comparison, several effective examples of institutionalization in 
some of the leading jurisdictions and experiences. It sets clearly what goals Saudi Arabia should 
pursue and how they can be achieved successfully. A comprehensive definition of the 
institutionalization of ADR is proposed in this chapter. This is followed by a thorough and critical 
analysis of ADR institutionalization in public, administrative and private sectors and offers several 




recommendations to overcome some of the outlined issues that are being faced by the international 
practice today. Chapter 2 shows that many areas of improvement and progress in this field is yet 
to be explored in the Saudi jurisdiction. It argues, moreover, that institutionalization of ADR can 
accelerate the reform steps that need to be taken in the Saudi legal system in order to provide a 
clear and effective dispute resolution system on which foreign investors can rely on and trust which 
will help the country greatly in accomplishing all its economic objectives. This chapter, in sum, 
underlines the aims and reform needed to achieve the desired outcomes and to ensure successful 
application. It clarifies, furthermore, why and how the Kingdom should take the identified 
measurements and what it should pursue or avoid.      
2.7 Chapter Seven:  
This chapter concludes the dissertation by summarizing the main arguments and 
summarizing the previous chapters. Finally, the analysis also leads to proposing several 
recommendations.   
3. Recommendations: 
In order to help in achieving the aims and objectives stated in this dissertation, several 
recommendations are proposed as follow:  
1- ADR should be promoted and supported and the use of its various techniques should 
be encouraged in all possible areas of application throughout the kingdom. Government 
and its all concerned executive bodies should, therefore, aim to find the best ways to 
promote ADR. They should, moreover, aim to spread awareness, knowledge and 
understanding regarding the effectiveness of ADR and the benefits of the resort to such 
means not only for resolving disputes, but also in reducing the possibilities of their 




occurrence.    
2- The legislative branch in the kingdom should take serious steps toward supporting 
ADR and the use of its various techniques by creating a clear statutory framework for 
ADR. This can be achieved through enacting a new law of ADR in the kingdom for 
that purpose. 
3- The proposed Law of ADR should declare its purposes, acknowledge the importance 
of ADR, and address its main potential benefits for all targeted individuals, groups or 
bodies. It should, furthermore, authorize the use of ADR, by traditional courts for 
example, define each of the different forms ADR, and distinguish between them. In 
this sense the main purpose of the proposed law should be to serve as a wide umbrella 
for an array of other new laws, each one of them deals with a specific form of ADR 
means, which are to be enacted in the future as needed. One of the advantages of having 
a clear statutory framework for ADR in the Saudi legal system is that it will decrease 
the judicial hostility towards ADR means and will reduce the wide exercise of judicial 
discretion in many cases, which will enhance the status of such ADR means as a result.  
4- The topic of ADR, its role and significance should be at the forefront of discussions at 
the legislative level in the kingdom. This will lead to exploring its effectiveness, 
examining the benefits of implementing ADR means, and determining all the possible 
ways to support their use at the national level. Deep and intense discussions among 
legislators will result in a strong drafting of the proposed law (in recommendation 
No.1) which will reflect the legislative intent in supporting ADR and will consequently 
lead to an effective implementation of the law.  




5- The dispute resolution system in the kingdom should be evaluated periodically to assess 
its efficiency and to determine all the needed reform or improvements to any area that 
requires attention. It is of a great significant, hence, to track the global progress in the 
field of ADR and the development of the concept of justice generally. This will be the 
tool by which the evaluation process of the national system will be easier, faster and 
more effective.  This will, consequently, help to improve the practice of ADR in the 
country. 
6- The use of ADR should be included in any future reform initiatives concerning the 
justice system in the kingdom. In this sense, ADR should not be seen as alternatives 
only, they must be regarded as the ideal and appropriate remedy. This requires a 
genuine belief in the capacity of ADR and its effectiveness in resolving various types 
of disputes by everyone involves in the decision-making process and in the process of 
dispute resolution.  
7- Resolving various contemporary disputes in an efficient way requires recognition and 
full understanding of the global meaning of ADR. The Saudi legal system, therefore, 
should take into consideration what the new global order necessitates when it comes to 
implementing ADR in the Saudi jurisdiction.  
8- The recent legislative modernization wave that took place in the Saudi jurisdiction and 
signified by the enactment of the 2012 Arbitration Law should have a great positive 
impact that should improve the practice accordingly. The practice of arbitration must 
match the recently enacted law and resembles and uphold its modern provisions. The 
new law of arbitration, hence, should shape and guide the modern practice of arbitration 
in the Saudi jurisdiction. 




9- Judges should show their full support to the law and to the arbitral proceedings. They 
should, moreover, show their willingness to enforce arbitration agreements and arbitral 
awards, limit their supervision role, and reduce the judicial oversight over arbitration.  
10- One effective way through which the judicial support can be achieved is through 
constantly engaging Saudi judges in intensive training programs in the subject of 
international arbitration. Such programs should help the judges to understand the reality 
of the arbitration process and all its fundamental principles. Supporting the arbitral 
process and upholding the international principles of arbitration by the bench are some 
examples of what could be resulting from effective training courses directed to the 
judges. 
11- Several legal issues have been identified in Chapter 3 of this dissertation pertaining the 
2012 law of arbitration such as the statutory time limits, legal vacuums, and 
overlapping and conflicting laws …etc. These issues warrant attention and correction 
as it could affect the efficiency and the implementation of the law. The proposed 
approach to overcome these issues calls for a revised law based on a careful study of 
all the identified legal problems as well as other issues which might have stemmed 
from practice since the law’s entry into force. The revised law should, moreover, 
contain all the provisions that govern arbitration which are found in other law such as 
the law of enforcement. This is necessary to enhance the unity of the provisions of the 
law of arbitration and will result in improving the clarity of the arbitration legal 
framework in the kingdom.   
12-  In order for the kingdom to boost its position internationally in the field of arbitration 
and to be considered as an arbitration friendly jurisdiction, the principles of arbitration, 




arbitral process and awards should be enforced and supported to the fullest possible 
extent by the law and the practice. The international practice of arbitration offers many 
lessons in this regard which are to be learned, and then implemented or avoid. Learning 
from the experiences of the leading jurisdictions in the world will definitely yield 
significant consequences that will contribute to the development of this field in the 
kingdom. 
13- The development of arbitration law and practice is a continuous process. Many issues 
pertaining the international practice of arbitration and other forms of ADR have been 
identified throughout the dissertation. Legal remedies have been also proposed and 
examined. The Saudi jurisdiction is not immune to these issues. That is to say, there 
should be an initiative that calls for a collaborative efforts from legislative and 
executive authorities in the kingdom to examine all the contemporary problems, trends 
and issues that surrounds the international practice of arbitration today, evaluate the 
efficiency of all proposed solutions, and then implement the mechanisms that prove 
most appropriate. This approach will encourage, allow, and ensure the continuation of 
the progress in this field and of the development of practice in the Saudi jurisdiction. It 
may also lead to new reforms. 
14-  The enactment and the implementation of modern laws alone should not be considered 
as enough if the goal was to build a hospitable jurisdiction for arbitration and other 
ADR means. Creating an enabling environment for ADR will help greatly in achieving 
the desired economic growth in the country. This requires further efforts and steps in 
order to create such enabling and appealing environment. Efforts should aim, for 
example, to increase the awareness of the necessity such methods, and build the 




confidence in their efficiency in resolving disputes among legislators, judges, lawyers, 
practitioners and disputants. This will ensure a wide acceptance of all the principles 
contained in the implemented laws which come in line with the international principles 
and practice. Such acceptance will result in full enforcement of these laws, and strong 
support for ADR processes at all levels. 
15- Building a clear, effective and strong dispute resolution system in the kingdom can be 
achieved through a robust and effective legal education in the country. The analysis in 
this dissertation has led to conclude that reform is due in law schools in the kingdom 
as schools have failed so far to give ADR the attention it deserve. The weak status of 
ADR instruction in these schools has stemmed from the lack of genuine recognition 
among them and academics of the significance of ADR in dispute resolution in 
contemporary legal practice. Since there has been an enormous success in other 
jurisdictions in this area, law schools should invest heavily in the field of ADR and 
instruction thereof. The reform needed in the curricula should, therefore, reflect the 
necessity of teaching this subject to the future judges and lawyers to arm them with the 
skills they need to be successful in the legal practice. It should also aim at reforming 
the curricula in order to abolish ADR illiteracy. 
16- Law schools should take serious steps to overcome the apparent lack of faculty 
specialized in ADR. Offering fully funded study-abroad scholarships for faculty 
members in the subject of ADR is one way through which law schools can reduce and 
solve the ADR faculty shortage. 
17- Another area in which law schools can contribute to the growth and development of 
ADR in the country is through hosting and organizing ADR conferences and 




workshops periodically. They should also encourage the participation of the faculty, 
experts and specialists, and students. This will eventually result in generating huge 
cumulative educational benefits over time. 
18- Law school should also play a major role in monitoring the growth and development 
of ADR in the kingdom by encouraging and funding research in this subject. 
Supporting the academic and scholarly contribution is essential in order to track and 
assess the progress made in the field and to ensure the accomplishment of the statutory 
objectives (after they are set) and to propose recommendations for reform if deemed 
necessary.   
19- The survey conducted by the author of this dissertation and all its findings and results, 
as illustrated and analyzed in Chapter 5, should be carefully reviewed by all law schools 
in the country, any person or body who is, or will be, in charge of reforming legal 
education in the kingdom, and any person or body who is interested in the development 
or the reform of the legal education.  
20- One of the aims of the conducted survey was to inspire future works on the subject of 
ADR instruction in the kingdom. Two prospect works are recommended in this regard; 
first, the structure of the survey and the questions should be conducted every five to ten 
years in order to measure and evaluate the change and progress made in this area. 
Secondly, the survey should be reassessed, redesigned, or updated as needed to better 
achieve the desired results in the future.  
21- This work should also motivate additional efforts to comprehensively examine the 
reality of the legal education and law schools in the kingdom to provide a thorough 
assessment of this subject and propose the appropriate reform. This is necessary to 




narrow the gap between education and practice or work, and to improve the profession 
as a whole in the kingdom. The proposed work can be accomplished by the law schools 
or the ministry of education in coordination with the relative bodies such as the 
Ministry of Justice and the Saudi Bar Association.    
22- Indeed, institutionalization of ADR in the kingdom is an area that needs additional 
attention and improvement. The efforts toward institutionalizing ADR in the Saudi 
jurisdiction are believed to be slow and insufficient compared to many other legal 
systems in the world where institutionalization has proved successful. The success of 
such approach, hence, necessitates collaborative efforts among legislators, executives, 
judiciary and lawyers to identify all the possible channels through which 
institutionalization can be implemented and adopted in the public, administrative or 
private sectors.    
23- Administrative and financial supports by the government should be granted and 
provided for efforts aims to institutionalize ADR especially in the public and 
administrative areas to achieve the desired successful result.  A similar support may be 
deemed necessary for some of the private bodies at the early stage of their 
establishment.  
24- Court-Annexed ADR pilots and programs should be funded and supported by the 
government to promote the use of ADR within the court system. Courts should be, 
hence, authorized and encouraged to design and adopt such programs. The designed 
pilots should be, furthermore, put under trial for a sufficient period of time. The 
completion of such period should be followed by a thorough evaluation based on which 




the efficiency of the implemented programs and court performance should be measured 
and recommendations to improve the practice should be offered. 
25- To better achieve the best results from implementing court-annexed ADR programs 
within the public system of justice in the kingdom, the Ministry of Justice and the 
Supreme Council of Magistracy, each according to their purview, should establish a 
supervisory body for the following purposes: 1- To assist courts in designing effective 
ADR programs. 2- To monitor, plan, coordinate and oversee the implementation 
process of the applied ADR programs and schemes. 3- To provide the needed training 
and support for the judges, court experts and staff involved in the process. 4- To 
recognize and endorse the best practices among courts.     
26-  Private arbitration or ADR bodies (service providers and non-service providers) 
should receive the recognition and support they need to perform their tasks and achieve 
their objectives. The government, therefore, should provide all means of recognition, 
for example by requiring lawyers and practitioners to complete certain accreditation 
requirements as set by one of the established private entities. This will certainly boost 
their authority and will also reflect the government’s confidence in their work, by 
which their role will be effectively enforced. 
27- Leading arbitral institutions in the world such as the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) and the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) should be 
encouraged to set up a Saudi-based offices. Taking such step will promote and foster 
international trade and commerce in the country and will attract international investors 
to invest in the kingdom as parties of international commerce have strong belief in the 
efficiency of these institutions. Doing so will, furthermore, facilitate and accelerate the 




accomplishment of the desired economic objectives and will contribute to the growth 
of the country’s economy. Learning from the experiences of other jurisdictions in the 
region in this matter, such as the United Arab Emirates and Singapore, is of utmost 
importance as it can greatly help in making this step a success.       
28- The observation and analyzation of the contemporary international practice and trends 
regarding the institutionalization of ADR and the practice of some of the leading 
arbitral institutions yield many valuable lessons pertaining several challenges and 
concerns that are encountered today by the international arbitration system as well as 
other forms of ADR. 
29-  Several concerns and challenges have been addressed and analyzed in Chapter 6 of 
this dissertation. Solutions have also been proposed. The results of the analysis 
included therein should, hence, serve as a useful guide for any future work or study in 
this field and should be considered as the basis for any progress toward 
institutionalizing ADR in the private sphere.   
30- Enhancing the justice system in any jurisdiction by promoting ADR and its use requires 
collaboration between governments and entities committed to promoting ADR and its 
continued development. Such collaboration will indeed yield significant 
consequences—better results in a shorter time. All concerning bodies could benefit 
from carefully examining all the identified risks in this dissertation as this will save 
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 كم عدد الساعات الدراسية لمقررات القانون التخصصية في الخطة الدراسية لمرحلة البكالوريوس؟  (1
 
 
 المنازعات بصفة عامة ضمن تلك المقررات التخصصية؟هل يتم تدريس أي من الوسائل البديلة لفض  (2
 ال    □نعم       □
  
 ( فقط. 14، 13، 12، 11(إذا كانت اإلجابة بـ )ال(: فضال اإلجابة مباشرة على األسئلة رقم 
 ( فقط.  11، 10، 9، 8، 7، 6، 5، 4، 3إذا كانت اإلجابة بـ )نعم(: فضال اإلجابة على األسئلة رقم )
 
 ريس الوسائل البديلة لفض المنازعات من خالل:هل يتم تد (3




أم تخصيص أكثر من مقرر دراسي لهذا الغرض؟ مثال: مقرر التحكيم، مقرر الوساطة ... الخ، يرجى في هذه الحالة  □ (ب









 في أي سنة بدأ تدريس هذه المقررات لديكم؟ (4
 
  
 هل يتم تدريسها على هيئة:               )يمكن اختيار أكثر من إجابة( (5
 .محاضرات أكاديمية □ (أ
 حلقات نقاش دراسية. □ (ب
 محاور تفاعلية: تدريبات عملية، قضايا افتراضية. □ (ج
 جميع ما سبق. □ (د
 
 هل تدّرس هذه المقررات من قبل أعضاء هيئة تدريس متخصصين في الوسائل البديلة لتسوية المنازعات أو أي من مجاالتها؟ (6
 ال    □نعم       □
 
 التدريس الموكل إليهم تدريس أي من هذه المقررات:  إذا كانت اإلجابة بـ )نعم(: هل أعضاء هيئة (7
 مواطنون سعوديون. □ (أ











 ( من هذا االستبيان؟ 3لسؤال رقم )هل يتم تدريس التحكيم ضمن أي من المقررات المذكورة في ا (9
 ال    □نعم       □
 
 إذا كانت اإلجابة بـ )نعم(:  (10
 هل يدّرس التحكيم بشكل عام؟ أو □ (أ
يتم تدريس أكثر من مقرر متخصص عن التحكيم؟ مثال: التحكيم التجاري، التحكيم في القضايا المدنية، التحكيم   □ (ب




هل تقومون بتنظيم مؤتمرات، ندوات، حلقات نقاش، أو ورش عمل متخصصة عن الوسائل البديلة لتسوية المنازعات والدعوة  (11
 لحضورها والمشاركة فيها؟ 
 ال    □نعم       □
 
 كأحد المقررات التخصصية لديكم:      ما هو السبب في عدم تدريس أي من الوسائل البديلة لفض المنازعات  (12
 )يمكن اختيار أكثر من إجابة(                                         
 ندرة المتخصصين من األكاديميين المؤهلين في هذا المجال. □ (أ
 عدم حاجة سوق العمل في الوقت الراهن. □ (ب
 إعطاء األولوية لمقررات أخرى أكثر أهمية. □ (ج
 لساعات األكاديمية للمقررات التخصصية المعتمدة للحصول على المؤهل.محدودية عدد ا □ (د
 عدم الحاجة إلى تدريس هذه المقررات حالياً. □ (ه




 هل سيتم إضافة الوسائل البديلة أو أي من فروعها للخطة الدراسية المعتمد لديكم في السنوات القريبة القادمة؟ (13
    ال □نعم       □
 













15) How many total credit hours are allocated for each specialized areas of law in the Study 
Plan for the Bachelor of laws? 
 
16) Do any of these specialized courses cover ADR methods generally? 
□        YES         □ NO 
If NO, please answer the following questions (11, 12, 13 and 14) only. 
If YES, please answer the following questions (3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11) only. 
 
17) Is ADR taught in/as: 




e) □ Multiple separate courses? E.g. an arbitration course, a meditation course … etc. If 
so, please specify the title of each offered course and its credit hours. 
 







18) When did your school begin teaching such course(s)? 
 
 
19) Are ADR course(s) taught as:   (more than one answer is possible) 
e) □ Formal academic lectures? 
f) □ Seminars? 
g) □ Interactive discussions: practical training and simulations? 
h) □ All the above? 
20) Are the lecturers assigned to teach ADR course(s) specialized in ADR or in a specific 
area of the field? 
        □        YES         □ NO 
21) If YES, are they: 
c) □ Saudi citizens? 
d) □ Non-Saudis? 




23) Is arbitration offered in any of the courses mentioned in question No. (3) of this survey? 
□        YES         □ NO 
24)  If so: 
c) □ Is arbitration taught as a general subject? Or 
d) □ Is it taught in specialized courses on different subject areas of arbitration? E.g. 
commercial arbitration, arbitration in civil cases, labor arbitration …etc. Please specify 
these courses and their credit hours. 
 
 
25) Does your school organize conferences, seminars, discussion groups or specialized 
workshops in ADR and invite speakers and participants and take part in them? 




26) Why does your school not offer a specialized course(s) in ADR? (More than one answer 
is possible) 
g) □ The paucity of specialized academics in the field. 
h) □ The absence of labor market demand at present. 
i) □ We give priority to more important courses. 
j) □ Limited credit hours assigned for specialized courses required to complete the degree. 
k) □ We currently see no need to teach such courses. 
l) □ Other, please specify. 
 
 
27) Will ADR or any of its subject areas be added to your bachelor’s degree plan of study in 
the upcoming years? 
     □ YES         □ NO 
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